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Abstract
Quantum key distribution allows two parties connected by a quantum
channel to establish a secret key that is unknown to any unauthorized
third party. The secrecy of this key is based on the laws of quantum
physics. For security, however, it is crucial that the honest parties are
able to control their physical devices accurately and completely. The goal
of device-independent quantum key distribution is to remove this require-
ment and base security only on the (observable) behaviour of the devices,
i.e., the probabilities of the measurement results given the choice of meas-
urement.
In this thesis, we study two approaches to achieve device-independent
quantum key distribution: in the first approach, the adversary can distrib-
ute any system to the honest parties that cannot be used to communicate
between the three of them, i.e., it must be non-signalling. This constraint
is strictly weaker than the ones imposed by quantum physics, i.e., the ad-
versary is strictly stronger. Security can then be concluded only based on
the observed correlations. In the second approach, we limit the adversary
to strategies which can be implemented using quantum physics. More
precisely, we demand that the behaviour of the system shared between
the honest parties and the adversary can be obtained by measuring some
kind of entangled quantum state. Security is then based on the laws of
quantum physics, but it does not rely on the exact details of the physical
systems and devices used to create the observed correlations. In partic-
ular, it is independent of the dimension of the Hilbert space describing
them.
For both approaches, we show how device-independent quantum key
distribution can be achieved when imposing an additional condition. In
v
the non-signalling case this additional requirement is that communica-
tion by means of the quantum system is impossible between all subsys-
tems, while, in the quantum case, we demand that measurements on
different subsystems must commute. We give a generic security proof
for device-independent quantum key distribution in these cases and ap-
ply it to an explicit quantum key distribution protocol, thus proving its
security. We also show that, without any additional such requirement
there exist means of non-signalling adversaries to attack several systems
jointly. Some extra constraints are, hence, necessary for efficient device-
independent secrecy.
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Zusammenfassung
Quanten-Schlu¨sselverteilung erlaubt zwei durch einen Quantenkanal ver-
bundenen Parteien einen Schlu¨ssel zu erzeugen, der vor jeder unberech-
tigten Drittpartei geheim ist. Die Sicherheit dieses Schlu¨ssels basiert auf
den Gesetzen der Quantenphysik. Sie kann aber nur garantiert werden,
wenn die ehrlichen Parteien die physikalischen Apparate genau und voll-
sta¨ndig kontrollieren ko¨nnen. Das Ziel gera¨teunabha¨ngiger Quanten-
Schlu¨sselverteilung ist, diese Bedingung zu lockern, und die Sicherheit
nur auf das (testbare) Verhalten der Apparate zu basieren, genauer ge-
sagt, auf die Wahrscheinlichkeiten vonMessresultaten, gegeben die Wahl
einer bestimmten Messung.
In dieser Arbeit betrachten wir zwei mo¨gliche Vorgehensweisen um gera¨-
teunabha¨ngige Quanten-Schlu¨sselverteilung zu erreichen: in der ersten
kann der Gegner den ehrlichen Parteien jede beliebige Art von Syste-
men zukommen lassen, die nicht zur Kommunikation verwendet werden
kann. Diese Bedingung ist strikte schwa¨cher als diejenigen, die durch die
Quantenphysik vorgegeben sind, der tolerierte Gegner ist also sta¨rkerer.
Sicherheit wird in dieses Fall nur von den beobachteten Korrelationen her-
geleitet. In der zweiten Vorgehensweise beschra¨nken wir die mo¨glichen
Strategien des Gegners auf solche, die durch Quantensysteme implemen-
tiert werden ko¨nnen. Genauer gesagt verlangen wir, dass das System der
ehrlichen Parteien und des Gegners durch das Messen eines verschra¨nk-
ten Quantenzustandes erzeugt werden kann. Sicherheit beruht in diesem
Fall auf den Gesetzen der Quantenphysik, ist aber unabha¨ngig von den
Details der physikalischen Systemen und der Apparate, mit Hilfe derer
die Korrelationen zustande kamen. Insbesondere ist die Dimension des
Hilbertraumes, der die Systeme beschreibt, beliebig.
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Fu¨r beide Vorgehensweisen zeigen wir, wie gera¨teunabha¨ngige Quanten-
Schlu¨sselverteilung erreicht werden kann, falls noch eine weitere Bedin-
gung eingehalten wird: fu¨r den Fall, wo die Systeme nicht zur Kommu-
nikation gebraucht werden ko¨nnen, entspricht diese der Vorgabe, dass
Kommunikation auch zwischen Teilsystemen unmo¨glich ist; wa¨hrend im
quantenmechanischen Fall Messungen auf verschiedenen Teilsystemen
kommutieren mu¨ssen. Wir geben in beiden Fa¨llen einen allgemeinen Si-
cherheitsbeweis fu¨r gera¨teunabha¨ngige Quanten-Schlu¨sselverteilung
und wenden diesen auf ein konkretes Protokoll an, von dem wir zeigen,
dass es auch unter diesen schwachen Annahmen sicher ist. Wir zeigen
weiter, dass ohne eine solche zusa¨tzliche Bedingung gute Strategien exis-
tieren, mit denen ein Gegner, der nur durch die Unmo¨glichkeit von Kom-
munikation beschra¨nkt ist, mehrere Systeme gemeinsam attackieren kann.
Weitere Einschra¨nkungen sind deshalb im Allgemeinen notwendig fu¨r ef-
fiziente gera¨teunabha¨ngige Sicherheit.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Quantum Key Distribution
Key agreement is a protocol among two parties, Alice and Bob, to pro-
duce local strings such that, ideally, both strings are equal and no ad-
versary can get any information about this string by eavesdropping the
protocol. This task can only be realized based on certain assumptions
(such as assuming that computing power [DH76, RSA83] or memory
[Mau90] of the adversary are bounded) or the availability of resources
(such as noisy channels [CK78]). Wiesner [Wie83] observed that a quan-
tum channel can serve as such a resource in context of various crypto-
graphic tasks. The reason is that a quantum channel obeys the uncer-
tainty principle of quantum mechanics, which states that there exist cer-
tain properties of quantum mechanical systems that cannot be known
(exactly) simultaneously and that measuring one of them necessarily dis-
turbs the other. Wiesner [Wie83] proposes a scheme for sending two
messages ‘either but not both of which may be received’1 and a way of
making ‘money that is physically impossible to counterfeit’. The idea
of basing security on the laws of quantum physics was further developed
and combined with ideas from public-key cryptography by Bennett,
Brassard, Breidbart, and Wiesner [BBBW82] and finally made into a key-
1It later turned out that, unfortunately, the laws of quantum mechanics alone are not
enough to achieve this functionality, called oblivious transfer [Lo97, May97, LC97].
1
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distribution scheme by Bennett and Brassard [BB84].
Roughly, the BB84 key-distribution scheme [BB84] works as follows (see
Figure 1.1): Alice and Bob are connected by an (insecure) quantum chan-
nel and a public but authenticated classical channel.2 Alice encodes a bit
by sending a photon that is polarized in the direction of either of two
basis states. However, she chooses not only the value of the encoded bit
at random, but also the encoding is done in either the horizontal or di-
agonal basis.3 Bob receives the photon, chooses one of the two bases at
random and measures the polarization of the photon in this basis. They
repeat this process several times, each time taking note of the basis and
the encoded bit, or measurement result, respectively. Later, Alice uses the
classical authenticated channel to tell Bob which basis she used to encode
the bit. If Bob measured in the ‘wrong’ (i.e., other) basis, he obtained a
random bit uncorrelated with what Alice sent. They discard exactly these
bits. Wherever Bob measured in the same basis Alice used for the encod-
ing, he should have received exactly the bit Alice had sent. Alice and
Bob randomly select some of the bits and check this. If Bob received the
correct bits, they use the remaining bits as a key.
Why is this secure? Assume that Eve intercepts the quantum channel
between Alice and Bob and measures the photon. Since she does not
know the basis in which the bit was encoded, with probability 1/2, she
measures in the wrong basis, in which case Bob’s bit will be random even
when he measures in the same basis Alice used for the encoding. These
‘errors’ introduced by an eavesdropper will (with high probability) be no-
ticed by Alice and Bob when they check their results and they will abort
the protocol.
Of course, however, Eve does not need to measure the photon going
through the quantum channel, but she can do amore sophisticated attack.
For example, she can entangle a systemwith the photon, store it, and delay
her measurement until after Alice and Bob have revealed the basis used
for the encoding. Indeed, it took several years until it was shown that
the scheme remains secure in this case and a full security proof against
2An authenticated channel can be built from an insecure classical channel using a short
key [Sti91, GN93]. To account for the need of this initial key, quantum key distribution is
sometimes called key expansion.
3Instead of photons, Alice could also use another two-level quantum system and for
the encoding another set of two mutually unbiased bases, i.e., two bases where measuring a
basis-state of one basis in the other basis gives a random outcome.
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γ
{ 01 , }01 { , }
basis
bit
useful
+ + × + × ×
1 0 0 0 1 1
✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
basis
result
useful
× + × + + ×
0 0 1 0 1 1
✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
same basis, different bit→ eavesdropper
Figure 1.1: The [BB84] quantum key-distribution protocol.
the most general attacks was made [May01, LC99, BBB+06, SP00, ILM01].
A further difficulty is that a physical implementation of the protocol will
never be perfect and always contains noise. It is, therefore, necessary to
allow for noisy channels and unreliable detectors in order to establish a
key. It was also realized that the possibility of Eve delaying her measure-
ment until the key is actually used in an application could pose a serious
problem. The definition of secrecy of a key needs to be made carefully
to hold in this situation [KRBM07]. Meanwhile, these issues have been
considered in the security proofs and it can be shown that quantum key
distribution remains secure despite of them [Ren05].
Some years after Bennett and Brassard, Ekert [Eke91] proposed a quan-
tum key distribution protocol the security of which is based on a different
property of quantum physics: the monogamy of entanglement. In fact,
two quantum systems which are strongly entangled (correlated) can at
most be weakly entangled with a third system [Ter04]. The idea of Ekert’s
protocol is the following (see Figure 1.2): Alice prepares two photons4 in
an entangled quantum state, more precisely the singlet state, i.e., |Ψ−〉 =
4The original protocol [Eke91] uses spin-(1/2) particles. For simplicity, we stick with the
formulation in terms of photons.
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(|01〉 − |10〉)/√2. She sends one of the two particles to Bob. They both
measure their particle in a basis chosen at random. Alice chooses from
a basis rotated by an angle of 0, π/8, or π/4, Bob chooses from π/8, π/4,
and 3π/8. She takes her outcome to be the measurement result, while he
outputs the opposite of the measurement result. Note that the probability
that Alice and Bob obtain the same outcome is cos2 αwhen they measure
in bases mutually enclosing an angle of α, i.e., for 0 they obtain perfectly
correlated outcomes and for π/2 they obtain perfectly anti-correlated out-
comes. After all measurements are completed, they compare their res-
ults over the public authenticated channel and estimate the correlation
of their outcomes given they measured in each possible combination of
bases. They add the correlations for the bases pairs (0, π/8), (π/4, π/8)
and (π/4, 3π/8) (where the first angle is associated with Alice and the
secondwith Bob) and subtract the correlation of the bases (0, 3π/8). When
this value is 2
√
2, they continue, otherwise they abort.5 If they do not
abort, they take exactly those outcomes as key where they measured in
the same direction. The security of the protocol is based on the fact that
a value of 2
√
2 can only be reached by the singlet state and because this
state is pure, the eavesdropper’s system cannot be correlated with it.
At first it seemed that Ekert’s protocol relying on the monogamy of en-
tanglement and Bennett and Brassard’s protocol based on the uncertainty
principle could be brought in a similar form [BBM92]. In both cases, the
only property necessary for security seemed to be the fact that when Alice
and Bob use bases pointing in the same direction, they obtain perfectly
correlated outcomes. Indeed, a key distribution scheme of the type pre-
pare and measure as the one of Bennett and Brassard, can usually be for-
mulated in terms of an entanglement-based protocol, as the one of Ekert,
by considering as state the superposition of the random choice of basis
and encoded bit on Alice’s side with the state corresponding to this ran-
dom choice on Bob’s side, i.e., the state |Ψ〉 =∑r√P (r) |r〉 ⊗ |φr〉, where
r is the random value and |φr〉 the state that is sent conditioned on r
(see [Ren05] for a more detailed explanation). Alice then measures (in the
computational basis) to obtain the random value r, while Bob does the
same as in the original protocol.
However, after a more detailed investigation, it turned out that Ekert’s
protocol had an advantage over the BB84 protocol. Namely, in Ekert’s pro-
5Note that this test corresponds to testing the value of the Bell inequality given in Sec-
tion 2.6.1.
1.2. The Need for Device-Independence 5
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)
γγ
{ , , } { ,, }
basis
result
test/key
+ + × + + ×
1 0 0 0 1 1
t t k t k t
basis
result
test/key
+ × × + + +
0 0 0 0 1 1
t t k t k t
Figure 1.2: Ekert’s quantum key distribution protocol [Eke91]. The
marked bits form the key.
tocol the key bits do not have any associated ‘element of reality’
[Eke91]. This implies that the eavesdropper ‘is in the hopeless position
of trying to intercept non-existent information’ [BBM92]. This property
can be very useful to overcome attacks taking advantage of flaws in the
physical implementation and to create a key distribution protocol with
untrusted devices, as we will explain below.
1.2 The Need for Device-Independence
It had been discovered that quantum key-distribution protocols are vul-
nerable to imperfections in the physical implementation in a way that
an adversary could easily manipulate the apparatus such that the key-
distribution scheme becomes completely insecure.
Imagine, for example, that in the BB84 protocol, several photons are sent
fromAlice to Bob [BLMS00, Lu¨t00]. Eve could easily attack this system by
storing some of the photons in a memory. Later, she can measure it in the
basis announced by Alice and know the encoded bit with certainty. The
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scheme, therefore, crucially relies on the source to emit single photons to
be secure. In practice, on the other hand, the photons are usually emitted
by a laser with a Poissonian photon-number distribution and these are
neither theoretically nor practically a single-photon source.
As a second possible way to attack the system, imagine that the devices
encoding the bit and measuring the photon are faulty: Instead of encod-
ing and measuring in two different bases chosen at random, they always
use the same basis. The eavesdropper can measure the photon in this
basis without disturbing it. She can learn the bit perfectly, but will remain
completely unnoticed by Alice and Bob.
The BB84 scheme is particularly vulnerable to the problem that the bit or
basis might not only be encoded in the photon, but additionally in other
carriers. This problem was already noticed when the BB84 protocol was
implemented for the very first time [BBB+92]: The devices responsible for
the choice of the polarization angle made a loud noise and this noise was
different depending on the angle, such that the scheme could only reach
security against a completely deaf eavesdropper [Bra05].
In fact, in the security analysis of quantum key distribution, the dimen-
sion of the systems, i.e., their Hilbert spaces, always enters into the cal-
culations, both in the estimation of the entropy the adversary has about
the raw key, as well as in the reduction of coherent to collective attacks
(de Finetti theorem) [Ren05]. These security proofs, therefore, only hold
when the dimension of the system is known, which cannot be assumed
if the adversary can tamper with the devices. For the security proof of
quantum key distribution, it is, therefore, assumed that the devices are
trustworthy and work exactly as specified.
This shows that even though quantum key distribution is often claimed to
be unconditionally secure (meaning that it does not rely on computational
hardness assumptions) it actually does make certain assumptions. The
first of these assumptions — always present in key agreement — is, that
Alice and Bob have secure laboratories. If the eavesdropper can look over
Alice’s shoulder when she is typing the key into her computer to use it
for encryption, or if the physical device contains a transmitter sending all
raw data to Eve, it is clear that no security is possible.6 This assumption is
crucial and cannot be removed. Even though it might seem clear that such
6In classical cryptography it has recently been investigated how to construct encryption
schemes which are robust against (partial) leakage of the key [DHLAW10, BKKV10].
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attacks need to be prevented somehow, this might not always be trivial in
practice. There are examples of successful attacks where critical informa-
tion about the key has been read from the screen via reflections [BDU08],
from acoustic disk noise [ST04], protocol response time [Koc96, Ber05] or
from the electromagnetic waves emitted by the screen [Kuh03]. In quan-
tum key distribution, information about the raw key could be inferred
from timing information exchanged over the public authenticated chan-
nel [LLK07]. Alice and Bob, therefore, need to shield their laboratories
securely.
A further assumption usually present in quantum key distribution is that
Alice and Bob have complete control over their physical devices (i.e., only
the quantum channel is corrupted) and know their exact and complete spe-
cification. For example, if the device is supposed to emit a single photon
with an encoded bit, it cannot emit another particle where this bit is also
encoded. We have argued above that a failure of this assumption can
directly lead to possible attacks on the quantum key-distribution scheme.
These attacks are not only theoretical constructions, but can be implemen-
ted in practice and used to break even commercially available quantum
key-distribution schemes [Mak09].
Additionally, Alice and Bob need to be able to toss coins, i.e., have local
trusted sources of randomness. In particular, it is important that they
can choose their measurement bases at random and independent from
the eavesdropper, and that they can choose random samples to test their
systems. It is clear that if the eavesdropper could know beforehand, or
even choose, the randomness used for either of these two processes, it
would be easy to attack successfully.7
Finally, it is normally assumed that Alice and Bob are able to do clas-
sical computation (perfectly). For example, they need to be able to calcu-
late the statistics of their measurement outcomes. In the case of the BB84
protocol this corresponds to counting correctly the number of bits which
were incorrectly received by Bob when measuring in the same basis. This
is crucial to estimate the error rate and to abort in case the eavesdropper
intercepted too many messages. The classical post-processing of Alice’s
and Bob’s data is usually also assumed to be error-free.
The goal of device-independent quantum key distribution is to reduce the
7If Alice and Bob can build quantum devices, they can, of course use quantum physics
to build a random number generator.
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above assumptions to a minimum, in particular, to remove all assump-
tions about the exact working of the physical devices.8 The devices could
then even be manufactured by the adversary. Ideally, the security should
only rely on testable features of the devices, for example, the statistics
of their behaviour. The honest parties would then only need to trust
their ability to do classical calculations (to compute the statistics) and the
shielding of their laboratories.
1.3 Possible Approaches
Mayers and Yao [MY98] noted that in the context of device-independent
key distribution, entanglement-based protocols have a major advantage
compared to prepare-and-measure protocols. They propose a source with
an additional testing device — taking purely classical inputs and outputs
— such that these classical inputs and outputs can be used to test whether
the source is suitable for quantum key distribution. They call this a self-
checking source. They noted that there exist certain correlations of the
measurement results of quantum states which can only be achieved by a
state equivalent to the singlet state. In particular, the correlations used in
the entanglement-based protocol (Figure 1.2) to test for entanglement are
of this type. Security follows because the singlet state necessarily needs
to be independent of any state the eavesdropper might have. The ar-
gument of Mayers and Yao was made robust against noise [MMMO06]
and extended to self-checking of circuits and other devices. In [ABG+07],
a device-independent quantum key-distribution protocol secure against
collective9 attackswas given. Under a plausible, but unproven conjecture,
this protocol can even be made secure against the most general attacks if
the measurement devices are memoryless [McK10].
The idea used in the security proof of these device-independent schemes
is that, for binary outcomes, the Hilbert space is in some sense equivalent
to the Hilbert space of qubits. It is then sufficient to restrict to the case of
qubits in the security analysis, which means that eavesdropping can be
8We will not consider the case where Alice and Bob do not trust their random number
generator, but assume that they can toss random coins. For a proposal how to build device-
independent sources of randomness starting from a small random seed, see [Col06].
9In a collective attack each of the systems is attacked independently and individually,
but a joint measurement can be performed on Eve’s system in the end.
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detected using a Bell test. If this test gives a value close to 2
√
2 (for the
case of the CHSH inequality, see Section 2.6.1), the state must also be close
to the singlet state (potentially embedded into higher dimensions). The
realization of these key-agreement protocols are, therefore, very similar
to an entanglement-based protocol.
Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [BHK05] observed that the correlations obtained
from measuring an entangled quantum system can be used to prove the
security of key distribution based on the non-existence of hidden vari-
ables describing this physical system. In fact, Bell [Bel64] had shown
that it is not possible to describe the correlations obtained from measure-
ments on certain entangled quantum states in a way that each of the meas-
urements has a well-defined pre-determined outcome. Barrett, Hardy,
and Kent show that there exist certain quantum correlations such that
the measurement outcomes even need to be completely random before the
measurement is actually carried out. This property can be used to show
that the measurement outcomes need to be completely independent of
any information the eavesdropper can possibly hold.
Note that the scheme Barrett, Hardy, and Kent propose uses quantum
physics to create these (observable) correlations. However, the security
is based only on the requirement that no information can be exchanged
between the three parties via the system and it is, therefore, independ-
ent of quantum physics. The scheme they propose works as follows (see
Figure 1.3). Alice and Bobmeasure n singlet states using one out ofN pos-
sible bases on a circle (where the N th basis corresponds to a π/2 rotation
compared to the 0th basis). Bob inverts his outcome bit. They announce
the measurement bases over the public authenticated channel and keep
only the results for which they have measured in the same or in neigh-
bouring bases modulo N (i.e., where they either had a very small angle
between the measurement directions or an angle of almost π/2). From
the remaining measurements, they uncover all but one result. They check
whether all the results where they measured almost in the same direction
were equal and all the results where they measured in almost orthogonal
direction were different. If this is not the case, they abort. If they did
not abort, they take the remaining measurement outcome as key bit (with
Bob inverting the value in case theymeasured at almost π/2). The scheme
works becausemeasuring a quantum system gives a higher probability of
passing the test than what could be achieved by classical shared random-
ness.
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1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)
γγ
{ . . .
0
pi
2N
2pi
2N
(N−1)pi
2N
} { . . .
0
pi
2N
2pi
2N
(N−1)pi
2N
}
basis
result
useful
1 N -3 0 5 N -1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
basis
result
useful
0 N N -1 0 N -2 2
1 0 0 0 1 1
✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Figure 1.3: The protocol of Barrett, Hardy, and Kent. Alice and Bob
choose a number i at random from {0, . . . , N−1} and measure the singlet
in a basis turned by an angle iπ/2N . The marked bit is the key.
The scheme proposed by Barrett, Hardy, and Kent is secure against the
most general attacks. However, it only works if the quantum system and
the measurement are perfectly noiseless, as otherwise the scheme will
abort. Furthermore, its security is at most directly proportional to the
number of systems used, which implies that it only reaches a zero key
rate. The reason for this is that the measurement outcomes are directly
used as part of the key (without doing privacy amplification).
One proposition to overcome this problem is to use an entanglement-
based scheme as given in Figure 1.2. Indeed, it can be shown that the
outputs of such a system are also partially secret against non-signalling
eavesdroppers. This system corresponds, in fact, to the case N = 2 in the
scheme of Barrett, Hardy, and Kent. The idea is to use several of these
partially secure bits to create a highly secure bit using privacy amplifica-
tion, i.e., by applying a function to them. Of course, when Alice’s and
Bob’s measurements enclose a certain angle, they will, in general, not ob-
tain highly correlated outcomes and they will also need to do information
reconciliation to correct the errors in their raw keys. Such classical post-
1.4. Outline and Main Results 11
processing does indeed work, if the eavesdropper’s attacks are restricted
to individual attacks [AGM06, AMP06, SGB+06], i.e., the eavesdropper is
assumed to attack and measure each system independently. For general
attacks, privacy amplification against non-signalling adversaries is, how-
ever, only possible if additional non-signalling conditions are imposed
between the subsystems [Mas09, HRW10, HRW08].
The implementation of these protocols then works again along similar
lines as an entanglement-based protocol.
1.4 Outline and Main Results
In this thesis, we study both approaches to device-independent quantum
key distribution, using the whole of quantum physics and using only
the impossibility of signalling via the physical devices (non-signalling
principle). Below, we give an outline of the thesis with an overview of
the main results. We include an informal description of the ‘proof idea’
and point to the locations where the formal statements and proofs can be
found.
Preliminaries
In the next chapter, we establish the notation and review the techniques
we will use. The basics of probability theory are explained in Section 2.1
and the notion of (computational) efficiency in Section 2.2. We will show
security based on random systems and by comparing our system to an
ideal system. This approach and what it means for a key to be secure
is explained in Section 2.3. As a tool, we will use convex optimization
in the security analysis, which we review in Section 2.4. We then intro-
duce the basic laws of quantum physics (Section 2.5). In Section 2.6, we
study which systems can be realized using different resources, in particu-
lar shared randomness (Section 2.6.1), quantummechanics (Section 2.6.2),
and general non-signalling theories (Section 2.6.3).
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Key distribution secure against non-signalling adversaries
In Chapter 3, we study key agreement in the presence of adversaries only
limited by the non-signalling condition. This means that the adversary
can interact with the physical system in an arbitrary way as long as this
interaction does not imply communication between the different subsys-
tems. Even though this non-signalling condition might be inspired by
quantum mechanics, this approach does not require the validity of quan-
tum mechanics for the security proof. The systems are implemented by
quantum physics (i.e., we think that such systems exist, because quantum
mechanics predicts them), but for the security analysis this is completely
irrelevant. Security is based only on the observed correlations.
Main results: We show that for any type of partial non-signalling se-
crecy, privacy amplification against a non-signalling adversaries is pos-
sible using a deterministic privacy amplification function (the XOR) if the
non-signalling condition holds between all subsystems. This insight leads
to a device-independent key-distribution scheme which is efficient in
terms of classical and quantum communication.
Informal proof sketch: Assume Alice and Bob share some kind of phys-
ical system. They can choose a measurement and obtain a result. We
model this abstractly as a non-signalling system PXY |UV (see the left-
hand side of Figure 1.4) taking inputs and giving outputs. The attack a
non-signalling adversary can make on such a system corresponds exactly
to the choice of a convex decomposition (input) and obtaining one of the
elements (output) (see Lemmas 3.1, p. 66, and 3.2, p. 67).
PXY |UV = pz0 · P
z0
XY |UV
non-signalling
+pz1 · P
z1
XY |UV
non-signalling
+ · · ·
Figure 1.4: By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, an attack of the eavesdropper corres-
ponds to a choice of convex decomposition. Her outcome is an element
in the convex decomposition.
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The question how much Eve can know about Alice’s output bit X , there-
fore, corresponds to finding the best convex decomposition of Alice’s and
Bob’s system, such that, given Z , Eve can guess X .
Since the conditions on a non-signalling system are linear, we can char-
acterize this quantity by a linear program (see Lemma 3.9, p. 77), i.e., an
optimization problem of the form
PRIMAL
max : bT · x
s. t. A · x ≤ c
where x is a vector, A contains, amongst others, the non-signalling condi-
tions and c contains the probabilities PXY |UV of the marginal system as
seen by Alice and Bob. The maximal distance from uniform of X , from
a non-signalling adversary’s point of view, is bTx∗/2, where x∗ is the op-
timal solution of this linear program.
As an example, consider a system with binary inputs and outputs such
that Pr[X ⊕ Y = U · V ] = 1 − ε.10 In this case, the distance from uniform
of Alice’s output bit X is at most 2ε, i.e., the more non-local the system is,
the more secret is the output bit.
Alternatively to the primal form, we can consider the dual form of the
linear program, given by
DUAL
min : cT · λ
s. t. AT · λ = b
λ ≥ 0 .
Any dual feasible λ gives an upper bound on the primal value (bTx ≤
cTλ) and, therefore, on Eve’s knowledge about the bit. The dual value
is of the form cTλ, where c contains the marginal probabilities, and it,
therefore, corresponds to an event defined by the inputs and outputs of
Alice’s and Bob’s system. This implies that Alice and Bob can ‘read’ the
secrecy of the bit from the behaviour of their system (Lemma 3.10, p. 80).
10Note that this corresponds to the Bell test performed in [Eke91]. A value ofB in the Bell
test — the maximum quantum value being 2
√
2— corresponds to 1− ε = 1/2 + B/8, see
Section 2.6.1.
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In the above example of a system with binary inputs and outputs, there
exists a λ (the optimal one) such that cTλ/2 = 2Pr[X ⊕ Y 6= U · V ] = 2ε
(see Example 12, p. 81).
Now consider the case where Alice and Bob share n copies of a bipartite
non-signalling system. This can be seen as a (2n)-party non-signalling
system, where the non-signalling condition must hold between all sub-
systems. Our main insight, stated in Lemma 3.12, p. 83, is that a system
is (2n)-party non-signalling if and only if it fulfils A⊗nx = 0, where A are
the conditions a bipartite non-signalling system must fulfil.
We can then show that the security of the XOR of several (partially secure)
bits Xi can be calculated by the linear program (in its dual form)
DUAL
min : cTn · λn
s. t. (A⊗n)T · λn = b⊗n
λn ≥ 0 ,
i.e., it is the ‘tensor product’ of the individual linear programs. This im-
plies that for any λ which is feasible for a single system, λn = λ
⊗n is
feasible for n systems (Lemma 3.13, p. 84) and this gives an upper bound
on the distance from uniform. When the n bipartite marginal systems
behave independently, i.e., they are of the form c⊗n this gives an upper
bound on Eve’s knowledge of (cTλ)n/2, and the (2n)-party system is as
secure as if Eve had attacked each of the partial systems individually. In
our example, the maximal distance from uniform of the XOR of n bits is
(4ε)n/2. The general statement for systems which do not necessarily have
product form is given in Theorem 3.1, p. 85.
The insight that the XOR can be used to create a highly secure bit can
be used to construct a key-agreement scheme where the key bits and the
error-correction information are formed by the XOR of random subsets of
the physical bitsXi. Such a scheme is analysed in Section 3.5. An explicit
protocol, implementable roughly as the one in Figure 1.2, is shown to be
secure against a non-signalling adversary in Section 3.6.
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Key distribution secure against quantum adversaries
We then turn to the analysis of device-independent key agreement secure
against quantum adversaries in Chapter 4. In this scenario, all systems
have to be implemented by quantum physics, but we do not make any
assumptions on how they are implemented (Hilbert space dimension, etc.).
The reason to consider this scenario is that a non-signalling adversary is
stronger than (realistically) necessary, which gives lower key rates.
The difficulties arising in device-independent key agreement in the pres-
ence of quantum adversaries are different from the ones in the non-sig-
nalling case. In the non-signalling case, the difficulty was privacy ampli-
fication, i.e., to show that an adversary cannot attack the key bit created
from several bits significantly better than when each of these bits is at-
tacked individually. On the other hand, it is already known that a highly
secure string can be created from a partially secure one by privacy ampli-
fication [RK05] even when the adversary can hold quantum information.
The crucial question in this case is therefore, to determine the secrecy con-
tained in the initial string. This secrecy is quantified by the min-entropy,
which in turn directly relates to the probability with which the adversary
can guess the value of the string correctly. This will, therefore, be the
quantity we are interested in bounding.
Main results: We show how the probability that an adversary can guess
the output of a quantum system can be calculated using a semi-definite
program. We then show that the guessing probability of the outputs of
several quantum systems, where measurements on different subsystems
commute, follows a product theorem, in the sense that the probability to
guess the whole string correctly is the product of the guessing probabil-
ity of each subsystem. Using this property, we can construct a device-
independent key-agreement scheme secure against the most general at-
tacks by a quantum adversary.
Informal proof sketch: Conceptually, our approach is similar to the one
in the case of non-signalling adversaries. We will also show that the con-
ditions several quantum systems must fulfil are the tensor product of the
conditions of the individual systems.
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Alice and Bob share a quantum system characterized by a probability
distribution PXY |UV . An adversary trying to guess Alice’s string X can
choose a measurement on her part of the system and obtain a measure-
ment result. What measurement she performs can, of course, depend
on additional information. Any measurement induces a convex decom-
position of Alice’s and Bob’s system, where each element needs to be a
quantum system, i.e., Eve’s possibilities are given by Figure 1.5.
PXY |UV = pz0 · P
z0
XY |UV
quantum
+pz1 · P
z1
XY |UV
quantum
+ · · ·
Figure 1.5: A quantum adversary’s possibilities to attack a system (see
Lemma 4.1, p. 106). The choice of measurement induces a convex decom-
position of Alice’s and Bob’s system.
Finding the maximal guessing probability, therefore, corresponds to the
optimization problemof finding the sum of quantum systemswith a fixed
marginal system of Alice and Bob that gives the best value, as stated in
Lemma 4.3, p. 110.
We then use a semi-definite criterion that any quantum system must ful-
fil [NPA07], more precisely, a sequence of semi-definite criteria which
can approximate the set of quantum systems arbitrarily well [DLTW08,
NPA08]. Using this sequence as condition on the elements of the convex
decomposition, we can bound the guessing probability by a semi-definite
program (Lemma 4.4, p. 112), i.e., an optimization problem of the form
PRIMAL
max : bT · x
s. t. A · x = c
x  0 ,
where ‘ 0’ means that the matrix corresponding to x must be positive-
semi-definite. The matrix A contains the condition that the measurement
operators on different parts of the system commute, that all measure-
ment operators are orthogonal projectors, and that the operators associ-
ated with the same measurement sum up to the identity. The vector c
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contains the marginal system of Alice and Bob. We can then write the
probability that Eve correctly guesses Alice’s value as Pguess ≤ bTx∗.
The dual of the above semi-definite program is of the form
DUAL
min : cT · λ
s. t. AT · λ  b
and any dual feasible solution gives an upper bound on the possible
guessing probability of a quantum adversary in terms of the probabilities
describing the system shared between Alice and Bob.
Strictly speaking, the vector c above contains certain entries which can be
calculated knowing the state and measurements of Alice and Bob, but
which do not correspond to an observable quantity. The above semi-
definite program can, therefore, be used to calculate security in the device-
dependent scenario. To obtain the device-independent scenario, we modify
the program to optimize additionally over all the unknown entries which
are compatible with the observable behaviour of the system (i.e., the prob-
abilities PXY |UV ). This is done in Section 4.3.2.
Our main technical insight is that a (2n)-party quantum system (where
the quantum state is arbitrary but measurements act on a specific sub-
system) must necessarily fulfil the conditions A⊗n characterized by the
tensor product of the conditions associated with a bipartite system (Lem-
ma 4.9, p. 122). This implies that the dual of the semi-definite program
calculating the guessing probability of the output of n systems is of the
form (Lemma 4.10, p. 123)
DUAL
min : cTn · λn
s. t. (A⊗n)T · λn  b⊗n .
Since b  0, using a criterion from [MS07], this implies that for any λ that
is feasible for a single system, λ⊗n is feasible for n systems, as stated in
Lemma 4.11 p. 124.
If the n marginal systems are independent (i.e., cn = c
⊗n), this implies
that the probability that Eve correctly guesses the value of Alice’s string
is the product of the probabilities that she guesses each output correctly.
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More precisely, if the guessing probability of an individual system is
bounded by Pguess ≤ cTλ, then for n systems it is bounded by the product
Pguess n ≤ (cTλ)n. In terms of the min-entropy this means that the min-
entropy of n systems is n times the min-entropy of the individual systems.
The general statement for arbitrary marginals is given in Theorem 4.3,
p. 124.
Using this insight, it is possible to create a secure key agreement scheme.
We first consider the case where the n bipartite marginal systems behave
independently (Section 4.5) before considering the general case in Sec-
tion 4.6. Finally in Section 4.7, we give a protocol similar to [Eke91] and
analyse its security in the device-independent scenario with commuting
measurements.
Necessity of non-signalling condition
In the last chapter (Chapter 5) we study the question whether an addi-
tional non-signalling condition between the subsystems is necessary. The
setup we consider is the one where Alice and Bob share n systems such
that Pr[Xi⊕Yi = Ui ·Vi] = 1− ε (andXi and Yi are uniform random bits).
As seen above, the output Xi of each of these systems is partially secure.
We ask the question whether Alice can create a bit B = f(X) (where
X = X1 . . . Xn) from her outputs that is highly secure, even when Eve
can attack all systems at once and only needs to respect a non-signalling
condition between Alice, Bob and Eve.
Main results: We first show that two partially secure systems are as
local as a single one. This implies that they cannot be more secure. We
then give a general attack for any number of systems such that the in-
formation a non-signalling adversary can gain about any bit B = f(X)
is large. More precisely, there exists a constant lower bound independent
of the number of systems. This shows that privacy amplification is not
possible in this setup.
Informal proof sketch: We first consider the case of one or two sys-
tems and calculate their so-called local part. The local part is the maximal
weight a local system can have in a convex decomposition of the system.
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This corresponds to the fraction of runs that need to give rise to non-local
correlations when repeating an experiment and is a way of quantifying
non-locality as a resource. Since for any local system, a non-signalling ad-
versary can always have perfect knowledge about the outcomes (when
the inputs are public), the local part gives an upper bound on the ex-
tractable secrecy of a non-signalling system (and a lower bound on the
knowledge of the eavesdropper).
We show that two systems are as local as a single one (Lemma 5.5, p. 151)
and that they can, therefore, not be more secure (see Figure 1.6).
=(4ε)(1-4ε)· +(4ε)2· +(1-4ε)·⊗
PRε
PRε
Local ⊗
Local
Local
⊗
PR
PR
Figure 1.6: Local part of two systems.
For more than two systems, we give an attack directly, not using the local
part. In Section 5.5.2, we show that for any number of systems and for
any function, there exists a specific good attack. Intuitively, this attack
corresponds to a convex decomposition of Alice’s and Bob’s system, such
that each element has weight 1/2 (for an impossibility proof this is suf-
ficient), and P z0XY |UV is such that the bit B = f(X) is maximally biased
towards 0 (note that PXY |UV looks like n systems).
PXY |UV
B biased to 0
= 12 ·
P z0XY |UV
non-signalling
B biased to 1
+ 12 ·
P z1XY |UV
non-signalling
Figure 1.7: The successful attack in the tripartite non-signalling case is
such that, with probability 1/2, Eve obtains an outcome such that the bit
B is biased to 0.
In order to define an attack, it is sufficient to construct a non-signalling
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system P z0XY |UV such that
P z0XY |UV (x, y, u, v) ≤ 2 · PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) .
This corresponds exactly to the condition that there exists a second non-
signalling system P z1XY |UV summing up to the correctmarginal (Lemma 3.8,
p. 76).
Intuitively, we construct P z0XY |UV starting from PXY |UV and by ‘moving
around probabilities’ such that the system remains non-signalling and the
above condition is fulfilled. (This intuition is explained in Figure 1.8, the
formal definition is given in Definition 5.4, p. 154). We prove that this
indeed defines a convex decomposition of Alice’s and Bob’s joint system
in Lemma 5.8, p. 155, and Lemma 5.9, p. 156.
B = 0B = 0
· · ·
...
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4
ε−ε2
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ε−ε2
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ε−ε2
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ε−ε2
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ε2
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4
ε2
4
ε2
4
(1−ε)2
4
(1−ε)2
4
Figure 1.8: For the successful attack, we construct P z0XY |UV starting from
PXY |UV and shifting around probabilities.
Using this attack, we show that the distance from uniform of the bit f(X)
as seen from Eve is at least
max
{
1
2
· |P (f(X) = 0)− P (f(X) = 1)| ,
∑
y
min {P (f(X |Y = y) = 0, P (f(X |Y = y) = 0}
}
.
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(see Lemma 5.10, p. 157), where the first term is the bias of the bit f(X)
and the second term is the sum over all possible outputs on Bob’s side of
the minimal probability that the bit B is 0 or 1 given this specific value y.
In case the function f is linear, we can explicitly calculate this value (Lem-
ma 5.11, p. 158). It is always at least ε, but when taking the XOR of many
bits it becomes even larger.
In Section 5.6.2, we show that this same attack can also be used against
any function. We do this in several steps: First, we show that, doing this
attack, Eve always gains a substantial amount of information unless Alice
and Bob have highly correlated bits (Lemma 5.13, p. 162). Then we show
that if Alice applies a biased function to obtain her secret bit, Eve can
also attack (Lemma 5.16, p. 164). We can finally use a result from [Yan07]
on non-interactive correlation distillation stating that it is not possible
to produce an unbiased highly correlated bit from several weakly correl-
ated bits by applying a function. This leads to a constant lower bound on
Eve’s information about the key bit, independent of the number of sys-
tems used (Theorem 5.2, p. 164) and implies that privacy amplification is
not possible in this setting.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Probability Theory
Probabilities
The result of a random experiment is called an event and, roughly speaking,
the chance that such an event is realized is its probability. In order to be
able to define the probability of an event, it is necessary to know what
events can actually occur. The set of possible outcomes of a random ex-
periment is called sample space and denoted by Ω. Every subset A of Ω,
i.e., A ∈ P(Ω), is an event.
We will only encounter discrete probability spaces, i.e., the case when Ω
is a finite or countably infinite set and restrict to this case hereafter. For
a more detailed introduction to probability theory we refer to textbooks,
such as [Fel68, Lec98].
Definition 2.1. A discrete probability space is a triple (Ω,A, P ), where Ω is
a set, A ⊂ P(Ω), and P : A → [0, 1] is a function such that
• P (Ω) = 1,
• for every sequence of eventsAi such thatAi∩Aj = ∅ holds for i 6= j,
we have P (
⋃
iAi) =
∑
i P (Ai) .
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P is called probability on (Ω,A).
When Ω is discrete, it is actually sufficient for the definition of a proba-
bility space to associate a positive number pi with each ωi ∈ Ω, called
elementary event, such that
∑
i pi = 1. The probability of any event A is
then the sum of the probabilities associated with the elementary events
in A.
We define the conditional probability of an event A given another event B.
This probability is different from the probability of the event A, because
the set of possible events is now restricted to the subsets of B, instead
of Ω.
Definition 2.2. Let (Ω,A, P ) be a discrete probability space and B ∈ A
an event with P (B) > 0. The conditional probability of an event A ∈ A is
P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
.
Two events A and B are called independent if the probability that both
events happen is the product of the two probabilities.
Definition 2.3. Two events A and B are called independent if
P (A ∩B) = P (A) · P (B) .
Conditioning A on an independent event B leaves its probability un-
changed, i.e.,
P (A|B) = P (A) .
Random variables
A random variable is a way of encoding the events in Ω by a number.
Definition 2.4. A discrete random variable X on a probability space
(Ω,A, P ) is a mapX : Ω→ R such thatX(Ω) is countable. Furthermore,
X−1(x) = {ω ∈ Ω|X(ω) = x} ∈ A .
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The function PX : X → [0, 1], such that
PX(x) = P (A) , where A = X
−1(x) ,
is called probability distribution of the random variableX .
We will denote random variables by capital letters, such as X , the range
of the random variable by calligraphic letters, X , and the value a ran-
dom variable has taken by lower-case letters x. The probability that the
random variable X takes value x is PX(x). Sometimes we will drop the
index when the random variable is clear from the context.
We can also define the joint probability distribution of two (ormore) random
variables.
Definition 2.5. Consider two random variables X and Y defined on the
same sample space. The function PXY : X × Y → [0, 1] defined as
PXY (x, y) = P (A ∩B) where A = X−1(x) and B = Y −1(y) ,
is called the joint probability distribution ofX and Y .
When the joint probability distribution of two (or more) random variables
is given, we will sometimes consider the marginal distribution of X . This
is the distribution of the random variable X of a joint distribution when
one ignores the value of the second random variable Y .
Definition 2.6. Given the joint probability distribution PXY of two ran-
dom variablesX and Y , the marginal distribution of X is
PX(x) =
∑
y
PXY (x, y) .
In analogy with the case of events, we also define the conditional proba-
bility distribution as the distribution of the random variableX , given that
another random variable Y has taken the value y.
Definition 2.7. The conditional probability of X = x given Y = y with
PY (y) > 0 is
PX|Y=y(x) =
PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
.
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The conditional probability distribution PX|Y is
PX|Y (x, y) = PX|Y=y(x) .
A conditional probability distribution can be seen as a system taking as
input the random variable Y and giving a (probabilistic) output X , de-
pending on the input y.
When considering the conditional probability distribution of several ran-
dom variables, PXY |UV , the marginal conditional distribution PX|UV can
be defined in the same way as the marginal distribution. Furthermore, if
it holds that PX|UV (x, u, v) = PX|UV (x, u, v′) for all v, v′ ∈ V ,1 then we
drop the second conditional random variable in the notation and simply
write PX|U , where
PX|U (x, u) =
∑
y
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) .
We also define the expectation value of a random variableX .
Definition 2.8. Let X be a random variable with distribution PX . The
expectation value of X is
〈X〉 =
∑
x∈X
PX(x) · x .
A special probability distribution is the uniform distribution, i.e., the one
where all possible outcomes are equally likely.
Definition 2.9. Let U be a random variable of range U . The uniform distri-
bution over U is
PU (u) =
1
|U| .
We will often use the letter U (for ‘uniform’) to denote a random variable
which is uniformly distributed.
1This is in particular the case when considering non-signalling systems, which will be
defined in Section 2.6.3.
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Distance between distributions
The distance between two distributions of the same random variable can
be measured by the variational distance. The variational distance is exactly
the minimal probability that the random variable drawn from one or the
other distribution takes a different value.
Definition 2.10. Let P and Q be distributions over X . The variational
distance between P and Q is
d(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)| .
Of particular importance for us is the distance of a distribution PX from
the uniform one. We denote this distance by d(X).
Definition 2.11. The distance from uniform of a random variable X over
X with distribution PX is the variational distance between PX and the
uniform distribution over X , i.e.,
d(X) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
∣∣∣∣PX(x)− 1|X |
∣∣∣∣ .
Note that when X is a bit, i.e., X = {0, 1}, then
d(X) =
1
2
1∑
x=0
∣∣∣∣PX(x)− 12
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣PX(0)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12 · |PX(0)− PX(1)| .
Chernoff bounds and sampling
Lemma 2.1 (Chernoff [Che52], Hoeffding [Hoe63]). Let X1, . . . , Xn
∈ {0, 1} be n independent random variables such that for each i, Xi is drawn
according to the distribution PX with PX(1) = p. Then for any ε > 0 it holds
that
Pr
[
1
n
∑
i
xi ≥ p+ ε
]
≤ e−2nε2 and
Pr
[
1
n
∑
i
xi ≤ p− ε
]
≤ e−2nε2 .
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PX(x)
1
X
X1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2.1: The distance from the uniform distribution is either of the two
shaded areas.
The following bound on the sum of the binomial coefficients is well-known.
Lemma 2.2. For any 0 < p < 1/2,
⌊p·n⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ 2h(p)·n ,
where h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) is the binary entropy function.
Lemma 2.3 (Sampling Lemma [KR05]). Let Z be an n-tuple and Z ′ a k-tuple
of random variables over Z , with symmetric joint probability PZZ′ . Let Qz′
be the relative frequency distribution of a fixed sequence z′ and Q(z,z′) be the
relative frequency distribution of a sequence (z, z′), drawn according to PZZ′ .
Then for every ε ≥ 0 it holds that
PZZ′
[‖Q(z,z′) −Qz′‖ ≥ ε] ≤ |Z| · e−kε2/8|Z| .
2.2 Efficiency
Some cryptographic tasks cannot be achieved with perfect security. For
these cases, we have to accept some probability of error, or even rely on
computational hardness.
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Definition 2.12. Let g : N→ R be a function.
• The set of functions f : N → R upper-bounded by g is called O(g)
(O-notation)
O(g) = {f : N→ R|∃c > 0, n0 : f(n) ≤ c · g(n) for all n > n0} .
• The set of functions f : N → R lower-bounded by g is called Ω(g)
(Ω-notation)
Ω(g) = {f : N→ R|∃c > 0, n0 : f(n) ≥ c · g(n) for all n > n0} .
A function f : N → R is called polynomially upper-bounded (or polynomial)
if there exists a constant k ≥ 0 such that f ∈ O(nk).
In computational complexity, algorithms that run in time at most polyno-
mial in the input size are called efficient, and inefficient otherwise.
Definition 2.13. A function f : N → R is called negligible if for every pos-
itive polynomial p(·), there exists an n0 such that for all n > n0
f(n) <
1
p(n)
.
For example, in key distribution, we are interested in schemes where
(ideally) the probability that an adversary succeeds in breaking it is neg-
ligible in some security parameter. On the other hand, the probability
that the honest parties succeed in achieving their task should be high, for
example overwhelming, as defined below.
Definition 2.14. A probability p : N→ R is called overwhelming if 1− p(n)
is negligible.
Note that the definition of polynomial and negligible have the nice prop-
erty that they are closed under composition. More precisely, if f and g are
polynomial, then so are f ◦ g, f + g, and f · g; if f and g are negligible,
then so is f + g; and even if f is polynomial and g is negligible, then f ◦ g
and f · g are negligible.
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2.3 Random Systems
Most cryptographic tasks can abstractly be modelled as random systems
[Mau02]. A system is an object taking inputs and giving outputs. The
way this system is physically implemented is often irrelevant in the cryp-
tographic context, and we can consider the system to be defined in terms
of its behaviour, i.e., the probabilities that it gives a certain output given
a specific input.
Definition 2.15. An (X ,Y)-random system S is a sequence of conditional
probability distributions PSYi|Xi...X1Yi−1...Y1 for i ≥ 1.
Even though the sequence of probability distributions defining a system
could potentially be infinite, we will only consider systems defined by
finite sequences and with a finite number of inputs and outputs. Two
random systems characterized by the same probability distributions are,
with the above definition, defined to be the same system.
The different interfaces, number of interactions, and, if there is, the time-
wise ordering of these inputs and outputs is described in the definition of
the system.
S
t
Figure 2.2: A system.
Example 1. The identity channel can be seen as the system taking as input
a value x ∈ X and outputting the value y = x, i.e., PSY |X(x, y) = 1 for
y = x and 0 otherwise.
Note that any protocol taking as inputX and calculating a certain value Y
can also be seen as a random system with input X and output Y
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2.3.1 Indistinguishability
The closeness of two systems S0 and S1 can be measured by introducing
a so-called distinguisher. A distinguisher D is itself a system and it has the
same interfaces as the system S0, with the only difference that wherever
S0 takes an input, D gives an output and vice versa. In addition, D has
an extra output. The distinguisher D has access to all interfaces of S0,
even though these interfaces might not be in the same location when the
protocol is executed (for example, one of the interfaces might be the one
seen by Alice, while the other is the one seen by Eve).
Definition 2.16. A distinguisher D for an (X ,Y)-random system is
a (Y,X )-random system defined by the distributions PSXi|Xi−1...X1Yi−1...Y1
for i ≥ 1 (i.e., it is one query ahead). Additionally, it outputs a bit B after
q queries based on the transcript (X1 . . .XqY1 . . . Yq).
B
∈ {0, 1}
D
S0
t
B
∈ {0, 1}
D
S1
t
Figure 2.3: The distinguisher
Now consider the following game:The distinguisher D is given one out of
two systems at random—either S0 or S1 —but the distinguisher does not
know which one. It can interact with the system and then has to output
a bit B, guessing which system it has interacted with. The distinguishing
advantage between system S0 and S1 is the maximum guessing advantage
any distinguisher can have in this game (see Figure 2.3). Equivalently, the
distance between two systems can be defined as the maximum difference
in probability that a distinguisher outputs the value B = 1 given it has
interacted with system S0 compared to when it has interacted with S1.
Definition 2.17. The distinguishing advantage between two systems S0 and
S1 is
δ(S0,S1) = maxD [P (B = 1|S = S0)− P (B = 1|S = S1)].
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Two systems S0 and S1 are called ǫ-indistinguishable if δ(S0,S1) ≤ ǫ.
The probability of any event E when the distinguisher D is interacting
with S0 or S1 cannot differ by more than this quantity.
Lemma 2.4. Let S0 and S1 be two ǫ-indistinguishable systems. Denote by
Pr[E|S0,D] the probability of an event E , defined by any of the input and output
variables, given the distinguisher D is interacting with the system S0. Then
Pr[E|S0,D] ≤ Pr[E|S1,D] + ǫ
Proof. Assume Pr[E|S0,D] > Pr[E|S1,D] + ǫ and define the distinguisher
D such that it outputs B = 0 whenever the event E has happened and
whenever E has not happened it outputs B = 1. Then this distinguisher
reaches a distinguishing advantage of δ(S0,S1) > ǫ contradicting the as-
sumption that the two systems are ǫ-indistinguishable.
The distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric, that is, it fulfils similar
properties as a metric, in particular, the triangle inequality.2
Lemma 2.5. The distinguishing advantage fulfils
• δ(S,S) = 0 ,
• δ(S0,S1) = δ(S1,S0) , and
• δ(S0,S1) + δ(S1,S2) ≥ δ(S0,S2) .
Proof.
δ(S0,S1) = maxD [P (B = 1|S = S0)− P (B = 1|S = S0)] = maxD [0] = 0 .
For the second equality, call the distinguisher that reaches the maximal
value on the right-hand side (i.e., δ(S0,S1)) D0. Define another distin-
guisher D1 to be the same as D0, but flipping the bit B before outputting
2Since we identify the system with the probability distributions describing it, the distin-
guishing advantage is actually a metric, i.e., for any two systems with distance 0, the two
systems are the same. In general, it is possible to introduce the distinguishing advantage
restricting the set of distinguishers to a certain class, for example, the ones which are compu-
tationally efficient. In this case, the weaker properties of a pseudo-metric remain fulfilled.
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it. This implies
δ(S0,S1) = [PD0(B = 1|S = S0)− PD0(B = 1|S = S1)]
= [1− PD1(B = 1|S = S0)− (1 − PD1(B = 1|S = S1))]
= [PD1(B = 1|S = S1)− PD1(B = 1|S = S0)]
≤ δ(S1,S0) .
The inverse inequality follows by the same argument with the roles of S0
and S1 exchanged. Finally note that
δ(S0,S1) + δ(S1,S2) = maxD [P (B = 1|S = S0)− P (B = 1|S = S1)]
+ max
D
[P (B = 1|S = S1)− P (B = 1|S = S2)]
≥ max
D
[P (B = 1|S = S0)− P (B = 1|S = S1)
+ P (B = 1|S = S1)− P (B = 1|S = S2)]
= δ(S0,S2) .
2.3.2 Security of a key
The security of a cryptographic primitive can be measured by the dis-
tance of this system from an ideal system, which is secure by definition
[MRW07]. For example, in the case of key distribution the ideal system is
the one which outputs a uniform and random key (bit string) to the hon-
est parties and for which all other input/output interfaces are completely
independent of this first interface. This key is secure by construction. If
the real key-distribution protocol is ǫ-indistinguishable from the ideal one,
then, by Lemma 2.4, the key obtained from the real system needs to be se-
cure except with probability ǫ. This is true because in the ideal case the
adversary knows nothing about the key.
Definition 2.18. A perfect key of length |S| is a system which outputs two
equal uniform random variables SA and SB (i.e., PSASB (sA, sB) = 1/|S|
for sA = sB and 0 otherwise) and for which all other interfaces are uncor-
related with SA and SB .
Definition 2.19. A key is ǫ-secure if the system outputting SA and SB is
ǫ-indistinguishable from a perfect key.
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S
× Sideal
S
Sreal
Figure 2.4: The real and ideal system for the case of key distribution.
This definition implies that the resulting security is universally compos-
able [PW01, BPW03, Can01], i.e., no matter in which context the key is
used it always behaves like a perfect key, except with probability at
most ǫ. In fact, assume by contradiction that there exists any way of
using the key (or any other part of the system which generates the key)
such that the result is insecure, i.e., distinguishable with probability larger
than ǫ from the ideal system. This process could be used to distinguish
the key-generation scheme from an ideal one with probability larger than
ǫ, which is impossible by definition.
Often, the analysis of the security of a key is subdivided into several parts
because the different properties are achieved by different sub-protocols.
For example, the bound on the information an eavesdropper can have
about Alice’s key SA is called the secrecy of the protocol. Secrecy is usually
achieved by privacy amplification. The probability that Alice’s and Bob’s
key differ can then be considered separately; this is called the correctness
of the protocol. The part of the protocol responsible for correctness is
information reconciliation. By the triangle inequality, the security of the
protocol is bounded by the sum of the secrecy and correctness.
Note that the above requirements of secrecy and correctness do not ex-
clude a trivial protocol: one that always outputs a key of zero length.
Such a protocol is, of course, not useful (although it is secure). The prop-
erty that the protocol should output a key (of non-zero length) when the
eavesdropper is passive is called the robustness of the protocol.
When key agreement is studied in an asymptotic scenario, where the
number of quantum system, channel uses, random variables etc. used
can be arbitrarily large, we are interested in the length of the key that can
(asymptotically) be achieved per number of systems.
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Definition 2.20. The rate q of a key-distribution protocol is the length of
the key per number of systems, i.e., log |S| = q · n.
Of course, we will be interested in protocols which are secure and output
a certain key length when the adversary is passive. The secret key rate is
then defined as the key length that can be generated when the channel is
noisy according to a certain noise model.
2.4 Convex Optimization
2.4.1 Linear programming
A linear program (see, e.g., [BV04]) is an optimization problem with a lin-
ear objective function and linear inequality (and equality) constraints, i.e.,
it can be expressed as
max : bT · x (2.1)
s. t. A · x ≤ c ,
where x, b, and c are real vectors, A is a real matrix, and x is the variable
we want to optimize. The inequality is meant to be the component-wise
inequalities of the entries. An xwhich fulfils the constraints is called feas-
ible. The set of feasible x is convex, more precisely, a convex polytope, i.e.,
a convex set with a finite number of extremal points (vertices). A feasible
x which maximizes the objective function bTx is called optimal solution and
is denoted by x∗. The value of bTx∗, i.e., the maximal value of the object-
ive function for a feasible x, is called optimal value and denoted by q∗. The
program is called feasible, if there exists a feasible x. If this is the case and
the optimal value is finite, there is always a vertex of the polytope defined
by the constraints at which the optimal value is attained.
Any linear program can be brought in the form given above (2.1), i.e.,
there exists a problem of the above form that is equivalent to the original
optimization problem. For example, if the objective function should be
minimized instead of maximized, this is equivalent to maximizing the
objective function and replacing b by −b. In the same way, constraints
of the form ax ≥ c can be brought into the above form by multiplying
them with −1 and equality constraints ax = c can be replaced by the two
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constraints ax ≤ c and −ax ≤ −c. On the other hand, an inequality con-
straint ax ≤ c can be replaced by an equality and an inequality constraint
by introducing a so-called slack variable s andwriting ax+s = c and s ≥ 0.
An important feature of linear programming is duality: The linear pro-
gram (2.1) is called the primal problem. From this linear program, another
linear program can be derived, defined by
min : cT · λ (2.2)
s. t. AT · λ = b
λ ≥ 0 .
This problem is called the dual, its optimal solution is denoted by λ∗ and
its optimal value by d∗ = cTλ∗. The weak duality theorem states, that
the value of the primal objective function for every feasible x is smaller
or equal to the value of the dual objective function for every feasible λ.
The strong duality theorem states that the two optimal values are equal,
i.e., q∗ = d∗.
Theorem 2.1 (Strong duality for linear programming). Consider a linear
program, defined by A, b, and c, and assume that either the primal or dual is
feasible. Then q∗ = bTx∗ = cTλ∗ = d∗.
It is therefore possible to solve a linear program either by solving the
linear program (2.1) itself, or by solving its dual (2.2).
2.4.2 Conic programming
The notion of linear programming can be generalized to conic program-
ming [BTN01]. In linear programming, the constraints are of the form
Ax ≤ c, where Ax ≤ c means that every entry of the vector Ax must be
smaller or equal the corresponding entry of the vector c. The relation ‘≤’,
therefore, defines a partial order on the set of vectors in Rn. Many of the
properties of linear programming follow from properties of this partial
ordering ‘≤’, namely that it is reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive, and
compatible with linear operations (homogeneous and additive). How-
ever, other ordering relations also have these properties. In fact, it turns
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Figure 2.5: A linear programming problem.
out that an ordering relation with the above properties (which we denote
by ‘’) is completely defined by its non-negative elements. Furthermore,
the non-negative elements must form a pointed convex cone.
Definition 2.21. A set K of elements of a Euclidean space E, i.e., a real
inner product space, is called a pointed convex cone if
• K is non-empty and closed under addition: a, a′ ∈ K→ a+a′ ∈ K .
• K is a conic set: a ∈ K,λ ≥ 0→ λa ∈ K .
• K is pointed: a ∈ K and −a ∈ K → a = 0 .
A pointed convex cone in a Euclidean space E induces a partial ordering
‘K ’ by defining
a K b ↔ b− a ∈ K .
This ordering relation has the properties described above. A conic program
is then defined as the optimization problem
max : bT · x (2.3)
s. t. A · x K c ,
whereK is a cone in a Euclidean space E, and A is a linear map from Rn
to E.
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Figure 2.6: A convex optimization problem.
The fact that the constraints are defined by a cone implies, for example,
that the feasible region is convex (unlike in the linear programming case
it does, however, not need to be a polytope); the optimization problem,
therefore, does not have any local optima.
Example 2. A linear program can be interpreted as the conic program
where the Euclidean space is Rm and the cone K is Rm+ , the non-negative
orthant of Rm, i.e.,
R
m
+ = {a = (a1, . . . , am)T ∈ Rm|ai ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m} .
Example 3. A semi-definite program corresponds to the case where
E = Sm, the space of m ×m symmetric matrices with the inner product
〈A,B〉 = tr(AB) = ∑i,j AijBij .3 The cone K is the set of symmetric
matrices which are positive semi-definite, i.e.,
Sm+ = {A ∈ Sm|xTAx ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Rm} .
The dual of the above conic program (2.3) is
min : 〈c, λ〉 (2.4)
s. t. AT · λ = b
λ K∗ 0 ,
3Note that this inner product transforms to the usual inner product between two vectors
if the matrices A and B are transformed into vectors by ‘stacking the columns on top of
each other’. In the context of semi-definite programming we will often use matrices and the
vectors which can be obtained from them interchangeably.
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where K∗ is the dual cone of K (see Definition 2.22 below) and 〈c, λ〉 de-
notes the inner product of c and λ.
Definition 2.22. Let K be a pointed convex cone in a Euclidian space E.
The dual coneK∗ of K is
K∗ = {λ ∈ E|〈λ, a〉 ≥ 0 for all a ∈ K} .
The dual program gives an upper bound on the value of the primal pro-
gram, i.e., the value of any feasible primal solution is always lower or
equal the value of any feasible dual solution.
Theorem 2.2 (Weak duality for conic programming). Consider a conic pro-
gram, defined by A, b, and c, and a coneK . Then q∗ = bTx∗ ≤ 〈c, λ∗〉 = d∗.
Unlike in the linear programming case, there exist special cases of conic
programs where the optimal value of the primal and dual program are
different, i.e., there exists a so-called duality gap. Often, it can, however, be
shown that the two values are indeed equal. This is, for example, the case
when there exists a strictly feasible solution of the primal or dual problem,
i.e., there exists an x such that Ax ≺K c, where ‘≺’ denotes the fact that
Ax lies in the interior of the cone.
2.5 Quantum Physics
We first give the postulates of quantum mechanics and then the neces-
sary definitions. For a more detailed introduction to quantummechanics,
we refer to [Fey63, CTDL78], and for more information about quantum
information to [NC00].
Postulates of quantum physics
1. The (pure) state of a system is represented by a vector |ψ〉, element
of a Hilbert space H. For all c 6= 0 ∈ C, |ψ〉 and c |ψ〉 represent the
same state.4
4Alternatively, we could choose to normalize the vectors such that for any non-zero vec-
tor |ψ〉 it holds ‖ |ψ〉 ‖ = 1.
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2. An observable A is represented by a self-adjoint linear operator A on
H, i.e., A = A†.
3. The result of a measurement of the observable A is a real number a
that is an eigenvalue of A.
4. If a system is in state |ψ〉, then the probability to obtain a when the
observable A is measured, is
Pr
ψ
[measurement of A = a] = 〈ψ|Pa |ψ〉〈ψ|ψ〉 ,
where Pa is the projector onto the subspace spanned by the eigen-
vectors of A with associated eigenvalue a. The expectation value is
〈A〉 = 〈ψ|A |ψ〉/〈ψ|ψ〉.
5. If the system is in state |ψ〉, then immediately after themeasurement
of A having given result a, the system is in the state |φ〉, where
|φ〉 = Pa |ψ〉 ,
and |φ〉 is an eigenvector of A associated with the eigenvalue a.
6. The temporal evolution of an isolated system is5
〈A〉(t) = 〈ψt|A |ψt〉 = 〈ψ0|At |ψ0〉 .
• In the Schro¨dinger picture
ı~
d
dt
|ψt〉 = H |ψt〉 , i.e., |ψt〉 = e−ıHt/~ |ψ0〉 .
• In the Heisenberg picture
d
dt
At =
ı
~
[H,At] , i.e., At = e
ıHt/~Ae−ıHt/~ .
withH = H†.
In the above, we have used the Dirac notation, i.e., elements of the Hilbert
space are denoted by |ψ〉, called ket, while elements of the dual space are
5Sometimes this postulate is stated as the requirement that the evolution of the system is
described by a unitary operator, i.e, |ψ〉′ = U |ψ〉 in the Schro¨dinger picture.
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denoted by 〈ψ|, called bra. The bracket 〈φ|ψ〉 is the scalar product of an
element |ψ〉 of H with the element of the dual 〈φ|. And 〈φ|A |ψ〉, where
A is a self-adjoint linear operator, can be seen equivalently as the case
where the vector is |Aψ〉 or where the dual vector is 〈Aφ|. 〈A〉 stands for
the expectation value and [A,B] denotes the commutator of two operators
A and B, i.e., [A,B] = AB −BA.
Definitions and properties
Most of the following definitions and properties can be found in books
on functional analysis, such as [RS81].
Definition 2.23. A Hilbert spaceH is a complex vector space, i.e.,
|ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ H and λ1, λ2 ∈ C → λ1 |ψ〉+ λ2 |φ〉 ∈ H
with a positive Hermitian sesquilinear form, i.e., for all |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ H, there
exists 〈φ|ψ〉 ∈ C such that
1. it is linear in |ψ〉: 〈φ|λ1ψ1 + λ2ψ2〉 = λ1 〈φ|ψ1〉+ λ2 〈φ|ψ2〉 ,
2. 〈φ|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉, where the bar denotes the complex conjugate ,
3. for all |ψ〉 ∈ H 〈ψ|ψ〉 ≥ 0 and 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 0 ↔ |ψ〉 = 0, the norm of a
vector |ψ〉 is defined as ‖ |ψ〉 ‖ =√〈ψ|ψ〉 .
Furthermore, H is complete, i.e., for all |ψn〉 ∈ H with n = 1, 2, 3, . . .
such that limn,m→∞ ‖ |ψn〉 − |ψm〉 ‖ = 0, there exists a |ψ〉 ∈ H such that
limn→∞ ‖ |ψn〉 − |ψ〉 ‖ = 0, i.e., limn→∞ |ψn〉 = |ψ〉.
Definition 2.24. Let H be a Hilbert space. The dual of H, denoted by
H∗ = {ω}, is the complex vector space of linear forms on H, i.e., for all
ω ∈ H∗
ω : H → C
|ψ〉 7→ ω[ψ]
with ω[λ1ψ1 + λ2ψ2] = λ1ω[ψ1] + λ2ω[ψ2].
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With every |φ〉 ∈ H, it is possible to associate an element of the dual
ωφ ∈ H∗ via the relation
ωφ : |ψ〉 7→ ωφ[ψ] = 〈φ|ψ〉
with ωλφ = λ¯ωφ. And for every element ω of H∗, there also exists an
element |φ〉 ofH such that
ω[ψ] = 〈φ|ψ〉 .
Definition 2.25. An orthonormal basis ofH is a set of vectors {|φi〉}i∈I such
that
• 〈φi|φj〉 = δij for all i, j ∈ I and
• 〈ψ|φi〉 = 0 for all i ∈ I → ψ = 0 .
Every Hilbert space has an orthonormal basis, but the Hilbert spaces usu-
ally considered in quantum physics have an additional property, namely
that they have a countable orthonormal basis.
Definition 2.26. H is called separable if it has a countable orthonormal
basis.
For separable Hilbert spaces it can be checked whether a set {|φi〉}i=1,2,...
of vectors in H forms an orthonormal basis, by testing if for all i, j,
〈φi|φj〉 = δij and
∑
i |φi〉 〈φi| = 1H. This implies that for any |ψ〉 , |φ〉
∈ H and orthonormal basis {|φi〉}, it holds that
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
〈φi|ψ〉 |φi〉 (Fourier formula)
‖ψ‖2 =
∑
i
| 〈φi|ψ〉 |2 (Plancherel formula)
〈φ|ψ〉 =
∑
i
〈φi|φ〉 〈φi|ψ〉 (Parceval formula).
Definition 2.27. A is a bounded linear operator onH, denoted by A ∈ B(H),
if
A : H → H
|ψ〉 7→ A[ψ]
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with A[λ1ψ1 + λ2ψ2] = λ1A[ψ1] + λ2A[ψ2] and
sup
ψ 6=0
‖A[ψ]‖
‖ |ψ〉 ‖ <∞ .
Observables corresponding to physical quantities are bounded. Through
the relation
(|ψ〉 〈φ′|) |φ〉 = |ψ〉 〈φ′|φ〉 = 〈φ′|φ〉 |ψ〉
we can express the operator mapping |φ′〉 to |ψ〉 multiplied by 〈φ|φ′〉 as
|ψ〉 〈φ′|. This leads to the outer product notation of A.
Definition 2.28. The adjoint A† of a bounded operator A is defined such
that 〈
φ
∣∣A†ψ〉 = 〈Aφ|ψ〉 .
It further holds that (λA)† = λ¯A†; (AB)† = B†A†; ‖A‖ = ‖A†‖; A†† = A
and
〈
ψ
∣∣A†Aψ〉 = 〈Aψ|Aψ〉 = ‖Aψ‖2 ≥ 0.
Definition 2.29. A bounded operatorA is called self-adjoint if A = A† and
it is called unitary if AA† = A†A = 1.
Definition 2.30. Let A = A† ∈ B(H). If A |ψ〉 = a |ψ〉 then |ψ〉 is an
eigenvector of Awith eigenvalue a and a ∈ R.
Definition 2.31. Let H be a Hilbert space and H′ a subspace of H with
{|φi〉}i∈I an orthonormal basis of H′. The projector of H onto H′ is the
operator
PH′ =
∑
i∈I
|φi〉 〈φi| .
The projector onto a subspace of H fulfils P = P † = P 2.
Theorem 2.3 (Spectral decomposition). Let A be a self-adjoint bounded lin-
ear operator on H with eigenvalues {ai}. Then H has an orthonormal basis
{|φi,k〉}k=1,...,di of eigenvectors of A and
A =
∑
i
aiPai ,
where Pai =
∑
k |φi,k〉 〈φi,k| is the projector onto the eigenspace associated with
the eigenvalue ai.
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Note that the eigenspaces associated with different eigenvalues of A are
orthogonal.
Example 4. An example of a Hilbert space is Cn with the scalar product
〈φ, ψ〉 = ∑ni=1 φ¯iψi. In this case, every vector |ψ〉 ∈ H and dual vector
〈φ| ∈ H∗ can be expressed as
|ψ〉 =

ψ1...
ψn

 with ψi ∈ C and for |φ〉 ∈ H 〈φ| = (φ¯1 · · · φ¯n) .
The scalar product is
〈φ|ψ〉 = (φ¯1 · · · φ¯n)

ψ1...
ψn

 = n∑
i=1
φ¯iψi ∈ C .
and the operator |φ〉 〈ψ| is a complex n× nmatrix
|ψ〉 〈φ| =

ψ1...
ψn

(φ¯1 · · · φ¯n) =

ψ1φ¯1 · · · ψ1φ¯n... . . . ...
ψnφ¯1 · · · ψnφ¯n

 ∈ Mn(C) .
Example 5. Another example of a Hilbert space is L2(R3, d3x), the set of
complex square integrable functions over R3. In this case,
ψ = ψ(−→x ) : R3 → C, such that∫
R3
d3x |ψ (−→x )|2 <∞ .
The scalar product is given by 〈φ, ψ〉 = ∫
R3
d3x φ¯(−→x )ψ(−→x ).
When the Hilbert space is Cn, we will often denote the canonical basis
vectors by |0〉 , . . . , |n− 1〉. We will call systems with n = 2 a qubit and
denote their basis states as
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
|1〉 =
(
0
1
)
.
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Composite systems
When describing a system that consists of two subsystems, one being de-
scribed by a Hilbert space H1 and the other by H2, then the pure state of
the total system can be described by the Hilbert space that is the tensor
product of the two subspaces, i.e.,H = H1 ⊗H2.
The tensor product is defined such that for |ψ〉 ∈ H1 and |φ〉 ∈ H2, it
associates a vector |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ∈ H with the property that
c · (|ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) = (c · |ψ〉)⊗ |φ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ (c · |φ〉)
(|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉)⊗ |φ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ |φ〉 + |ψ2〉 ⊗ |φ〉
|ψ〉 ⊗ (|φ1〉+ |φ2〉) = |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ1〉+ |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ2〉
for all c ∈ C, |ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 ∈ H1 and |φ1〉 , |φ2〉 ∈ H2.
We will sometimes drop the tensor product in the notation and write
|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 = |0〉 |1〉 = |01〉 .
The tensor product of linear operatorsA acting onH1 andB acting onH2
can be defined via the relation
(A⊗B) [|ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉] = (A |ψ〉)⊗ (B |φ〉) .
Note that when {|ψi〉}i is an orthonormal basis of H1 and {|φj〉}j is an
orthonormal basis of H2, then {|ψi〉 ⊗ |φj〉}i,j is an orthonormal basis of
H = H1 ⊗H2.
Not all states in the tensor product Hilbert space can be expressed as the
tensor product of a state in each of the two subsystems.
Definition 2.32. Let |ψ〉 ∈ H = H1⊗H2 be a pure state. Then, if |ψ〉 cannot
be expressed as the tensor product of a state |ψ1〉 ∈ H1 and |ψ2〉 ∈ H2, i.e.,
|ψ〉 6= |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 ,
the state |ψ〉 is called entangled.
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Example 6. Examples of entangled states of two qubits are the Bell states.
The state |Ψ−〉 is also called the singlet.
∣∣Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)
∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
∣∣Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) .
Density operators and generalized measurements
A useful way to represent quantum states is using density operators, i.e.,
operators on the Hilbert space. This representation has the advantage
that the situation where a certain pure state |ψi〉 occurs with probability
pi can be modelled easily.
Definition 2.33. A density operator is a Hermitian positive operator ρwith
trace 1, i.e.,
ρ = ρ† ,
ρ  0 ,
tr(ρ) = 1 .
The expression ρ  0means that the eigenvalues of ρ are non-negative.
The density matrix ρ associated with a (normalized) pure state |ψ〉 is
|ψ〉 〈ψ|.
If a measurement A is performed on a state characterized by a density
operator ρ, then
〈A〉 = tr(Aρ) .
The probability to obtain outcome ai is
Pr
ρ
[ai] = tr(Paiρ) ,
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where Pai is the projector onto the eigenspace associated with eigenvalue
ai.
We observe that for the density matrix ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| associated with the
pure state |ψ〉, we obtain
〈A〉 = tr (A |ψ〉 〈ψ|) = 〈ψ|A |ψ〉 and
Pr
ρ
[ai] = tr (Pai |ψ〉 〈ψ|) = 〈ψ|Pai |ψ〉 ,
as expected.
Furthermore, when the system is in state |ψi〉 with probability pi (this is
called a mixed state), we associate the density matrix
ρ =
∑
i
pi |ψi〉 〈ψi|
with this system. Because of the linearity of the trace, A and Pai , we
obtain in this case
〈A〉 = tr
(
A
∑
i
pi |ψi〉 〈ψi|
)
=
∑
i
pi 〈ψi|A |ψi〉 and
Pr
ρ
[ai] = tr
(
Pai
∑
i
pi |ψi〉 〈ψi|
)
=
∑
i
pi 〈ψi|Pai |ψi〉 .
Note that the same density matrix ρ can be associated with different prob-
abilistic mixtures of pure states. A density matrix ρ corresponds to a pure
state exactly if ρ2 = ρ.
A state represented by a density matrix is called entangled if it cannot be
expressed as the convex combination of the tensor product of two density
matrices, i.e.,
ρ 6=
∑
i
piρ1,i ⊗ ρ2,i .
For a density matrix ρ onH = H1 ⊗H2, we can obtain the density matrix
describing only the first part of the system by the partial trace over the
second system, i.e.,
ρ1 = tr2 ρ =
∑
i
(11 ⊗ 〈φi|) ρ (11 ⊗ |φi〉) ,
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where {|φi〉}i is a basis ofH2.
In a similar way as density matrices can be seen as a generalization of the
notion of a state, it is also possible to generalize the notion of a measure-
ment.
Definition 2.34. A POVM (Positive Operator-Valued Measure) is a set of
positive Hermitian operators {Ei}i such that
∑
iEi = 1.
Note, however, that any density matrix can be seen as a pure state on a
larger system and any POVM can be seen as applying a unitary trans-
formation to the system and an ancilla (additional system) followed by
a projective measurement (described by the eigenvalues and the projectors
onto the eigenspaces of a self-adjoint operator A).
In fact, a density operator on H1 defined by ρ1 =
∑
i pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| can be
expressed as the pure state
|ψ′〉 =
∑
i
√
pi |ψi〉1 |ψi〉2
in a Hilbert space H = H1 ⊗ H2 (where the dimension of H2 must be at
least the dimension of H1).
A POVM element Ei can be expressed as Ei = M
†
iMi because it is Her-
mitian and positive semi-definite. Define an operator U by
U [|ψ〉 |0〉] :=
∑
i
Mi |ψ〉 |i〉 .
U is unitary because of the completeness relation
∑
iEi = 1. If the pro-
jective measurement defined by Pi = 1 ⊗ |i〉 〈i| is applied to U [|ψ〉 |0〉],
this corresponds exactly to applying the POVM {Ei}i to |ψ〉. The POVM
is, therefore, equivalent to applying the above unitary transformation and
then performing a projective measurement.
This argument implies that we will always be able to restrict our analysis
to pure states and projective measurements (in a potentially larger space).
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Classical random variables as quantum states
A discrete random variable X with probability distribution PX can be
represented by the density matrix∑
x
PX(x) |x〉 〈x| ,
where {|x〉}x is an orthonormal basis of a Hilbert space HX . Measuring
the state in this basis gives the measurement result x with probability
PX(x).
Similarly, the case where a quantum system is described by a different
state depending on the value of a random variable X can also be repres-
ented by a quantum state. More precisely, by a state ρXA, which is called
classical on X .
Definition 2.35. A state ρXA such that
ρXA =
∑
x
PX(x) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxA ,
where {|x〉}x is an orthonormal basis of a Hilbert space HX and ρxA is a
density matrix onHA is called classical on X .
Min-Entropy
In classical information theory, tasks such as data compression or ran-
domness extraction can be characterized by the entropy of a distribution.
These entropies can also be defined for quantum states. We will, in par-
ticular, use the notion of the min-entropy of a system A conditioned on a
systemB. For the definition of other entropies of quantum states we refer
to [Ren05].
Definition 2.36. Themin-entropy of A given B of a density matrix ρAB on
HA ⊗HB is
Hmin(A|B)ρAB = max
σB
sup{λ ∈ R|2−λ1A ⊗ σB  ρAB} ,
where the maximization is over all density matrices σB onHB .
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In [KRS09], it is shown that when the system A is classical, then the min-
entropy of A given B is just the maximal probability that someone hold-
ing the system B can correctly guess the value of A.
Theorem 2.4 (Ko¨nig, Renner, Schaffner [KRS09]). Let ρAB be classical on
HA. Then
Hmin(A|B)ρAB = − log2 Pguess(A|B)ρAB ,
where Pguess(A|B)ρAB is the maximal probability of decoding A from B with a
POVM {EaB}a onHB , i.e.,
Pguess(A|B)ρAB := max{EaB}a
∑
a
PA(a) tr(E
a
Bρ
a
B) .
2.6 Systems from Different Resources
Consider a bipartite system taking an input and giving an output on each
side. This system is characterized by the conditional probability distri-
bution PXY |UV of the outputs given a certain input pair. Which systems
PXY |UV can be realized depends on the resources that can be used to real-
ize it.
We can view this situation as a game, where two parties — let us call
them Alice and Bob — are allowed to agree on a strategy, but are then
put into separate rooms. Later, they are asked questions by a referee —
Alice is asked question u of some set U , but does not know Bob’s question
v ∈ V and Bob gets question v, but does not know u. Their goal is to
give answers x ∈ X (for Alice) and y ∈ Y (for Bob) according to the
distribution PXY |UV using the resource at their disposition.
One possible such resource is, of course, communication. If Alice and
Bob are allowed to communicate u and v to each other and then decide
on their answers together, it should be possible for them to realize any
conditional probability distribution PXY |UV . (If Alice and Bob are also
able to make coin tosses locally.)
In the following, we will characterize n-party systems that can be imple-
mented using different resources. The resources we consider are, how-
ever, such that they do not allow for communication. An n-party sys-
tem is denoted by PX|U , where X is a vector of n random variables
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X = X1 . . . Xn. In the case of two parties, we will sometimes write
PXY |UV . Sometimes, we will also consider the case when two parties,
Alice and Bob, share a (2n)-party system and will denote this system by
PXY |UV in order to make clear which random variable is associated with
which party. For a (2n+ 1)-party system, associated with Alice, Bob and
Eve, we will use the notation PXY Z|UVW .
2.6.1 Local systems
The first resource we consider is shared randomness. More precisely, we
assume that Alice and Bob are allowed to discuss a strategy and make an
arbitrary number of coin tosses. But after they are separated, they are only
allowed to base their answers on the question they have obtained, and the
value of the shared randomness. The strategies can be considered deter-
ministic, i.e. given a certain value of the shared randomness r the strategy
of Alice tells her exactly which answer x to give as function of the ques-
tion u and the same for Bob. Indeed, any strategy of Alice which chooses
an x probabilistically as function of u and r can be expressed as a determ-
inistic strategy by incorporating Alice’s local randomness into the shared
randomness R. The distributions PXY |UV that can be generated this way
by Alice and Bob are called local. Formally, we define the following.
Definition 2.37. An n-party system PX|U is called local deterministic if
PX|U (x,u) =
∏
i
δxi,fi(ui) ,
where δ denotes the Kronecker delta, i.e., the function δa,b = 1 if a = b
and 0 otherwise, and where f i : Ui → Xi is a function associating with
each ui an xi.
Local systems are all the ones which can be expressed as convex combin-
ations of local deterministic systems.
Definition 2.38. An n-party system PX|U is called local if
PX|U (x,u) =
∑
r
PR(r) ·
∏
i
δxi,fir(ui)
with
∑
r PR(r) = 1. A distribution which is not local is called non-local.
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The space of local probability distributions is a convex polytope and its
vertices are the local deterministic distributions. A convex polytope can
be described either in terms of its vertices or, alternatively, as an intersec-
tion of a finite number of halfspaces (see, e.g., [BV04]). In the context of
local probability distributions, these halfspaces correspond to so-called
Bell inequalities [Bel64]. Informally speaking, a Bell inequality is an upper
bound on a linear combination of the probabilities PX|U (x,u) that must
hold for all local distributions PX|U .
Definition 2.39. A Bell inequality is an inequality of the form∑
x,u
q(x,u)PX|U (x,u) ≤ c
that must hold for any local distribution PX|U , and where q : X ×U → R
is a function associating with each value of x and u a real number, and c
is a real number.
If a distribution PX|U violates a Bell inequality, this proves that it is non-
local. The reverse argument is also possible: Any non-local distribution
lies outside the local polytope and, therefore, must violate some Bell in-
equality.
The best-known example of a Bell inequality is the one given by Clauser,
Horne, Shimony, and Holt [CHSH69], also called CHSH inequality. This
inequality is the only one relevant for bipartite systems with binary in-
puts and outputs, in the sense that any non-local system of this type must
violate it, possibly using a relabelling of the inputs and outputs.
Example 7 (CHSH inequality [CHSH69]). For any local system PXY |UV
with X = Y = U = V = {0, 1} it holds that6
1
4
∑
(x,y,u,v):x⊕y=u·v
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) ≤
3
4
.
6Originally [CHSH69], the Bell inequality was stated in terms of systems giving outputs
in {−1, 1}, in which case the inequality reads
〈X0Y0〉+ 〈X0Y1〉+ 〈X1Y0〉 − 〈X1Y1〉 ≤ 2 ,
where X0 stands for the random variable X given input u = 0, and 〈X0Y0〉 denotes the
expectation value of the random variableX0Y0.
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0
Figure 2.7: A local deterministic system. In this notation, a local determin-
istic system corresponds to the selection of a line (column) for each input,
as indicated by the arrows. The CHSH inequality (Example 7) corres-
ponds to the condition that the sum of the entries in the hatched cells is
at most 3. This system, therefore, reaches the maximal possible value for
a local system.
For a specific system PXY |UV (not necessarily local), we will sometimes
call the value of the expression on the left-hand side in the above inequal-
ity the Bell value (or CHSH value) of this system. A generalization of the
CHSH inequality to systems with more inputs has been given by Braun-
stein and Caves [BC90].
Example 8 (Braunstein-Caves inequality [BC90]). For any local system
PXY |UV with X = Y = {0, 1} and U = V = {1, . . . , N} it holds that7
1
2N
·

 N∑
u=1
u+1∑
v=u
∑
(x,y):x=y
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v)
+
∑
(x,y):x 6=y
PXY |UV (x, y,N, 1)

 ≤ 1− 1
2N
.
7The Braunstein-Caves inequality was also originally given in terms of correlations of
systems with outputs in {−1, 1}.
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2.6.2 Quantum systems
Consider the setup where Alice and Bob are allowed to discuss a strategy
and use shared randomness (as above), but in addition they are allowed
to share a — possibly entangled — quantum state. Alice and Bob can
now base their answers on the shared randomness, but also on the meas-
urement outcomes they obtain frommeasuring the quantum state. Which
measurement they perform can, of course, depend on the shared random-
ness and on the question they have obtained.
Interestingly, the set of probability distributions which can be obtained
this way is strictly larger than the local set described above. I.e., these
distributions can be non-local. This is what is meant by the expression
‘quantum mechanics is non-local’.8
Definition 2.40. An n-party system PX|U , whereX = X1 . . . Xn, is called
quantum if there exists a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ H =⊗iHi and a set of measure-
ment operators {Exiui} onHi such that
PX|U (x,u) =
〈
ψ
∣∣∣⊗
i
Exiui
∣∣∣ψ〉 .
The measurement operators are
1. Hermitian, i.e., Exiui
† = Exiui for all xi, ui,
2. orthogonal projectors, i.e., ExiuiE
x′i
ui = E
xi
ui δxix′i ,
3. and sum up to the identity, i.e.,
∑
xi
Exiui = 1Hi for all ui.
As we have seen in the previous section, it is not a restriction to assume
the quantum state to be pure and the measurements to be projections,
since any quantum state can be represented as a pure state in a larger Hil-
bert space and measurements as projective measurements by introducing
an ancilla (see Section 2.5).
In finite dimensions, the requirement that the measurements act only on
one part of a larger tensor-product Hilbert space is equivalent to the re-
8Quantum physics is sometimes said to be a local theory, meaning that it is not possible
to act on a system that is in a distant location. We will call this property non-signalling (see
Section 2.6.3).
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quirement that all operators associated with different parties commute.
See, e.g., [DLTW08] or [Weh08] for an explicit proof.
Theorem 2.5. Let H be a finite dimensional Hilbert space and {Exiui} be a set
of Hermitian orthogonal projectors with
∑
ui
Exiui = 1. Assume further that
[Exiui , E
xj
uj ] = 0 for all xi, xj , ui, uj where i 6= j. Then there exists a unitary
isomorphism between H and H′ = ⊗iH′i such that in H′, Exiui are of the form
E˜xiui ⊗ 1 and where E˜xiui acts onH′i only.
For any (n+ 1)-party quantum system, the marginal and conditional sys-
tems are also quantum systems. This follows from the postulates of quan-
tum physics, but we give a direct proof in terms of systems below.
Lemma 2.6. Let PXZ|UW be an (n+1)-party quantum system. Then the mar-
ginal system PX|U (x,u) :=
∑
z PXZ|U ,W (x, z,u, w) and the conditional sys-
tem PX|U ,W=w,Z=z(x,u) := PXZ|UW (x, z,u, w)/PZ|W=w(z) are n-party
quantum systems.
Proof. For the marginal system, take the same state |ψ〉 and the measure-
ment operators {Exiui} for all i < n. The measurement operator associ-
ated with the nth party are {Exnun ⊗ 1Hn+1}. They fulfil the requirements
because they are part of the requirements of the operators of the (n + 1)-
party quantum system and remain valid when tensored with the identity.
It then holds that
PX|U (x,u) =
〈
ψ
∣∣∣(⊗
i
Exiui
)
⊗ 1Hn+1
∣∣∣ψ〉
=
〈
ψ
∣∣∣(⊗
i
Exiui
)
⊗
(∑
z
Ezw
)∣∣∣ψ〉
=
∑
z
〈
ψ
∣∣∣(⊗
i
Exiui
)
⊗ Ezw
∣∣∣ψ〉
=
∑
z
PXZ|UW (x, z,u, w) .
For the conditional system take the state
1√〈ψ|1H1...n ⊗ Ezw |ψ〉1H1...n ⊗ Ezw |ψ〉 ,
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where 1H1...n =
⊗n
i=1 1Hi and the measurement operators {Exiui}.
PX|U ,W=w,Z=z(x,u)
=
〈
ψ
∣∣∣∣ 1H1...n ⊗ Ezw†√〈ψ|1H1...n ⊗ Ezw |ψ〉
⊗
i
Exiui
1H1...n ⊗ Ezw√〈ψ|1H1...n ⊗ Ezw |ψ〉
∣∣∣∣ψ
〉
=
1
〈ψ|1H1...n ⊗ Ezw |ψ〉
〈
ψ
∣∣∣(⊗
i
Exiui
)
⊗ Ezw
∣∣∣ψ〉
=
1
PZ|W=w(z)
PXZ|UW (x, z,u, w) .
The set of quantum systems is convex, but it is not a polytope, i.e., the set
of its extremal points is infinite.
Example 9. The system in Figure 2.8 is a quantum system. It can be ob-
tained bymeasuring the state |ψ−〉 = (|10〉−|01〉)/√2 using the operators
Exu = |Ψxu〉 〈Ψxu| and Eyv = |Φyv〉 〈Φyv| as given below.∣∣Ψ00〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+ |1〉) ∣∣Ψ10〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 − |1〉)∣∣Ψ01〉 = |0〉 ∣∣Ψ11〉 = |1〉∣∣Φ00〉 = √2−√22 |0〉 − √2+√22 |1〉 ∣∣Φ10〉 = √2+√22 |0〉+ √2−√22 |1〉∣∣Φ01〉 = √2+√22 |0〉 − √2−√22 |1〉 ∣∣Φ11〉 = √2−√22 |0〉+ √2+√22 |1〉 .
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Figure 2.8: A quantum system.
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The system in Figure 2.8 fulfils
1
4
∑
(x,y,u,v):x⊕y=u·v
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) =
2 +
√
2
4
≈ 0.85 ,
i.e., it violates the Bell inequality of Example 7 in Section 2.6.1. Although
quantum systems do not need to respect Bell inequalities, there exist limit-
ations on the violations which can be reached by quantum systems. These
limitations are called Tsirelson bounds, after Tsirelson, who showed, in par-
ticular, that the above quantum system reaches indeed the maximal pos-
sible CHSH value [Tsi80].
2.6.3 Non-signalling systems
The set of systems that can be obtained by measuring a quantum state is
strictly larger than the local set, but these correlations still do not imply
communication. The behaviour on her side does not give Alice any in-
formation about the question Bob has obtained. This property is called
non-signalling. We can consider the systems which can be obtained when
Alice and Bob are allowed to share as resource an abstract device taking
inputs and giving outputs on each side, under the sole condition that this
device cannot be used for signalling. This set of non-signalling systems
contains the set of quantum systems as a proper subset.
Definition 2.41. An n-party system PX|U is called non-signalling if for any
set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n},∑
xi:i∈I
PX|U (x,uI ,uI¯) =
∑
xi:i∈I
PX|U (x,u
′
I ,uI¯)
holds for all xI¯ , uI , u
′
I , uI¯ , and where uI stands for the variables with
indices in the set I , uI = {ui|i ∈ I}, and uI¯ for the variables with indices
in the complementary set, i.e., uI¯ = {ui|i /∈ I}.
This definition implies that, for any partition of the interfaces of the sys-
tem, from the interaction with one set of the interfaces no information
can be inferred about the inputs that were given to the remaining set of
interfaces. This condition is actually equivalent to requiring that the be-
haviour of all but one interfaces gives no information about the input that
was given to this one interface.
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Lemma 2.7. An n-party system PX|U is non-signalling if and only if for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∑
xi
PX|U (x, ui,ui¯) =
∑
xi
PX|U (x, u′i,ui¯) ,
where ui¯ stands for u1 . . . ui−1ui+1 . . . un.
Proof. The condition is necessary, because it is simply the non-signalling
condition for the set I = {i}. To see that it is sufficient, note that for any
set I ∑
xi:i∈I
PX|U (x,u) =
∑
xi:i∈I
PX|U (x,uI ,uI¯)
=
∑
xi:i∈I\{j}
∑
xj
PX|U (x,uI\{j}, uj)
=
∑
xi:i∈I\{j}
∑
xj
PX|U (x,uI\{j}, u′j)
=
∑
xi:i∈I\{j′}
∑
xj′
PX|U (x,uI\{j,j′}, u
′
j, uj′)
=
∑
xi:i∈I\{j′}
∑
xj′
PX|U (x,uI\{j,j′},u′{j,j′})
= · · ·
=
∑
xi:i∈I
PX|U (x,u′I ,uI¯) .
Since the set of non-signalling systems can be described by linear con-
straints on the probabilities describing the system, it is often easier to deal
with the strictly larger set of non-signalling systems than with the set of
quantum systems. The set of non-signalling systems, in fact, forms again
a convex polytope.
Example 10 (The PR box [PR94]). The system in Figure 2.9 is a non-sig-
nalling system. It is called a PR box after Popescu and Rohrlich [PR94].
The PR box (Figure 2.9) reaches
1
4
∑
(x,y,u,v):x⊕y=u·v
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) = 1 ,
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Figure 2.9: The PR box. The non-signalling condition corresponds to the
requirement that the two hatched areas contain the same probability (and
similar for other outputs).
i.e., it not only violates the Bell inequality of Example 7 in Section 2.6.1, it
also reaches the maximum of this expression.
For an (n + 1)-party non-signalling system PXZ|UW , the marginal and
conditional systems are well-defined and, again, n-party non-signalling
systems.
Lemma 2.8. Let PXZ|UW be an (n+1)-party non-signalling system. Then the
marginal system
PX|U (x,u) :=
∑
z
PXZ|U ,W (x, z,u, w)
and the conditional system
PX|U ,W=w,Z=z(x,u) :=
1
PZ|W=w(z)
PXZ|U ,W (x, z,u, w)
are n-party non-signalling systems.
Proof. Let us first see that the conditional systems are non-signalling. By
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Lemma 2.7, it holds that for each i,∑
xi
PXZ|UW (x, z, ui,ui¯, w) =
∑
xi
PX|U (x, z, u′i,ui¯, w) .
Dividing both sides by PZ|W=w(z) implies that the conditional system
PX|U ,W=w,Z=z(x,u) is non-signalling.
The marginal system is non-signalling because it is a linear combination
of conditional systems and because the non-signalling condition is linear.
This property justifies dropping the input of the other parts of the system
in the notation when considering the marginal system associated with a
non-signalling system.
Chapter 3
Security Against
Non-Signalling Adversaries
3.1 Introduction
Non-signalling cryptography (sometimes also called relativistic cryptography),
as introduced by Kent, bases its security on the impossibility of signal-
ling between space-like separated events, as predicted by relativity theory.
In secure multi-party computation, the property guaranteeing security is
that any choice made during the protocol must be independent from any
event occurring in a space-like separated location. In this way, realizing
a secure coin toss by two mistrustful parties is straight-forward [Ken99a]:
Both parties choose a value and send them to each other simultaneously.
The outcome of the coin toss is the XOR of the two values. Both players
only accept if they receive the message from the other player such that it
must have been sent from the location of the other player before the recep-
tion of their own message. Since each player must have chosen its value
independently of the other player’s, they cannot bias the outcome of the
coin toss. Based on the same principle, protocols for bit commitment can
also be defined [Ken99b, Ken05, Col06].
In [BHK05], Barrett, Hardy, and Kent proposed a protocol for secure key
agreement based on the non-signalling principle (see Section 1.3). The
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case of key agreement works slightly differently from the above descrip-
tion, because there are two players which cooperate and trust each other
(as opposed to the case of multi-party computation, where the players
cooperate but do not trust each other). On the other hand, the eaves-
dropper cannot be forced to interact with the legitimate parties. The non-
signalling condition then enters the argument via the requirement that
Alice and Bob must not be able to signal to each other by interacting with
their quantum systems even given the eavesdropper’s measurement outcome.
The secrecy of the key bit is based on the fact that there exist non-local cor-
relationswhich imply that the outcomes must be completely independent
of any information the eavesdropper can possibly hold. These correla-
tions can be realized by measuring an entangled quantum state and addi-
tionally have the property that Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are perfectly
correlated. These properties are exactly what is necessary for a secure
shared bit.
An advantage of non-signalling key agreement is that its security proof is
based on observed correlations. It is independent from the question how
these correlations were realized, such as the physical particles used to dis-
tribute them, the dimension of the Hilbert space or the exact working of
the measurement device. These protocols are, therefore, naturally device-
independent. Of course, allowing an adversary to do anything compatible
with the non-signalling principle might be more than what a quantum ad-
versary can do. However, Barrett, Hardy, and Kent’s protocol implies that
security is possible in principle even against such powerful adversaries.
The protocol of Barrett, Hardy, and Kent (see Figure 1.3, p. 10) is secure
against the most general type of attacks — in the context of quantum key
distribution these are called coherent attacks. The adversary can directly
attack the key, independently of whether the physical realization of the
protocol was made using several systems. Unfortunately, the security
of the resulting key bit is only proportional to the number of systems
and measurement bases used. Furthermore, the correlations need to be
perfect for Alice and Bob not to abort, i.e., no noise can be tolerated. These
properties imply that the protocol has zero key rate.
When restricting the type of attacks an adversary can make, these prob-
lems can be overcome. In fact, there exist (noisy) non-local correlations
with a finite number of inputs that imply partial secrecy against a non-
signalling eavesdropper, i.e., the outcome can be biased but not perfectly
known. When Eve has to try to guess each bit of the raw key independ-
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ently and individually, i.e., she is restricted to individual attacks, this im-
plies that Alice and Bob can extract a secure key by applying information
reconciliation and privacy amplification [AGM06, AMP06, SGB+06]. This
works in the same way as against a purely classical adversary. However,
generally we would not like to make such a restriction and it is unclear
whether these schemes remain secure. In fact, consider privacy amplific-
ation: Alice and Bob apply a public hash function to their raw key. An
adversary able to do arbitrary attacks can now directly attack the final key,
without having to learn anything about the raw key. Indeed, in Chapter 5
we show that, unless Alice and Bob apply further countermeasures, the
final key is only roughly as secure as the individual bits against a non-
signalling adversary able to do collective attacks.
In this chapter, we study privacy amplification of non-signalling secrecy
under the following such countermeasure: We require the non-signalling
condition not only to hold between Alice, Bob, and Eve, but also between
each of the subsystems.
Chapter outline We first characterize the exact possibilities that a non-
signalling adversary has to attack a system (Section 3.2) and give the de-
scription of the setup we consider (Section 3.2.2). We show how non-local
systems can imply partial secrecy against non-signalling adversaries in
Section 3.3.1, and give a general way to calculate the secrecy of a bit using
a linear program (Section 3.3.2). In Section 3.4.1, we consider the case of
several systems and express the non-signalling condition for several sys-
tems in terms of the non-signalling conditions for the subsystems. This
insight leads directly to an XOR-Lemma for non-signalling secrecy, i.e.,
the XOR can be used as a fixed privacy-amplification function, see Sec-
tion 3.4.2. In Section 3.5, we construct a general key-agreement scheme
from several partially secure non-signalling systems, and give a specific
protocol in Section 3.6.
Related work The idea of basing secrecy on the non-signalling prin-
ciple was introduced by Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [BHK05]. Key agree-
ment against non-signalling adversaries when allowing restricted (indi-
vidual) attacks was shown in [AGM06, AMP06, SGB+06]. In [Mas09],
Masanes showed that privacy amplification against non-signalling ad-
versaries works using a fixed function if an additional non-signalling con-
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dition holds between the subsystems. The proof is specific for the case of
the CHSH inequality or its generalization, the Braunstein-Caves inequal-
ity (see Section 2.6.1), and is non-constructive, i.e., no explicit function
for privacy amplification is given. Recently, Masanes showed that, in the
above case, choosing the privacy amplification from a two-universal set
is sufficient [MRW+09].
Contributions The main technical contributions of this chapter are
Lemma 3.12, relating the non-signalling condition of several systems to
the ones for each subsystem and the XOR-Lemma for non-signalling se-
crecy (Theorem 3.1). Some results of this chapter have previously been
published in [HRW10].
3.2 Modelling Non-Signalling Adversaries
PXY Z|UVW
U V
X Y
W Z
Figure 3.1: The tripartite scenario including the eavesdropper.
In non-signalling key distribution, the measurements of Alice and Bob
on some kind of physical system are abstractly modelled as a probability
distribution PXY |UV . This distribution must be non-signalling. A non-
signalling adversary is an additional interface to the system shared by Alice
and Bob, such that the resulting tripartite system PXY Z|UVW is still non-
signalling between all parties. Of course, there is no need to limit the hon-
est parties to two, there could be arbitrarily many: Alice, Bob, Charlie, etc.
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In particular, the case when Alice and Bob share n different subsystems
can be seen as the case of 2n parties (plus the eavesdropper). The fact that
we model the eavesdropper as a single interface even if the honest parties
share several subsystems reflects the eavesdroppers ability to attack all
systems jointly.
In fact, the only restriction we will make on the ways the adversary can
interact with the system is that the system between the honest parties and
the adversary is non-signalling.
Condition 1. The system PXY Z|UVW must be a (2n + 1)-party non-sig-
nalling system.
The non-signalling condition is motivated by quantum mechanics where
measurements on different parts of an entangled quantum state cannot
be used for message transmission. It, therefore, follows from the assump-
tion usually made in quantum key distribution that, once the physical
system is distributed, it can be modelled as an entangled quantum state
and each party can only act (perform a measurement) on their part of the
Hilbert space. However, Condition 1 is really equivalent to the condition
that the honest parties have secure laboratories, in the sense that no (un-
authorized) information must leak to any other party — in particular, no
information is leaked via the physical system. It is clear that no crypto-
graphy is possible if this condition does not hold, for example, if Alice’s
laboratory contains a transmitter sending the key (or even the secret!) to
the eavesdropper (see also Section 1.2). Note that the non-signalling con-
dition between the honest parties and their subsystems can be guaranteed
by either building several laboratories within the laboratories or by meas-
uring the physical systems in a space-like separated way1, in which case
information transmission between them is ruled out by relativity theory.
3.2.1 Possible attacks
In order to define the exact possibilities a non-signalling adversary has
to attack a system, we define a non-signalling partition as a convex decom-
position of the non-signalling system PX|U (see Figure 3.3).
1In special relativity, space-like separated means that the coordinates of the events fulfil
c2∆t2 − |∆−→x |2 < 0, where c is the speed of light, and implies that there exists a reference
frame according to which the two events occur simultaneously.
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Xn
Vn
Yn
U2
X2
V2
Y2
U1
X1
V1
Y1
W Z
Figure 3.2: Alice and Bob share n systems. Eve can attack all of them at
once.
PXY |UV = pz0 · P
z0
XY |UV
non-signalling
+pz1 · P
z1
XY |UV
non-signalling
+ · · ·
Figure 3.3: By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, an attack of the eavesdropper corres-
ponds to a choice of convex decomposition. Her outcome is an element
in the convex decomposition.
Definition 3.1. A non-signalling partition of a given n-party non-signalling
system PX|U is a family of pairs {(pzw ,P zwX|U )}zw , where pzw is a weight
and P zw
X|U is an n-party non-signalling system, such that
PX|U =
∑
zw
pzw · P zw
X|U . (3.1)
The non-signalling partition defines exactly the possible extensions of a
given n-party non-signalling system to an (n + 1)-party non-signalling
system and, therefore, the possibilities a non-signalling adversary has to
attack the system PX|U . This is stated in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemma 3.1. For any given (n + 1)-party non-signalling system, PXZ|UW ,
any input w induces a non-signalling partition of the n-party non-signalling
system PX|U , parametrized by z, with pzw := PZ|W=w(z) and P
zw
X|U :=
PX|U ,Z=z,W=w.
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Proof. Since PXZ|UW is an (n + 1)-party non-signalling system, the mar-
ginal system PX|U and the conditional systemsPX|U ,Z=z,W=w aren-party
non-signalling systems. For a givenW = w, PZ|W=w is a probability dis-
tribution and, therefore, pzw := PZ|W=w(z) is a weight. Equation (3.1)
holds by the definition of the marginal system.
Lemma 3.2. Given an n-party non-signalling system PX|U , let W be a set
of non-signalling partitions, w = {(pzw , P zw
XZ|U )}zw . Then the (n + 1)-party
system where the input of the last party is w ∈ W , defined by
PXZ|U ,W (x, z,u, w) := p
zw · P zw
X|U (x,u) ,
is non-signalling and has marginal system PX|U .
Proof. To see that it has the correct marginal system, note that for any w,∑
zw
pzw · P zw
X|U = PX|U by (3.1). To see that it is non-signalling, consider
Lemma 2.7, p. 58. We have∑
xi
PXZ|UW (x, z, ui,ui¯, w) =
∑
xi
PXZ|UW (x, z, u′i,ui¯, w)
because the conditional systems P zw
X|U (x,u) are n-party non-signalling.
Additionally,∑
z
PXZ|UW (x, z,u, w) =
∑
z
PXZ|UW (x, z,u, w′) ,
holds by (3.1).
3.2.2 Security of our key-agreement protocol
The setup we consider (see Figure 3.4) is the one where Alice and Bob
share a public authenticated channel plus some kind of physical system,
modelled as a non-signalling system. They can interact with the physical
system (i.e., give inputs and obtain outputs). Using the public authentic-
ated channel, they can then apply a protocol to their inputs and outputs
in order to obtain a shared secret key.
Eve can wire-tap the public channel, choose an input on her part of the
system and obtain an output. The following lemma states that it is no ad-
vantage for Eve tomake several non-signalling partitions (measurements)
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instead of a single one, as the same information can be obtained by mak-
ing a refined non-signalling partition of the initial system. Without loss
of generality, we can, therefore, assume that Eve gives a single input to
the system at the end (after all communication between Alice and Bob is
finished).
Lemma 3.3. Let w be a non-signalling partition of a non-signalling system
PX|U , with elements {(pzw , P zwX|U )}zw , and letw′z be a set of non-signalling par-
titions of the non-signalling systems P zw
X|U , with elements
{(pz
′
w′z , P
zw,z
′
w′z
X|U )}z′w′z . Then there exists a non-signalling partition of PX|U
with elements {(pzwpz
′
w′z , P
zw,z
′
w′z
X|U )}zw,z′w′z .
Proof. Since pzw and p
z′
w′z are weights, their product is also a weight. The
distributions P
zw,z
′
w′z
X|U are n-party non-signalling systems because they are
elements of the non-signalling partition w′z . Finally,
∑
zw,z′w′z
pzwp
z′
w′z · P zw,z
′
w′z
X|U =
∑
zw
pzw ·
(∑
z′
w′z
p
z′
w′zP
zw,z
′
w′z
X|U
)
=
∑
zw
pzw · P zw
X|U = PX|U ,
wherewe have first used that w′z is a non-signalling partition of P
zw
X|U and
then that w is a non-signalling partition of PX|U .
In our real scenario (see Figure 3.4), Alice, therefore, uses the inputs and
outputs U and X of the system and the information Q exchanged over
the public authenticated channel to create a string SA. Bob uses V and
Y and the information Q to create SB . Eve obtains all the information
Q exchanged over the public authenticated channel, can then choose the
input to her system W (which can depend on Q) and finally obtains the
outcome Z of the system.
We define security by comparing this real scenario to an ideal scenario
which is secure by definition (see Section 2.3). In the ideal scenario, Alice
and Bob output the same uniformly distributed string, and the system
Eve interacts with is completely uncorrelated with it. Our goal is to
bound the distinguishing advantage between the real and ideal system.
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Sreal public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
non-signalling
system
Q
pi pi′
SA SB
Sint public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
non-signalling
system
Q
pi pi′
SA SA
Sideal public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
non-signalling
system
Q
pi pi′
PS(s) = 1/|S|S S
Figure 3.4: Our real system (top). Alice and Bob share a public authen-
ticated channel and a non-signalling system. When they apply a protocol
(π, π′) to obtain a key, all this can together be modelled as a system. In
our ideal system (bottom), the system outputs a uniform random string S
to both Alice and Bob. We also use an intermediate system (middle) in our
calculations, which outputs SA to both Alice and Bob.
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In order to bound the distance between the real and ideal system, we
introduce an intermediate system (see Figure 3.4). Using the triangle in-
equality (Lemma 2.5, p. 32) we can bound the distance between the real
and ideal system by the sum of the distance between real or ideal system
and the intermediate system. Note that the distance between the real and
intermediate system is the parameter characterizing the correctness of the
protocol, whereas the distance between the intermediate and the ideal
system characterizes the secrecy (see Section 2.3.2).
In order to estimate the secrecy of the protocol, we introduce the distance
from uniform of the key string SA from the eavesdropper’s point of view.
Wewill in the following call it the distance from uniform of SA givenZ(Wn−s)
andQ, where we write Z(Wn−s) because the eavesdropper can choose the
input adaptively and the choice of input changes the output distribution.
Definition 3.2. Consider a system Sreal as depicted in Figure 3.4. The
distance from uniform of SA given Z(Wn−s) and Q is
d(SA|Z(Wn−s), Q)
=
1
2
∑
sA,q
max
w:n−s
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) · |PSA|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(sA)− PU (sA)| ,
where PU := 1/|SA| and the maximization is over all non-signalling sys-
tems PXY Z|UVW .
It will be useful to define the distance from uniform of a string S given a
specific adversarial strategy w. To denote this difference, we will denote
the strategy by a lower case letter.
Definition 3.3. The distance from uniform of S given Z(w) and Q is
d(S|Z(w), Q) = 1
2
∑
s,q
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) ·
∣∣∣∣PS|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(s)− 1|SA|
∣∣∣∣ .
The following corollary is a direct consequence2 of the definitions of the
systems in Figure 3.4 and the distinguishing advantage.
2Note that, because the system considered is non-signalling, we can think of a box giving
outputs indexed by w, Zw , of which one is selected instead of a system taking inputW .
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Corollary 3.1. Assume a key SA generated by a system as given in Figure 3.4.
Then
δ(Sint,Sideal) = d(SA|Z(Wn−s), Q) .
The distance from the intermediate system to the real system is exactly
the probability that the real system outputs different values on the two
sides. This is again a direct consequence of the definitions.
Corollary 3.2. Assume a key SA generated by the intermediate system Sint
depicted in Figure 3.4. Then
δ(Sreal,Sint) =
∑
sA 6=sB
PSASB (sA, sB) .
By the triangle inequality for the distinguishing advantage of systems
(Lemma 2.5, p. 32), we obtain the following statement.
Lemma 3.4.
δ(Sreal,Sideal) ≤ δ(Sreal,Sint) + δ(Sint,Sideal) .
In order to prove security, we will, therefore, have to show that this quant-
ity is small, more precisely, we will show that δ(Sreal,Sideal) ≤ ǫ, which
implies that the key-distribution scheme is ǫ-secure.
3.3 Security of a Single System
3.3.1 A bipartite system with binary inputs and outputs
Let us consider the case where Alice and Bob share a non-signalling sys-
temwhich takes one bit input and gives one bit output on each side. Alice
and Bob choose a random input and obtain the output. Then, they ex-
change their inputs over the public authenticated channel, i.e., Q = (U =
u, V = v),3 and take directly the output bit as secret key, i.e., SA = X .
3In a certain abuse of notation, we will allow Q to consist of both random variables and
events that a random variable takes a given value. In case of such events, U = u, this
means that the distance from uniform will hold given this specific value u, whereas taking
the expectation over Q will correspond to taking the expectation over all the ‘free’ random
variables contained inQ.
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Assume that the system fulfils
1
4
∑
(x,y,u,v):x⊕y=u·v
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) = 1− ε ,
i.e., for ε < 1/4, the system is non-local (see Definition 2.39, p. 52 and
Example 7, p. 52). Our goal is to show, that the bitX is partially secret. In
fact, its secrecy is proportional to the parameter ε. We do not consider the
correctness for the moment.
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Figure 3.5: A system with Pr[X ⊕ Y = U · V ] = 1− ε.
More precisely, we show the following statement.
Lemma 3.5. Let PXY Z|UVW be a non-signalling system with X = Y = U =
V = {0, 1} such that the marginal PXY |UV fulfils
1
4
∑
(x,y,u,v):x⊕y=u·v
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) = 1− ε
and let Q := (U = u, V = v). Then
d(X |Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ 2ε .
Proof. Consider w.l.o.g. the case X = 0. We call εi the probability that
X ⊕ Y 6= U · V for the inputs {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, respectively.
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Suppose w.l.o.g. that the input was (0, 0), so X should be maximally
biased for this input. Since it holds that Pr[X ⊕ Y 6= U · V |U, V = 0, 0] =
ε1, the bias of Y , given U = V = 0, must be at least p − ε1 (see Fig-
ure 3.6). Because of non-signalling, X ’s bias must be p as well when
V = 1, and so on. Finally, Pr[X ⊕ Y 6= U · V |(U, V ) = (1, 1)] = ε4 im-
plies p− ε2− (1− (p− ε1− ε3)) ≤ ε4, hence, p ≤ (1+
∑
i εi)/2 = 1/2+ 2ε.
Now consider a non-signalling partition of PXY |UV parametrized by z.
Let εz denote the error of the system given Z = z, i.e., εz = (
∑
i εi,z)/4.
Since this system must still be non-signalling, the bias of X given Z = z,
U = u and V = v is at most 2εz by the above argument. However,
PXY |UV =
∑
z p
z · P zXY |UV , implies ε =
∑
z p
z · εz and this holds for
all values of X , therefore, d(X |Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤
∑
z p
z · 2εz = 2ε.
PX|U=u,V=v(0) PY |U=u,V=v(0)u v
0
0
1
1
0
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n-s
n-s
n-s
ε
ε
ε
ε
Figure 3.6: The maximal bias of the output of a system with Pr[X ⊕ Y =
U · V ] = 1− ε.
Note that there is a non-signalling partition, given in Section 5.3, reaching
this bound.
Systems PXY |UV with ε ∈ [0, 0.25) are non-local, i.e., they violate a Bell
inequality, more precisely the CHSH inequality given in Example 7, p. 52.
For any of these systems, Eve cannot obtain perfect knowledge about
Alice’s output bit, and it, therefore, contains some secrecy.
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3.3.2 The general optimal attack on a bit
Now consider the case when a bit B = f(X) is obtained from the out-
puts of an n-party non-signalling system with arbitrary input and output
alphabet. This includes, in particular, the case where Alice and Bob share
a bipartite non-signalling system and the bit is a function only of Alice’s
outputs, i.e., the situation we will consider for key agreement. The inputs
as well as the function f are communicated over the public authenticated
channel, i.e., Q = (U = u, F = f). What is the maximal distance from
uniform given an adversary’s output variable Z this bit can have?
Finding the maximal distance from uniform corresponds to finding the
‘best’ non-signalling partition, from the adversary’s point of view. We
first show that it is enough to consider non-signalling partitions with two
elements.
PXY |UV
B biased to 0
= pz0 · P z0XY |UV
non-signalling
B biased to 1
+pz1 · P z1XY |UV
non-signalling
+ · · ·
Figure 3.7: In order to find the distance from uniform of a bit, it is enough
to consider non-signalling partitions with two elements (Lemma 3.6).
Lemma 3.6. Assume there exists a non-signalling partition w′ with
d(f(X)|Z ′(w′), Q), where Q = (U = u, F = f). Then there exists a non-
signalling partition w with the same distance from uniform with Z ∈ {z0, z1}
and such that P (f(X) = 0|Q,Z = z0) > 1/2 and P (f(X) = 0|Q,Z = z1) ≤
1/2.
Proof. Assume that the non-signalling partition has more than two ele-
ments. Define a new element (pz0 , PZ0
X|U ) by
pz0 :=pz
′
1 + · · ·+ pz′m
P z0
X|U :=
1
pz0
m∑
i=1
pz
′
iP
z′i
X|U ,
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where the set z′1, . . . , z
′
m is defined to consist of the conditional systems
P
z′i
X|U such that P (f(X) = 0|U = u, Z = z′i) > 1/2 (pz0 can be 0). Sim-
ilarly define (pz1 , P z1
X|U ) as the convex combination of the remaining ele-
ments of the non-signalling partition. Since the space of non-signalling
systems is convex, this forms again a non-signalling partition, and it
reaches the same distance.
We can simplify the problem even further, such that we only need to con-
sider a single element of the non-signalling partition. The reason is that
given one element of a non-signalling partition with two elements, the
other one is uniquely determined by the fact that the sum of the two is
the marginal system, i.e.,
PX|U = p · P z0X|U + (1 − p) · P z1X|U .
Lemma 3.7. Consider a non-signalling partition w with element (p, P z0
X|U )
such that P (B = 0|Q,Z = z0) > 1/2 with B = f(X) and Q = (U = u, F =
f). Then the distance from uniform of B given the non-signalling partition w
and Q = (U = u, F = f) is
d(B|Z(w), Q) = p · (P (B = 0|Q,Z = z0)− P (B = 1|Q,Z = z0))
− 1
2
· (P (B = 0|Q)− P (B = 1|Q)) ,
where P (B = 0|Q) stands for∑x:f(x)=0 PX|U (x,u).
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that P (B = 0|Q,Z = z1) ≤ 1/2. By Definition 2.11,
p. 27, the distance from uniform of B given the non-signalling partition
w and Q = (U = u, F = f) is
d(B|Z(w¯), Q)
= p ·
(
P (B = 0|Q,Z = z0)− 1
2
)
+ (1− p) ·
(
1
2
− P (B = 0|Q,Z = z1)
)
=
1
2
· p · (P (B = 0|Q,Z = z0)− P (B = 1|Q,Z = z0))
+
1
2
· (1− p) · (P (B = 1|Q,Z = z1)− P (B = 0|Q,Z = z1))
= p · (P (B = 0|Q,Z = z0)− P (B = 1|Q,Z = z0))
− 1
2
· (P (B = 0|Q)− P (B = 1|Q)) ,
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where we have used that (1− p)P z1
X|U = PX|U − pP z0X|U .
We have reduced the question of the maximal distance from uniform
given a non-signalling partition to the problem of finding the ‘best’ ele-
ment (p, P z0
X|U ) of a non-signalling partition. The question remains to be
answered, when (p, P z0
X|U ) is element of a non-signalling partition. The
criterion is given in Lemma 3.8.
Lemma 3.8. Given a non-signalling system PX|U , there exists a non-signalling
partition with element (p, P z0
X|U ) if and only if for all inputs and outputs x,u,
p · P z0
X|U (x,u) ≤ PX|U (x,u) . (3.2)
Proof. The non-signalling condition is linear and the space of conditional
probability distributions is convex, therefore a convex combination of
non-signalling systems P z
X|U is a non-signalling system. In order to prove
that the outcome z0 can occur with probability p it is, therefore, sufficient
to show that there exists another outcome z1 which can occur with 1 − p,
and that the weighted sum of the two is PX|U . If P
z0
X|U is a normalized
and non-signalling probability distribution, then so is P z1
X|U , because the
convex combination of the two, PX|U , is also non-signalling and normal-
ized. Therefore, we only need to verify that all entries of the comple-
mentary system P z1
X|U are between 0 and 1. However, this system is the
difference
P z1
X|U =
1
1− p (PX|U − p · P
z0
X|U ) .
Requesting this to be greater or equal to 0 is equivalent to (3.2). We ob-
serve that all entries of P z1
X|U are smaller or equal to 1 because of the
normalization: If the sum of positive terms is 1, each of them can be at
most 1.
The above argument implies in fact, that the maximal distance from uni-
form can be calculated by the following optimization problem— a linear
program.
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max :
∑
x:B=0
p · P z0
X|U (x,u)−
∑
x:B=1
p · P z0
X|U (x,u)
− 1
2
∑
x:B=0
p · PX|U (x,u) + 1
2
∑
x:B=1
p · PX|U (x,u)
s. t. p · P z0
X|U non-signalling
p · P z0
X|U (x,u) ≥ 0 for all x,u
p · P z0
X|U (x,u) ≤ PX|U (x,u) for all x,u .
We give a slightly different form of this optimization problem, where in-
stead of the variable pP z0
X|U , we optimize over a variable ∆ = 2pP
z0
X|U −
PX|U . ∆ can be seen as a non-signalling system which does not need to
be normalized nor positive. Why we use this form will become clear in
Section 3.4.
Lemma 3.9. The distance from uniform of B = f(X) given Z(Wn−s) and
Q := (U = u, F = f) is
d(B|Z(Wn−s), Q) = 1
2
· bT ·∆∗ ,
where bT∆∗ is the optimal value of the linear program
max :
∑
x:B=0
∆(x,u)−
∑
x:B=1
∆(x,u) (3.3)
s. t.
∑
xi
∆(x, ui,ui¯)−
∑
xi
∆(x, u′i,ui¯) = 0 for all x, ui, u
′
i,ui¯
∆(x,u) ≤ PX|U (x,u) for all x,u
∆(x,u) ≥ −PX|U (x,u) for all x,u .
Proof. We show that every element (p, P z0
X|U ) of a non-signalling partition
corresponds to a feasible∆, and vice versa.
Assume an element of a non-signalling partition, (p, P z0
X|U ), and define
∆(x,u) = 2p · P z0
X|U (x,u)− PX|U (x,u) .
∆ fulfils the non-signalling conditions by linearity. The positivity of p
and P z0
X|U (x,u) ≥ 0 imply ∆(x,u) ≥ −PX|U (x,u) and pP z0X|U (x,u) ≤
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PX|U (x,u) (Lemma 3.8) implies ∆(x,u) ≤ PX|U (x,u). ∆ is, therefore,
feasible.
To see the reverse direction, assume a feasible∆. Define
p =
1
2
·
(
1 +
∑
x
∆(x, 0 . . . 0)
)
P z0
X|U (x,u) =
PX|U (x,u) + ∆(x,u)
2p
.
(For completeness, define P z0
X|U (x,u) = PX|U (x,u) in case p = 0.) To see
that (p, P z0
X|U ) is element of a non-signalling partition note that, because
of the non-signalling constraints,
∑
x∆(x, 0 . . . 0) =
∑
x∆(x,u
′) for all
u′. I.e., p is independent of the chosen input and the above transformation
is, therefore, linear. This implies that P z0
X|U is non-signalling. Since
∑
x
P z0
X|U (x,u) =
∑
x
PX|U (x,u) + ∆(x,u)
2p
=
1 + (2p− 1)
2p
= 1 ,
it is normalized. Since −PX|U (x,u) ≤ ∆(x,u) ≤ PX|U (x,u) and∑
x PX|U (x,u) = 1, it holds that −1 ≤
∑
x∆(x, 0 . . . 0) ≤ 1 and this im-
plies P z0
X|U (x,u) ≥ 0 i.e., P z0X|U is a non-signalling system. By Lemma 3.8,
(p, P z0
X|U ) is element of a non-signalling partition because
p · P z0
X|U (x,u) =
1
2
·
(
1 +
∑
x
∆(x, 0 . . . 0)
)
· PX|U (x,u) + ∆(x,u)
1 +
∑
x∆(x, 0 . . . 0)
=
1
2
· (PX|U (x,u) + ∆(x,u))
≤ PX|U (x,u) .
The value of the objective function for any ∆ is exactly twice the dis-
tance from uniform reached by the non-signalling partition with element
(p, P z0
X|U ).∑
x:B=0
∆(x,u)−
∑
x:B=1
∆(x,u) =
∑
x:B=0
(
2p · P z0
X|U (x,u)− PX|U (x,u)
)
,
which is exactly twice the distance from uniform by Lemma 3.7.
Note that the linear program of Lemma 3.9 can be expressed either in its
primal or dual form (see Section 2.4.1).
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PRIMAL
max : bT ·∆ (3.4)
s. t.


An−s
−An−s
1
−1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·∆ ≤


0
0
PX|U
PX|U


︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
The dual of the above linear program has the form
DUAL
min :
cT︷ ︸︸ ︷

0
0
PX|U
PX|U


T
·λ (3.5)
s. t.
(
An−s −An−s 1 −1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AT
·λ = b
λ ≥ 0
As an example, consider again a system with binary inputs and outputs,
i.e. the case we have already studied in Section 3.3.1. We give the explicit
forms of A, b, and c below.
Example 11. For a bipartite system taking one bit input and giving one
bit output on each side, A, b, and c have the form
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A =


An−s
−An−s
116
−116


c =


016
016
PXY |UV
PXY |UV


b =


1
1
0
0
−1
−1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0


with PXY |UV =


P (0, 0, 0, 0)
P (0, 1, 0, 0)
P (0, 0, 0, 1)
P (0, 1, 0, 1)
P (1, 0, 0, 0)
P (1, 1, 0, 0)
P (1, 0, 0, 1)
P (1, 1, 0, 1)
P (0, 0, 1, 0)
P (0, 1, 1, 0)
P (0, 0, 1, 1)
P (0, 1, 1, 1)
P (1, 0, 1, 0)
P (1, 1, 1, 0)
P (1, 0, 1, 1)
P (1, 1, 1, 1)


and
An−s =


1 1 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 −1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1


.
Since a linear program can be solved either in its primal or its dual form,
we could as well have solved the dual problem (3.5) in order to obtain
the distance from uniform of the bit B, instead of the above linear pro-
gram. The dual is a minimization problem, and therefore, any feasible
solution of the dual program is an upper bound on the distance from uni-
form of the bit B. We further observe that the dual feasible solutions are
independent of the marginal probability distribution as seen by the hon-
est parties, and that the value reached by the dual feasible solution can be
expressed in terms of the marginal probability distribution.
Lemma 3.10. For any dual feasible solution of the linear program (3.3) (see
(3.5)), there exists an event E defined by the inputs and outputs of the system
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PX|U and (independent) randomness such that the value of (3.5) is proportional
to the probability of this event, and, therefore, d(f(X)|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ d/2 =
cTλ/2 ∝ P (E).
Note that Lemma 3.10 holds, in particular, for the optimal dual solution,
which implies that the distance from uniform is proportional to some
event defined by the random variables, i.e., the secrecy of the bit can be
inferred from the behaviour of the marginal system.
Proof. The value of d(f(X)|Z(Wn−s), Q) is bounded by the value of any
dual feasible solution, i.e., it is of the form cTλ/2, where c contains the
probabilities PX|U (x,u) (all other entries are 0) and λ ≥ 0. Therefore,
it can be expressed as a weighted sum of the probabilities PX|U (x,u).
If all weights have the same value, this implies that the optimal value
is proportional to an event E defined by X and U . If not all weights
have the same value, define for each x and u an additional random coin
which takes value 1 with probability λi/maxi(λi). The optimal value is
then proportional to an event E defined by X and U and the additional
random coin taking value 1.
Example 12. Let us come back to the above example of a bipartite system
with binary inputs and outputs. It can easily be verified that the following
is a dual feasible solution of the linear program:
λ∗T1 =
(12 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
1
2 0 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
1
2 · · ·
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1)
(it is also optimal for systems with ε ≤ 0.25). To obtain the value of the
objective function (cTλ∗1), the first part of λ
∗
1 will be multiplied by 0, i.e.,
does not contribute to the value. The second part is multiplied byPXY |UV .
We can easily see by comparison that for every x, y, u, v such that x⊕ y 6=
u · v, there is exactly one ‘1’ in the second part of λ∗1 and everywhere else
λ∗1 is 0, i.e.,
cT · λ∗1 =
∑
x,y,u,v:x⊕y 6=u·v
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) .
This confirms the results of Section 3.3.1.
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3.4 Several Systems
3.4.1 The non-signalling condition for several systems
We have already seen that the distance from uniform of a bit obtained
from any (not necessarily bipartite) non-signalling system can be
obtained by a linear program (3.3). In this section, we study the structure
of the space describing n-party non-signalling systems, and show that
the non-signalling condition for n parties can be expressed as function
of the non-signalling condition of the different parts it consists of. More
precisely, we show that the non-signalling condition of an (n +m)-party
non-signalling system is just the tensor product of the non-signalling con-
dition for an n- and anm-party non-signalling system.
Note that the probabilities describing an (n + m)-party non-signalling
system can be seen as living in the tensor product space of the vector of
probabilities describing each subsystem.
Lemma 3.11. Let PX1|U1 be an n-party non-signalling system, and write An−s
for the matrix describing the non-signalling conditions this system fulfils, i.e.,
An−s,1PX1|U1 = 0. Similarly, let PX2|U2 be an m-party non-signaling system
fulfilling An−s,2PX2|U2 = 0. Then the (n + m)-party system PX1X2|U1U2 is
non-signalling exactly if
(An−s,1 ⊗ 1n−s,2) · PX1X2|U1U2 = 0 and
(1n−s,1 ⊗An−s,2) · PX1X2|U1U2 = 0 .
Proof. The non-signalling conditions for the n-party non-signalling sys-
tem are of the form∑
x1i
PX1|U1(x1, u1i,u1¯i)−
∑
x1i
PX1|U1(x1, u1
′
i,u1¯i) = 0 .
The conditions (An−s,1 ⊗ 1n−s,2) · PX1X2|U1U2 = 0, therefore, correspond
to conditions of the form∑
x1i
PX1X2|U1U2(x1,x2, u1i,u1¯i,u2)
−
∑
x1i
PX1X2|U1U2(x1,x2, u
′
1i,u1¯i,u2) = 0 ,
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(and similarly for the second system) which must hold for any (n + m)-
party non-signalling system by Definition 2.41, p. 57. By Lemma 2.7, p. 58
these conditions are also sufficient.
The above argument implies that in the linear program (3.3), the non-
signalling condition can be replaced by this ‘tensor product’ expression
instead of directly requiring the system to be n-party non-signalling.
3.4.2 An XOR-Lemma for non-signalling secrecy
We can now show that non-signalling secrecy can be amplified by a de-
terministic privacy-amplification function, namely the XOR. Assume that
Alice and Bob share a system giving rise to a (non-local) probability dis-
tribution PXY |UV . Assume further that from this distribution a bit, f(X),
can be extracted and that this bit is partially secret by the non-signalling
condition. Then the bit obtained from n copies of the distribution
P⊗nXY |UV and by XORing the n partially secret bits together is insecure
only if all the n copies are insecure.
The key observation in order to show that the XOR of several partially
non-signalling secure bits is highly secure, is that the linear program de-
scribing the distance from uniform of this bit is the tensor product of the
‘individual’ linear programs in the sense that its constraint matrix An is
A⊗n and the objective function bn = b⊗n. The vector cn does not need to
be of product form, because a (2n)-party non-signalling system does not
necessarily need to consist of n independent bipartite non-signalling dis-
tributions. The linear program can be taken to be of the following form:
max : (b⊗n)T ·∆ (3.6)
s. t. A⊗n ·∆ ≤ cn .
Lemma 3.12. Let A1, b1, and c1 be the vectors and matrices associated with
the linear program (3.4) calculating the maximal distance from uniform of a bit
f(X1) of an n-party non-signalling system PX1|U1 and similarly call A2, b2,
and c2 the vectors and matrices associated with the distance from uniform of a
bit g(X2) of anm-party non-signalling system PX2|U2 . Then the distance from
uniform of the bit B = f(X1) ⊕ g(X2) is bounded by the linear program A, b,
and c, where A = A1 ⊗A2 and b = b1 ⊗ b2.
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Proof. Let us first verify that the constraints need to hold. Lemma 3.11
implies that for any ∆ associated with an (n + m)-party non-signalling
system, (A1 ⊗ 1)∆ ≤ 0must hold, and similarly with the sign on the left-
hand side reversed and for the non-signalling condition of the m-party
system. (A1 ⊗ A2)∆ ≤ 0 holds because it is a linear combination of the
conditions of the form (A1 ⊗ 1)∆ ≤ 0. The condition of the form (1 ⊗
1)∆ ≤ PX1X2|U1U2 must hold by Lemma 3.8.
It remains to see that b can be taken of this form. b is equal to 0 where
either b1 or b2 is equal to 0, equal to 1 exactly where both b1 and b2 are
equal to 1 or both are equal to −1. It is equal to −1 where b1 and b2 are
equal to 1, −1 or vice versa. This models exactly the vector b associated
with the bit B = f(X1)⊕ g(X2).
Now switch to the dual form of this linear program.
min : cTn · λn
s. t. (A⊗n)T · λn = b⊗n
λn ≥ 0
It is now straight-forward to see that if λ was a feasible solution for a
single copy of the system, then λn = λ
⊗n is a feasible solution for the
dual of the n copy version and, therefore, an upper bound on the distance
from uniform of the bit B =
⊕
iBi.
Lemma 3.13. For any λ1 which is dual feasible for the linear program A1, b1
associated with the non-signalling system PX1|U1 and λ2 which is dual feas-
ible for the linear program A2, b2 associated with the non-signalling system
PX2|U2 , λ = λ1 ⊗ λ2 is dual feasible for the linear program A, b associated
with PX1X2|U1U2 .
Proof. By Lemma 3.12, A = A1 ⊗A2 and b = b1 ⊗ b2. Therefore,
A · λ = (A1 ⊗A2) · (λ1 ⊗ λ2) = (A1 · λ1)⊗ (A2 · λ2) = b1 ⊗ b2 .
Furthermore, λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 implies λ1 ⊗ λ2 ≥ 0. Therefore, λ is dual feasible.
If the marginal cn of n systems has product form, the value of this dual
feasible solution — and, therefore, an upper bound on the distance from
uniform of the key bit — is cTnλn =
(⊗
i c
T
i
)
(
⊗
i λi) =
⊗
i(c
T
i λi) =
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∏
i(c
T
i λi), i.e., the same value as if each of the n systems was attacked
individually. If cn does not have product form, then the value is still
bounded by the probability that the event (defined by the input/output
configurations such that the bit is insecure (Lemma 3.10)) occurs for all
the n copies of the system as stated in the following lemma.
Theorem 3.1 (XOR-Lemma for non-signalling secrecy). Let PX1|U1 be an n-
party non-signalling system and f(X1) a bit such that
d(f(X1)|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ k1P (E1)/2, where E1 is an event defined by X1 and
U1 (and maybe independent randomness). Similarly, let PX2|U2 be anm-party
non-signalling system with associated bit g(X2) and d(g(X2)|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤
k2P (E2)/2. Let Q = (U = u, F = f,G = g). Then
d(f(X1)⊕ g(X2)|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ 1
2
· k1 · k2 · P (E1 ∧ E2) .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.13.
Example 13. Let us come back to the example of Section 3.3.1 (see also
Example 11) where PXY |UV is a (2n)-party non-signalling system and
each random variable is a bit. We have seen, in Example 12, that the
distance from uniform of each bit is upper-bounded by
d(Xi|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ 1
2
∑
xi,yi,ui,vi:xi⊕yi 6=ui·vi
PXiYi|UiVi(xi, yi, ui, vi) .
Therefore,
d
(⊕
i
Xi
∣∣∣ Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ 1
2
∑
x,y,u,v:xi⊕yi 6=ui·vi ∀i
PXY |UV (x,y,u,v) .
3.5 Key Distribution from Non-Signalling Sys-
tems
In this section we show how we can use the XOR-Lemma established in
the previous section to obtain a device-independent quantum key-agree-
ment protocol. An explicit example of such a protocol can be found in
Section 3.6.
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A (quantum) key-distribution protocol usually proceeds in several steps.
First, Alice and Bob use the quantum channel. They distribute entangled
quantum states and measure them in order to obtain (classical) input
and output values. Then they sacrifice some of their systems (data) to
check whether an eavesdropper was present and whether their data is
good enough to establish a key. This step is called parameter estimation.
Then, they do classical post-processing to transform their weakly correl-
ated data into bit strings which are almost certainly equal, i.e., they do
information reconciliation. Finally, they do privacy amplification, i.e., they
apply a function to their partially secure bit strings in order to obtain a
shorter, but highly secure key.
We have to show two things about this key (see Section 2.3.2): The prob-
ability that Alice’s and Bob’s key are not equal is small (correctness) and,
the adversary knows almost nothing about this key (secrecy). Together,
(Lemma 2.5, p. 32) these two properties imply that the key is close to a
perfect key. Note that the key can be of zero length (i.e., Alice and Bob
abort the protocol), in which case correctness and secrecy both trivially
hold. This situation occurs if the parameter estimation step indicates that
the systems are not good enough for key agreement. If the adversary has
full control over the systems which are distributed (the channel), it is not
possible to require that a key is always generated, because the adversary
could just interrupt the communication line. Of course, we would like a
key to be generated if the adversary is passive. This property of a key-
distribution scheme is called, robustness. Robustness characterizes the
probability that the protocol aborts even though no adversary is present.
3.5.1 Parameter estimation
The goal of parameter estimation is for Alice and Bob to test whether the
systems they have received are good enough to do key agreement. They
execute a protocol where they interact with their systems and then output
either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’. If the systems have the necessary properties for
key agreement, they should output ‘accept’, while if they have not, they
should output ‘reject’.
Definition 3.4. A parameter estimation protocol is said to ǫ-securely filter
systems PXY |UV of a set P (or string pairs (x,y) of a set B) if on input
PXY |UV ∈ P (or (x,y) ∈ B) the protocol outputs ‘abort’ with probability
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at least 1− ǫ.
Definition 3.5. A parameter estimation protocol is said to be ǫ′-robust on
systems PXY |UV of a set P if on input PXY |UV ∈ P the protocol outputs
‘abort’ with probability at most ǫ′.
Before starting the protocol, Alice and Bob fix its parameters, more pre-
cisely, the probabilities k and p and values ε and δ.
Protocol 1 (Parameter estimation).
1. Alice and Bob receive PXY |UV .
2. Alice chooses U such that for each i with probability 1− k, it holds
that Ui = uk, where uk is the input from which a raw key bit can be
generated, and with probability k she chooses one of the |U| inputs
uniformly at random.
3. Bob chooses V such that Vi = vk with probability 1 − k and with
probability k, Vi is chosen uniformly at random.
4. They input u and v into the system and obtain outputs x and y.
5. They send the inputs over the public authenticated channel.
6. If less than (1 − k)2pn of the inputs were (Ui, Vi) = (uk, vk) they
abort.
7. If any combination of the possible values of (uk¯, vk¯) (where k¯ de-
notes the inputs which were chosen uniformly at random) occurred
less than k2pn/|U||V| times, they abort.
8. From the inputs (uk¯, vk¯), they estimate PXY UV (x, y, u, v), i.e., they
calculate the fraction of times they obtained a certain combination
x, y, u, v. Call this distribution P estXY UV . If |U||V|P estXY UV Tλ ≥ ε,
where λ is a dual feasible solution of (3.5), or if P est(X 6= Y |U =
uk, V = vk) ≥ δ, they abort. Else they accept.
We define the set P as the set where we would expect an adversary not to
know a lot about the output of the system.
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Definition 3.6. The set P are all distributions PXY |UV such that
PTXY |UV · λ⊗n ≤ εn
for some dual feasible λ. Furthermore, the set Pη are all distributions
PXY |UV such that PTXY |UV λ
⊗n ≥ (ε+ η)n
The quantity relevant for our security parameter is PT
XkYk|UkVkλ
⊗k,
where PXkYk|UkVk is the marginal distribution of the systems which will
be used to create the key. This quantity is directly proportional to the fre-
quency of a certain event defined by X,Y ,U ,V of the system
PXY UV = PXY |UV /|U||V| and we will be able to apply classical
sampling.
Lemma 3.14. Protocol 1 ǫ-securely filters Pη with
ǫ = 2e−
t
16 (
η
|U||V|λmax
)
2
,
where t = k2pn and λmax = maxi λi.
Proof. We want to bound PT
XY |UV λ
⊗n. Note that
PTXY |UV · λ = |U||V| · PTXY UV · λ = |U||V| · λmax · PTXY UV · λ/λmax
if the inputs are chosen uniformly. Since λ/λmax ≤ 1, the last part is di-
rectly the probability of an event described by x, y, u, v (and maybe inde-
pendent randomness, see Lemma 3.10). Estimating PT
XY |UV λ
⊗n within
an error η corresponds to estimating the probability of this event within
η/|U||V|λmax. The claim now follows directly by applying Lemma 2.3,
p. 28.
Definition 3.7. The sets Pηk is defined as in Definition 3.6, but where
PXY |UV = PXkYk|UkVk is the (2k
′)-party marginal of a (2n)-party non-
signalling system.
Lemma 3.15. Let PXY |UV be a (2n)-party non-signalling system not in Pη.
And let PXkYk|UkVk be the (2k
′)-party marginal non-signalling system for some
randomly chosen set of size k′. Then PXkYk|UkVk /∈ Pη+η¯k , except with probabil-
ity
ǫ = 2e−
k′
16 (
η¯
|U||V|λmax
)
2
.
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Proof. This is again a direct application of the Sampling Lemma (Lem-
ma 2.3, p. 28), the same way as in the proof of Lemma 3.14.
Lemmas 3.14 and 3.15 imply that, if the parameter estimation protocol
does not abort, then, almost certainly, the systems which will be used for
key generation are such that a secure key can be generated.
Lemma 3.16. Protocol 1 ǫ1-securely filters Pη+η¯k with
ǫ1 = 2e
− t16 ( η|U||V|λmax )
2
+ 2e−
k′
16 (
η¯
|U||V|λmax
)2 ,
where t = k2pn and λmax = maxi λi.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemmas 3.14 and 3.15.
Now let us also see that the parameter estimation protocol will abort
on inputs for which the information reconciliation might not work and
where Alice and Bob might, therefore, obtain different keys.
Definition 3.8. The set B are all pairs of n-bit strings (x,y) such that
dH(x,y) ≤ δn. The set Bη are all pairs of n-bit strings (x,y) such that
dH(x,y) ≥ (δ+η)n. By Bηk we denote are all pairs of k′-bit strings (xk,yk)
such that dH(xk,yk) ≥ (δ + η)k′.
Lemma 3.17. Let (xk,yk) be the outputs on input (Ui, Vi) = (uk, vk). Then
protocol 1 ǫ2-securely filters (xk,yk) ∈ Bη+η¯k , for any η, η¯ > 0, with
ǫ2 = 2e
− t′16 η2 + 2e−
k′
16 η¯
2
(3.7)
with t′ = k2pn/|U||V| and k′ = (1− k)2pn.
Proof. This follows from applying Lemma 2.3, p. 28 twice.
Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 imply that Protocol 1 either aborts, or the key cre-
ated will be both secret and correct. The probability that the parameter-
estimation protocol lets a ‘bad’ system pass is at most ǫ = ǫ1+ ǫ2, i.e., it is
ǫ-secure for some ǫ ∈ O(2−n).
Let us also verify, that there exist input systems on which the parameter-
estimation protocol does not abort, i.e., it is robust.
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Definition 3.9. The set P−η are all distributions PXY |UV such that
PT
XY |UV λ
⊗n ≤ (ε − η)n and ∑(x,y):dH(x,y)≥m PXY |U=uk,V =vk(x,y) ≤
(δ − η)m for allm.
Note that, for example, the distribution describing n independent sys-
tems of which the individual systems are ‘good enough’ is in this set.
On an input in P−η, the probability that the parameter-estimation pro-
tocol aborts is O(2−n), i.e., the protocol is robust.
Lemma 3.18. Protocol 1 is ǫ′-robust on P−η with
ǫ′ = 2e−
t
16 (
η
|U||V|λmax
)
2
+ 2e−
t′
16η
2
+ e−2n((1−p)(1−k)
2)
2
+ |U||V| · e−2n
(
(1−p)k2
|U||V|
)2
,
where t = k2pn and t′ = k2pn/|U||V|
Proof. The probability to wrongly estimate the frequency is given by Lem-
mas 3.14 and 3.17. The last two terms are the probability that any in-
put combination does not occur often enough and follow directly from a
Chernoff bound (see Lemma 2.1, p. 27).
3.5.2 Information reconciliation
Information reconciliation [BS93] is the process responsible to make Alice’s
and Bob’s data highly correlated, i.e., if we consider Bob’s string as an
erroneous version of Alice’s, then information reconciliation corresponds
to error correction. The idea is that Alice applies a function to her data
and sends the function value to Bob. Bob searches the value ‘closest’ to
his data that maps to this function value and should, almost certainly, be
able to recover Alice’s data.
Definition 3.10. Let P be a set of distributions PXY (or B a set of bit-
string pairs (x,y)). We say that an information reconciliation protocol is
ǫ-correct on P (or B), if on input PXY ∈ P ((x,y) ∈ B) it outputs x′, y′
such that x′ 6= y′ with probability at most ǫ.
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Figure 3.8: The principle of information reconciliation. Alice sends to Bob
the function f and the value of the function applied to x, f(x). Bob can
then recover the value of x.
We will only consider one-way protocols, where Alice sends information
about her string to Bob, but Bob does not send anything. In that case,
x = x′, and only Bob changes his string.
Definition 3.11. Let P be a set of distributions PXY . We say that an
information reconciliation protocol is ǫ-robust on P if on input PXY ∈ P
it aborts with probability at most ǫ.
We will actually consider protocols where Alice and Bob never abort.
But it is possible to introduce different protocols where Bob has a small
chance to abort, for example, if he cannot find a suitable y′ or if he finds
more than one suitable y′.
Protocol 2 (Information reconciliation).
1. Alice obtains x and Bob y (distributed according to PXY ) with X =
Y = {0, 1}n. Alice outputs x′ = x.
92 Chapter 3. Security Against Non-Signalling Adversaries
2. Alice chooses a matrixA ∈Mm×n(GF (2)) at random and calculates
r = A⊙ x (where ‘⊙’ denotes the multiplication over GF (2)).
3. She sends the matrix A and r to Bob.
4. Bob chooses y′ such that dH(y,y′) is minimal among all strings z
with f(z) = A ⊙ x (if there are two possibilities, he chooses one at
random) and outputs y′.
To see that this protocol works, we need a result from [CW77] about two-
universal sets of hash functions and from [BS93] about information recon-
ciliation.
Definition 3.12. A set of functions F such that f : X → Z is called two-
universal if Prf [f(x) = f(x
′)] ≤ 1/|Z| for any x,x′ ∈ X , and where the
function f is chosen uniformly at random from F .
Theorem 3.2 (Carter,Wegman [CW77]). The set of functions fA(x) := A⊙x,
where A is an n×m-matrix over GF (2), is two-universal.
Brassard and Salvail [BS93] (see Theorem 4.5, p. 131) showed that inform-
ation reconciliation can be achieved by a two-universal function. We give
a slightly modified version of their result in Lemma 3.19.
Lemma 3.19. Let x be an n-bit string and y another n-bit string such that
dH(x,y) ≤ δ′n. Assume the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is chosen at ran-
dom amongst a two-universal set of functions. Choose y′ such that dH(y,y′) is
minimal among all strings r with f(r) = f(x). Then
Pr[x 6= y′] ≤ 2n·h(δ′)−m ,
where h(p) = −p · log2 p− (1 − p) log2(1− p) is the binary entropy function.
Proof. The probability that a y′ 6= x with dH(x,y′) ≤ δ′n are mapped to
the same value by f , when f ∈ F is chosen at random, is
Pr[f(x) = f(y′)|dH(x,y′) ≤ δ′ · n] ≤ 2−m ·
δ′·n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ 2−m2n·h(δ′) .
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Lemma 3.20. Protocol 2 is ǫ-correct on input (x,y) such that dH(x,y
′) ≤ δ′n,
with
ǫ = 2n·h(δ
′)−m .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.19.
Lemma 3.21. Protocol 2 is 0-robust on all inputs.
Proof. There is always a y′ such that A ⊙ y′ = r, because A ⊙ x = r.
Therefore, the protocol never aborts.
The above lemmas show that in the limit of large n, m = ⌈n · h(δ′)⌉
(where δ′ is the fraction of Bob’s bits which are different from Alice’s and
h the binary entropy function), is both necessary and sufficient for Bob
to correct the errors in his raw key, i.e., the protocol is ǫ-correct for some
ǫ ∈ O(2−n).
3.5.3 Privacy amplification
After Alice and Bob have done information reconciliation, they hold (al-
most certainly) the same strings. Evemight have some information about
this string. Privacy amplification [BBR88, ILL89] is the processmaking from
this string a highly secure key. The idea of privacy amplification is very
similar to the one of information reconciliation: Alice and Bob apply a
(public) function to their data. As long as Eve does not know the initial
data perfectly, she will know almost nothing about the function value.
We now want to show that privacy amplification against non-signalling
adversaries is possible using a random linear function, i.e., by applying
the XOR to randomly chosen subsets of the bits. In Section 3.4.2, we have
seen that a secure bit can be created using the XOR. Let us first estim-
ate what the security of the XOR of a random subset of the outputs of a
system ∈ P can be.
Lemma 3.22. Let c be a random vector of length n overGF (2), and PXY |UV ∈
P an (2n)-party non-signalling system. Call Sc = c⊙X . Then
d(Sc|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ 1
2
(
1 + ε+ η˜
2
)n
+ e−
n
8 + e−
n
64 (
η˜
|U||V|λmax
)
2
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Figure 3.9: The principle of privacy amplification. Alice and Bob apply
a public function to x to obtain f(x). Eve, who does not know x exactly,
knows almost nothing about f(x).
where Q = (U = u,V = v, C).
Proof. We need to estimate PT
XsYs|UsVsλ
⊗s for some randomly chosen set
S. We distinguish two cases depending on the size s of the set S. By the
Chernoff bound (see Lemma 2.1, p. 27), s ≤ n/4 happens with probability
at most e−
n
8 . For s > n/4, by Lemma 3.14, PT
XsYs|UsVsλ
⊗s is at most
(ε + η˜)s, except with probability 2e−
s
16 (
η˜
|U||V|λmax
)
2
≤ 2e− n64 ( η˜|U||V|λmax )
2
.
The distance is bounded by half the sum of the two terms. We obtain the
statement by taking the average over all possible choices of sets S, using
the binomial formula, i.e.,
∑
i
(
n
i
)
xi = (1+ x)n, and the union bound.
Let us now calculate the security of a key S, where each key bit is the XOR
of a random subset of the raw key. We first reduce the security of the key
S to the question of the security of every single bit.
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Lemma 3.23. Assume S := [S1, . . . , Ss], where the Si are bits. Then
d(S|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤
∑
i
d(Si|Z(Wn−s), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1) .
Proof.
d(S|Z(Wn−s), Q)
=
∑
s,q
max
w:n−s
∑
z
∣∣∣∣PS,Z,Q|W=w(s, z, q)− 12s · PZ,Q|W=w(z, q)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
s,q
max
w
∑
z
[
|PS,Z,Q|W=w(s, z, q)
− 1
2
· PS1...Ss−1,Z,Q|W=w(s1, . . . , ss1 , z, q)|
+ · · ·+ 1
2s−1
∣∣∣∣PS1,Z,Q|W=w(s1, z, q)− 12 · PZ,Q|W=w(z, q)]
∣∣∣∣
]
≤
∑
i
d(Si|Z(Wn−s), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1) ,
where the first equation is by the definition of the distance from uniform
and the second inequality holds by the triangle inequality.
We, therefore, need to bound the distance from uniform of the ith key bit
given all previous bits.
For this, we need to show a few lemmas. The first one states that the linear
combination of two random bit vectors (modulo 2) is again a random
vector. The second one implies that in order to bound the distance from
uniform of the ith bit given all previous bits, it is enough to bound the
distance from uniform given all linear combinations of these bits.
Lemma 3.24. Assume u and v are n-bit vectors and PU is the uniform distri-
bution over all these vectors. Define the vector w = u ⊕ v. Then w is again
distributed according to the uniform distribution, i.e.,
Pu←PUPv←PU (u ⊕ v) = Pw←PU (w) .
Proof. The uniform distribution over all n-bit vectors can be obtained by
drawing each of the n-bits at random, i.e., P (0) = P (1) = 1/2. The XOR
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of two random bits is again a random bit, i.e., P (0) = P (1) = 1/2 and
therefore,w is also a vector drawn according to the uniform distribution
over all n-bit vectors.
Lemma 3.25. Let S1, . . . , Sk be random bits. If Sk is uniform given all linear
combinations over GF (2) of S1, . . . , Sk−1, i.e., it holds that PSk|
⊕
i∈I Si
(0) =
PSk|
⊕
i∈I Si
(1) for all I ⊆ {1, . . . , k − 1}, then Sk is uniform given S1, . . . ,
Sk−1, i.e., PSk|S1...Sk−1(0) = PSk|S1...Sk−1(1).
Proof. We prove the case k = 3, the general case follows by induction.
We have to show that if PS3|S1 , PS3|S2 and PS3|S1⊕S2 are uniform, then
PS3|S1S2 is uniform. Consider the probabilities PS1S2S3 . Since PS3|S1 is
uniform, we obtain the constraints on PS1S2S3 (we drop the index)
P (0, 0, 0) + P (0, 1, 0) = P (0, 0, 1) + P (0, 1, 1) (3.8)
P (1, 0, 0) + P (1, 1, 0) = P (1, 0, 1) + P (1, 1, 1) .
Since PS3|S2 is uniform,
P (0, 0, 0) + P (1, 0, 0) = P (0, 0, 1) + P (1, 0, 1)
P (0, 1, 0) + P (1, 1, 0) = P (0, 1, 1) + P (1, 1, 1) . (3.9)
And from the fact that PS3|S1⊕S2 is uniform, we obtain
P (0, 0, 0) + P (1, 1, 0) = P (0, 0, 1) + P (1, 1, 1) (3.10)
P (0, 1, 0) + P (1, 0, 0) = P (0, 1, 1) + P (1, 0, 1) .
Subtract (3.9) from (3.8) and add (3.10) to obtain
2 · P (0, 0, 0) = 2 · P (0, 0, 1)
which implies
PS3|S1=0,S2=0(0) =
PS1S2S3(0, 0, 0)
PS1S2S3(0, 0, 0) + PS1S2S3(0, 0, 1)
= PS3|S1=0,S2=0(1) .
Uniformity of S1 and S2 follows in an analogous way.
Now we can calculate the distance from uniform of the ith bit given the
bits 1 to i− 1 by the union bound.
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Lemma 3.26. Let PXY |UV ∈ P and S := A ⊙X , where A is a i × n-matrix
over GF (2) and be PA the uniform distribution over all these matrices. Q :=
(U = u,V = v, A). Then
d(Si|Z(Wn−s), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1)
≤ 2
i−1
2
(
1 + ε+ η˜
2
)n
+ 2i−1e−
n
8 + 2i−1e−
n
64 (
η˜
|U||V|λmax
)
2
.
Proof. By Lemma 3.25, bounding the distance from uniform of Si given
S1, . . . , Si−1 corresponds to bounding the distance from uniform of Si
given all linear combinations over GF (2) of S1, . . . , Si−1. For each lin-
ear combination
⊕
j∈I Sj define the random bit Sc = c ⊙X , where c =⊕
j∈I aj ⊕ ai and aj denotes the jth line of the matrix A. Note that Sc
is a random linear function over X . If Sc is uniform and independent
of S1, . . . , Si−1, then Si is uniform given this specific linear combination.
However, the distance from uniform and independent of Sc is given by
Lemma 3.22. By the union bound over all 2i−1 possible linear combina-
tions of S1, . . . , Si−1, we obtain the probability that Si is uniform given
S1, . . . , Si−1, i.e.,
d(Si|Z(Wn−s), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1) ≤ 2i−1 · d(Sc|Z(Wn−s), Q) .
Now we can bound the distance from uniform of a key S := S1 . . . Ss by
Lemma 3.23 and 3.26.
Lemma 3.27. Assume S := A⊙X , whereA is a s×n-matrix overGF (2) and
be PA the uniform distribution over all these matrices. Q := (U = u, A). Then
d(S|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ 2
s
2
(
1 + ε+ η˜
2
)n
+ 2se−
n
8 + 2se−
n
64 (
η˜
|U||V|λmax
)2 .
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 3.23 and 3.26, when using the expres-
sion for geometric series, i.e.,
s∑
i=1
2i−1 =
2s − 1
2− 1 ≤ 2
s .
This expression is inO(2−n)whenever s = q ·n for some (constant) q with
2q−1(1 + ε) < 1.
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3.5.4 Key distribution
Now, we can put everything together in order to create a key-agreement
scheme using the steps above.
Definition 3.13. A key-distribution protocol is said to be ǫ-secret against
non-signalling adversaries if, on all inputs, d(SA|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≤ ǫ. It is
said to be ǫ′-correct if, on all inputs, Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫ′, and it is said to be
ǫ′′-secure if it is both secret and correct, i.e., δ(Sreal,Sideal) < ǫ′′.
Lemma 3.28. A key-distribution protocol which is ǫ-secret and ǫ′-correct, is
(ǫ + ǫ′)-secure.
Proof. This follows directly from the triangle inequality (Lemma 2.5,
p. 32).
Protocol 3 (Key distribution secure against non-signalling adversaries).
1. Alice and Bob obtain a system PXY |UV
2. They do parameter estimation using Protocol 1.
3. Information reconciliation and privacy amplification: Alice chooses
a matrix A ∈M(s+r)×n and calculates [SA, R] = A⊙ x.
4. Alice sends the matrix A and R to Bob and outputs SA.
5. Bob calculates y′ with minimal dH(y,y′) such that R = Ar ⊙ y′ and
outputs SB = As ⊙ y′.
Theorem 3.3. Protocol 3 is ǫ-correct, ǫ′-secret with ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ O(2−n) for s = q ·n
and r > n · h(δ) and where q is such that 2q−r/n−1(1 + ε) < 1. Additionally,
Protocol 3 is ǫ′′-robust on P−η with ǫ′′ ∈ O(2−n).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 3.16, 3.20 and 3.27. Note that
in order to do information reconciliation, a key of length s + r has to be
created. Robustness follows from Lemma 3.18.
The secret key rate is the length of the key a secure protocol can output,
divided by the number of systems used, in the asymptotic limit of a large
number of systems.
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Lemma 3.29. Protocol 3 reaches a key rate q of
q = 1− h(δ)− log2(1 + ε) .
3.6 The Protocol
In this section, we analyse a protocol with an implementation similar to
the one given in [Eke91]. We compute its key rate in the presence of a
non-signalling adversary. The protocol can be implemented using quan-
tum mechanics, the security relies, however, only on the non-signalling
condition. A slightly different protocol reaching a positive key rate in the
quantum regime is given in [HRW10].
π/8
π/8
v1
v0
u0, v2
u1
Figure 3.10: Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases in terms of polariza-
tion.
Protocol 4.
1. Alice creates n singlet states |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉−|10〉)/√2, and sends one
qubit of every state to Bob.
2. Alice and Bob randomly measure the ith system in either the basis
u0 or u1 (for Alice) or v0, v1 or v2 (Bob); the five bases are shown in
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Figure 3.10. Bob inverts his measurement result. They make sure
that no signal can travel between the subsystems.
3. The measurement results from the cases where both measured u0 =
v2 form the raw key.
4. For the remaining measurements, they announce the results over
the public authenticated channel and estimate the parameters ε and
δ (see Section 3.5.1). If the parameters are such that key agreement
is possible, they continue; otherwise they abort.
5. Information reconciliation and privacy amplification: Alice
randomly chooses an (m+ s)× n-matrix A such that p(0) = p(1) =
1/2 for all entries andm := ⌈n ·h(δ)⌉. She calculatesA⊙x (where x
is Alice’s raw key) and sends the first m bits to Bob over the public
authenticated channel. The remaining bits form the key.
Assume that Alice and Bob execute the above protocol using a noisy quan-
tum channel. More precisely, their final state is a mixture of a singlet with
weight 1 − ρ and a fully mixed state with weight ρ. The key rate as func-
tion of the parameter ρ is given in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: The key rate of Protocol 4 secure against a non-signalling
adversary in terms of the channel noise.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that privacy amplification of non-signalling secrecy is
possible, if a non-signalling condition holds between all subsystems. It
follows from the results in Chapter 5 that some kind of additional require-
ment is, in general, necessary. The question remains open whether it
could be partially relaxed, for example such that signalling is only al-
lowed in one direction (as it would be the case when the systems are
measured one after the other).
Another challenge is to find different non-local correlations, inequival-
ent to the CHSH inequality or Braunstein-Caves inequality, which imply
partial secrecy in this setup and can be used as building block for a key-
distribution scheme.

Chapter 4
Device-Independent
Security Against Quantum
Adversaries
4.1 Introduction
The key-distribution scheme studied in Chapter 3 is secure against all
non-signalling adversaries. Since it is not possible to signal by measuring
different parts of an entangled quantum state, this holds, in particular,
for an adversary limited by quantum physics. However, a non-signalling
adversary is, in general, much stronger than a quantum adversary. For
example, she can even have significant knowledge about a system that
violates the CHSH inequality (Section 2.6.1) by its maximum quantum
value. As discussed in Section 1.3, a quantum system reaching this value
must be (equivalent to) a singlet state. A quantum adversary could, there-
fore, not have any knowledge about the measurement outcome. For a key-
agreement scheme, this means that tolerating a non-signalling adversary
leads to an unnecessarily low key rate, or even the impossibility to agree
on a key in a range allowed in the presence of quantum adversaries.
In this chapter, we consider key agreement secure against quantum ad-
versaries. It is already known that classical post-processing, in particular
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privacy amplification [RK05], works even if the adversary holds quantum
information. The problem is to estimate the entropy, i.e., the uncertainty,
the adversary has about the raw key.
Chapter outline We study the possible attacks by a quantum adversary
and explain our setup in Section 4.2. We then study the security of a
single quantum system and show how the probability that an eavesdrop-
per can guess the measurement result (this quantity is equivalent to the
min-entropy) can be expressed as the solution of a semi-definite program.
We first give a version which depends on the exact state and measure-
ments of the honest parties (Section 4.3.1) and then modify it to a device-
independent version in Section 4.3.2. We also give a slightly different
form which can be used to calculate the security of a bit (Sections 4.3.3
and 4.3.4). We then turn to several systems and show how the condi-
tions they need to fulfil can be expressed in terms of the conditions of the
individual systems (Section 4.4.1) if measurements on different subsys-
tems commute. This leads directly to a product theorem for the guess-
ing probability (Section 4.4.2) (i.e., additivity of the min-entropy) and
an XOR-Lemma for partially secure bits against quantum adversaries
(Section 4.4.3). This insight can be used to construct a key-distribution
scheme. We first assume that the honest parties’ systems behave inde-
pendently (Section 4.5) and then remove this requirement in Section 4.6.
Finally, we give an explicit protocol in Section 4.7.
Related work The question of device-independent quantum key distri-
bution has been raised, and security in a noiseless scenario been shown
by Mayers and Yao in [MY98]. In [MMMO06], this result has been ex-
tended to allow for noise. In [ABG+07], a protocol secure against col-
lective attacks has been given. Under a plausible, but unproven conjec-
ture, it remains secure against coherent attacks if the devices are memory-
less [McK10]. All these results use the fact that for binary outcomes, the
effective dimension of the Hilbert space can be reduced.
The question of security against quantum adversaries is related to the
question which correlations can be obtained from measurements on a
quantum system [Tsi80, Weh06, Mas06]. In fact, our approach bases on
such a criterion given in [NPA07, DLTW08, NPA08].
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Contributions The main technical contribution of this chapter is Lem-
ma 4.9, which shows that the conditions several quantum systems must
fulfil can be expressed in terms of the conditions on the individual sub-
systems. The resulting product lemma for the guessing probability of
a quantum adversary is Theorem 4.3, and the XOR-Lemma for quantum
secrecy is given in Theorem 4.4.
4.2 Modelling Quantum Adversaries
4.2.1 Possible attacks
Consider the scenario where Alice, Bob, and Eve share a tripartite quan-
tum state. They can each measure their part of the system and obtain
a measurement outcome. We can, of course, also consider the state Alice
and Bob share after Eve’s part has been traced out, and this is also a quan-
tum state. In accordance with the non-signalling principle, the marginal
state Alice and Bob share is independent of what Eve does with her part
of the state (in particular, from her measurement). We can even consider
the state Alice and Bob share conditioned an a certain measurement out-
come of Eve and this is, of course, still a quantum state. Finally, in case
Alice and Bob share several systems (living in a tensor product Hilbert
space and such that measurements are preformed on the individual sub-
spaces), then even conditioned on the measurement outcomes of one sys-
tem, the remaining systems are still quantum systems.
We will consider the case where Alice and Bob share n bipartite quan-
tum systems and ask the question whether they can agree on a secret
key unknown to Eve by interacting with them. We make the following
requirement.
Condition 2. The system PXY Z|UVW must be a (2n+ 1)-party quantum
system.
In quantum cryptography, when Alice and Bob share a certain quantum
state described by a density operator ρAB , it is usually assumed that Eve
controls the whole environment, i.e., the total quantum state between
Alice, Bob, and Eve is pure. Any measurement on the purifying system
corresponds to a partition of the form ρAB =
∑
z p
zρzAB , where ρ
z
AB is
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the state conditioned on the measurement outcome z. Considering the
resulting systems, each of these ρzAB gives rise to a quantum system when
measured, i.e., any measurement Eve does on her part of the quantum
state induces a ‘convex decomposition’ of the quantum system Alice and
Bob share into several quantum systems. This limits the possibilities an
eavesdropper has to attack the systems.
Lemma 4.1. Let PXZ|UW be an (n + 1)-party quantum system. Then any
input W induces a family of pairs {(pz ,P z
X|U )}z , where pz is a weight and
P z
X|U is an n-party quantum system, such that
PX|U =
∑
z
pz · P zX|U . (4.1)
Proof. For any (n+ 1)-party quantum system PXZ|UW , the marginal and
conditional systems are n-party quantum systems (see Lemma 2.6, p. 55).
Equation (4.1) holds by the definition of the marginal system.
4.2.2 Security definition
The system we consider (see Figure 4.1) is the one where Alice and Bob
share a public authenticated channel plus a quantum state (modelled ab-
stractly as a device taking inputs and giving outputs). Alice and Bob
apply a protocol (π, π′) to the inputs and outputs of their systems in or-
der to obtain a key. Eve can wire-tap the public channel and choose a
measurement on her part of the quantum state. It is no advantage for
Eve to make several measurements instead of a single one, as the same
information can be obtained by making a refinedmeasurement on the ini-
tial state. Without loss of generality, we can, therefore, assume that Eve
makes a single measurement at the end (after all communication between
Alice and Bob is finished). In our scenario, Eve, therefore, obtains all the
communication exchanged over the public channel Q, can then choose
a measurement W (which can depend on Q) and finally obtains an out-
come Z .
To show security, we need to bound the distance of this real system from
an ideal system (see Section 2.3.2), where Alice and Bob both obtain the
same random string uncorrelated with anything else. In order to bound
the distance between our real system and the ideal system, we introduce
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Sreal public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
quantum state
ψ
Q
pi pi′
SA SB
Sint public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
quantum state
ψ
Q
pi pi′
SA SA
Sideal public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
quantum state
ψ
Q
pi pi′
PS(s) = 1/|S|S S
Figure 4.1: Our real system (top). Alice and Bob share a public authentic-
ated channel and a quantum state. In our ideal system (bottom), instead
of outputting the key generated by the protocol (π, π′), the system out-
puts a uniform random string S to both Alice and Bob. We also use an
intermediate system (middle) in our calculations.
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an intermediate system Sint, which is equal to our real system, but which
outputs SA on both sides (i.e., SB is replaced by SA).
We introduce the distance from uniform of the key from the eavesdrop-
per’s point of view.
Definition 4.1. Consider a system Sreal as depicted in Figure 4.1. The
distance from uniform of SA given Z(Wq) and Q is
d(SA|Z(Wq), Q) = 1
2
∑
sA,q
max
w:quantum
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q)
· ∣∣PSA|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(sA)− PU (sA)∣∣ ,
where the maximization is over all quantum systems PXY Z|UVW .
The following statement is a direct consequence of the definitions of the
systems in Figure 4.1 and the distinguishing advantage.
Corollary 4.1. Consider the intermediate system Sint and the ideal system as
depicted in Figure 4.1. Then
δ(Sint,Sideal) = d(SA|Z(Wq), Q) .
This quantity will be the one that is relevant for the secrecy of the protocol.
Furthermore, the correctness of the protocol, i.e., the probability that
Alice’s and Bob’s key are equal, is determined by the distinguishing ad-
vantage from the intermediate system to the real system, more precisely,
the probability that the real system outputs different values on the two
sides. This is again a direct consequence of the definitions.
Corollary 4.2. Consider the intermediate system Sint and the real system Sreal
as defined above. Then
δ(Sreal,Sint) =
∑
sA 6=sB
PSASB (sA, sB) .
Finally, by the triangle inequality for the distinguishing advantage of sys-
tems (see Lemma 2.5, p. 32), we obtain the following statement relating
the security of our protocol to the secrecy and correctness.
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Lemma 4.2.
δ(Sreal,Sideal) ≤ δ(Sreal,Sint) + δ(Sint,Sideal) .
Since a system with δ(Sreal,Sideal) ≤ ǫ is ǫ-secure, we will be interested in
bounding this quantity.
4.3 Security of a Single System
4.3.1 A bound on the guessing probability
It will be our goal to show the security of a key-distribution protocol
of the form as given in Figure 4.1. The crucial part hereby is to bound
the min-entropy an adversary has about the (raw) key. However, the min-
entropy is equivalent to the probability that an eavesdropper interacting
with her part of the quantum state can correctly guess the value of Alice’s
raw key X (see Theorem 2.4, p. 50). Once this probability is bounded, a
secure key can be obtained using standard techniques, such as informa-
tion reconciliation and privacy amplification, which are already known
to work in the quantum case [RK05], [Ren05].
We will, in the following, study the scenario where Eve can choose an
inputW , depending on some additional informationQ, and then obtains
an output Z (depending on W ). She then has to try to guess a value
f(X) of range F . In the context of key distribution, f will be the identity
function on the outputs on Alice’s side.
Definition 4.2. Consider a system Sreal as depicted in Figure 4.1. The
guessing probability of f(X) given Z(Wq) and Q is
Pguess(f(X)|Z(Wq), Q) =
∑
q
max
w:quantum
∑
z
PZQ|W=w(z, q)
·max
f(x)
Pf(X)|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(f(x)) ,
where the maximization is over all quantum systems PXY Z|UVW . The
min-entropy of f(X) given Z(Wq) and Q is
Hmin(f(X)|Z(Wq), Q) = − log2 Pguess(f(X)|Z(Wq), Q) .
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Theorem 2.4, p. 50 justifies this definition of the min-entropy.
Lemma 4.1 gives a bound on the probability that a quantum adversary
can guess Alice’s outcome by the following maximization problem. (We
assume that the inputs u are public, i.e., Q = (U = u, F = f)).
Lemma 4.3. The value of Pguess(f(X)|Z(Wq), Q), where PXZ|UW is an (n+
1)-party quantum system and Q = (U = u), is upper-bounded by the optimal
value of the following optimization problem
max :
|F|∑
z=1
pz
∑
x:f(x)=z
P zX|U (x,u)
s. t. PX|U =
|F|∑
z=1
pz · P zX|U
P zX|U n-party quantum system, for all z .
Proof. The first condition follows by the definition of the marginal system
and the second by the fact that for any (n+ 1)-party quantum system the
conditional systems are n-party quantum systems (see Lemma 2.6, p. 55).
The objective function is the definition of the guessing probability. It is
sufficient to consider the case |Z| = |F| because any system where Z has
larger range can bemade into a system reaching the same guessing proba-
bility by combining the system where the same value f(X) has maximal
probability. By the convexity of quantum systems, this remains a quan-
tum system.
In [NPA07], a criterion in terms of a semi-definite program is given, which
any quantum system must fulfil. The idea is that if a system is quantum,
then it is possible to associate amatrix Γwith it which needs to be positive
semi-definite.
Definition 4.3. A sequence of length k of a set of operators {Exiui : xi ∈Xi, ui ∈ Ui, i ∈ 1, . . . , n} is a product of k operators of this set. The se-
quence of length 0 is defined as the identity operator.
Definition 4.4. The matrix Γ is defined as
Γij :=
〈
Ψ
∣∣∣O†iOj ∣∣∣Ψ〉 ,
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where Oi = E
xm
umE
x′n
u′n
· · · is a sequence of the measurement operators
{Exiui}. The matrix Γk is defined in the same way as Γ, but restricting
the operators to sequences of length at most k.
In the above notation we consider the measurement operators as operat-
ors on the whole Hilbert space H. These operators must fulfil the con-
ditions of Definition 2.40, p. 54, (i.e., they must be Hermitian orthogonal
projectors and sumup to the identity for each input). If we additionally re-
quire them to commute, this is equivalent to a tensor-product structure by
Theorem 2.5, p. 55, if we consider only finite dimensional Hilbert spaces.
Note that the requirements the measurement operators fulfil translate to
requirements on the entries of the matrix Γ. For example, certain entries
must be equal to others or the sum of some must be equal to the sum of
others.
In order to decide whether a certain system is quantum, we can ask the
question whether such a matrix Γ exists; because if it is, it must be pos-
sible to associate a matrix with it, which is consistent with the probabil-
ities describing the system and fulfil the above requirements. The prob-
lem of finding a consistent matrix Γ is a semi-definite programming prob-
lem.
Theorem 4.1 (Navascue´s, Pironio, Acı´n [NPA07]). For every quantum sys-
tem PX|U there exists a symmetric matrix Γk with Γkij =
〈
Ψ
∣∣O†iOj∣∣Ψ〉 and
where Oi = E
xm
umE
x′n
u′n
· · · is a sequence of length k of the operators {Exiui}. Fur-
thermore,
Aqb · Γk = 0 , and
Γk  0 ,
where Aqb corresponds to the conditions
• orthogonal projectors: 〈Ψ∣∣OExiuiEx′iuiO′∣∣Ψ〉− 〈Ψ∣∣OExiui δxix′iO′∣∣Ψ〉 = 0 ,
• completeness:∑xi 〈Ψ∣∣OExiuiO′∣∣Ψ〉− 〈Ψ∣∣OO′∣∣Ψ〉 = 0 for all ui ,
• commutativity: 〈Ψ∣∣OExiuiExjujO′∣∣Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ∣∣OExjujExiuiO′∣∣Ψ〉 for i 6= j ,
where O and O′ stand for arbitrary sequences from the set {Exiui}.
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Proof. Orthogonality, completeness, and Hermiticity follow directly from
Definition 2.40, p. 54. Let us see that the matrix is positive semi-definite.
For all v ∈ Cm
vTΓkv =
∑
ij
vTi Γ
k
ijvi =
∑
ij
v∗i
〈
Ψ
∣∣∣O†iOj ∣∣∣Ψ〉 vj = 〈Ψ∣∣V †V ∣∣Ψ〉 ≥ 0
where V :=
∑
i viOi. Finally, the matrix can be taken to be real, because
for any complex Γk, the matrix (Γk + Γk
∗
)/2 is real and fulfils the condi-
tions.
We do not require this matrix to be normalized. Note that the matrix
Γk contains, in particular, the (potentially not normalized) probabilities
PX|U (x,u) associated with an n-party quantum system, for n ≤ 2k.
Definition 4.5 (Navascue´s, Pironio, Acı´n [NPA07]). Let PX|U be an n-
party system. If there exists a positive semi-definite matrix Γk such that
AqbΓ
k = 0 and with the entries of Γkij = PX|U (x,u)where Γ
k
ij is the entry
associated with
〈
Ψ
∣∣ ∏
i E
ui
xi
∣∣Ψ〉, then this Γk is called quantum certificate
of order k associated with the system PX|U .
In [DLTW08, NPA08], it is shown that if a certificate of order k can be
associated with a certain system PX|U for all k → ∞, then this system
is indeed quantum. More precisely, it corresponds to a quantum system
where operators associated with different parties commute, but do not
necessarily have a tensor product structure. For any finite dimensional
system, this is, of course, equivalent, as we have seen in Theorem 2.5,
p. 55.
The above criterion allows to replace the condition thatP z
XY |UV is a quan-
tum system by the condition that a certainmatrix is positive semi-definite
and allows us to bound Eve’s guessing probability by a semi-definite pro-
gram.
Lemma 4.4. The maximum guessing probability of f(X), given Z(Wq) and
Q := (U = u, F = f), is upper-bounded by1
Pguess(f(X)|Z(Wq), Q) ≤
|F|∑
z=1
bTz · Γz ,
1In the following, we sometimeswrite matrices as vectors bywriting the columns ‘on top
of each other’. When we write that a vector needs to be positive semi-definite, we mean that
the matrix obtained by the inverse of this transformation must be positive semi-definite.
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Figure 4.2: The matrix corresponding to the second order criteria
of [NPA07] associated with a bipartite system. We denote the operators
associated with the first party by E and with the second by F . If the
system is quantum, the entry of the row associated with operator A and
column associated with operator B corresponds to 〈Ψ|A†B|Ψ〉, and the
resulting matrix is positive semi-definite. The constraints are such that
certain entries of the matrix are 0, or that the sum of certain entries are
equal to the sum of other entries (for example, entries in areas hatched
the same way are equal).
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where
∑|F|
z=1 b
T
z · Γz is the optimal value of the optimization problem
max :
|F|∑
z=1
∑
x:f(x)=z
Γz(x,u) (4.2)
s. t. Aqb · Γz = 0 for all z
Γz  0∑
z
Γz = Γkmarg
where Γz(x,u) denotes the entry of the matrix Γz corresponding to〈
Ψ
∣∣∏
iE
xi
uiE
z
w
∣∣Ψ〉, i.e., it contains in particular the probabilities P z
X|U (x,u);
bz is a matrix of the same size as Γ
z and it has a 1 at the positions where Γ has
the entry
〈
ψ
∣∣O†iOi∣∣ψ〉, where Oi = ∏mExmum such that f(x) = z. The mat-
rix Γkmarg denotes the certificate of order k associated with the marginal system
PX|U .
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.3, the fact that any quantum system
P z
X|U has a quantum certificate of order k and
∑
z E
z
w = 1.
The primal and dual program can be expressed as:
PRIMAL
max :
|F|∑
z=1
bTz · Γz (4.3)
s. t.


Aqb · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · Aqb
1 · · · 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·

 Γ1...
Γ|F|

 =


0
...
0
Γkmarg


︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
Γi  0 for all i
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DUAL
min : Γkmarg
T · λ|F|+1 (4.4)
s. t.


ATqb · · · 0 1
. . .
0 · · · ATqb 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
AT
·


λ1
...
λ|F|
λ|F|+1

 

 b1...
b|F|


︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
λi unrestricted
Note that any dual feasible solution gives an upper bound on the guess-
ing probability (linear) in terms of thematrix associatedwith themarginal
system of Alice and Bob, Γkmarg. Furthermore, the dual feasible region is
independent of Alice’s and Bob’s marginal system, it only depends on the
number of inputs and outputs and the step in the semi-definite hierarchy
considered.
However, the matrix Γkmarg contains entries which do not correspond to
observable probabilities and are only known if the state andmeasurement
operators are known (i.e., in a not device-independent scenario). It will
be the goal of the next section to express the guessing probability in terms
of observable quantities.
4.3.2 Guessing probability in terms of observable proba-
bilities
Certain entries of the matrix Γkmarg do not correspond to observable prob-
abilities, and it is, therefore, impossible to know their value by testing the
system. In this section, we will modify the above optimization problem
in such a way as to get a solution only in terms of observable probabil-
ities. More precisely, we will modify the optimization problem to take
the ‘worst’ possible quantum certificate consistent with observed prob-
abilities. This leads to the following, modified, semi-definite program.
The matrix AIJ is defined such that, multiplied with a quantum certific-
ate, the observable probabilities are obtained, i.e., AIJΓ
k = PX|U (where
PX|U denotes the vector containing the values PX|U (x,u) for all x,u).
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PRIMAL
max :
|F|∑
z=1
bTz · Γz (4.5)
s. t.


Aqb · · · 0 0
. . . 0
0 · · · Aqb 0
1 · · · 1 −1
0 · · · 0 AIJ

 ·


Γ1
...
Γ|F|
Γkmarg

 =


0
...
0
0
PX|U


Γi  0, Γkmarg unrestricted
DUAL
min : PTX|U · λ|F|+2 (4.6)
s. t.


ATqb · · · 0 1 0
. . . 0
0 · · · ATqb 1 0
0 · · · 0 −1 ATIJ

 ·


λ1
...
λ|F|
λ|F|+1
λ|F|+2



=


b1
...
b|F|
0


λi unrestricted
Note that we have changed Γkmarg to be a variable (instead of a constant).
Obviously Γkmarg  0 holds because it is the sum of positive semi-definite
matrices. However, it is easier when we do not make this restriction ex-
plicit in the program.
Lemma 4.5. Let λ1, . . . , λ|F|+2 be dual feasible for (4.6). Then λ1, . . . , λ|F|+1
are dual feasible for (4.4) reaching the same objective value.
Proof. We use the fact that AIJΓ
k
marg = PX|U . Since λ1, . . . , λ|F|+2 are
dual feasible for (4.6), it holds that ATIJλ|F|+2 = λ|F|+1. Therefore,
Γkmarg
T · λ|F|+1 = Γkmarg
T · ATIJ · λ|F|+2 = PTX|U · λ|F|+2 .
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Lemma 4.5 implies that any dual feasible solution of (4.6) gives an up-
per bound on the guessing probability linear in terms of the observable
probabilities.
Furthermore, in terms of the min-entropy, it means that Eve’s min-entro-
py about Alice’s value f(X), is at least Hmin(f(X)|Z(Wq), Q) ≥
− log2 PTX|Uλ|F|+2 for any dual feasible λ.
Example 14. Consider a bipartite quantum system with binary inputs
and outputs given by the mixture of the system in Figure 2.8, p. 56, with
weight 1−ρ and a perfectly random bit with weight ρ (this system can be
achieved bymeasuring amixture of a singlet and a fullymixed state using
the measurements given in Example 9, p. 56). The guessing probability of
the output bit X as function of the parameter ρ is given in Figure 4.3.2
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Figure 4.3: The bound on the guessing probability of the measurement
outcomes of Example 14.
4.3.3 Best attack on a bit
The above analysis can also be used to find the best attack in case the
function f maps X to a bit. However, in this case, we can give a slightly
different form to calculate the distance from uniform of a bit. This will
allow us to show an XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy in Section 4.4.3.
2The data plotted in Figure 4.3 has been obtained by solving (4.5) numerically, using the
programs MATLAB®, Yalmip and Sedumi [MAT08, Stu98, Lo¨f04].
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Lemma 4.6. The distance from uniform of B = f(X) ∈ {0, 1} given Z(Wq)
and Q := (U = u, F = f) is upper-bounded by
d(B|Z(Wq), Q) = 1
2
· bT · Γ∗∆ ,
where bTΓ∗∆ is the optimal value of the optimization problem
max :
∑
x:B=0
Γ∆(x,u)−
∑
x:B=1
Γ∆(x,u) (4.7)
s. t. AqbΓ∆ = 0
Γ∆  Γkmarg
Γ∆  −Γkmarg ,
where Γkmarg is the matrix associated with the marginal system PX|U .
Proof. Define
Γ∆ = 2p · Γz0 − Γmarg ,
and note that with this definition Γz0 = (Γmarg + Γ∆)/(2p) and Γ
z1 =
(Γmarg − Γ∆)/(2(1− p)).
The distance from uniform of a bit can be expressed as
d(B|Z(Wq), Q) = 1
2
·
[
p ·
( ∑
x:B=0
Γz0(x,u)−
∑
x:B=1
Γz0(x,u)
)
+ (1− p) ·
( ∑
x:B=1
Γz1(x,u)−
∑
x:B=0
Γz1(x,u)
)]
=
1
2
· bT · Γ∗∆ ,
Now notice that Γz0 and Γz1 are actually quantum certificates of order k
if Γ∆ fulfils the above requirements. The conditions the matrix Γ needs to
fulfil are all linear and, therefore, because Γkmarg fulfils them, Γ
z0 and Γz1
fulfil them exactly if Γ∆ does. The semi-definite constraints correspond
exactly to the requirement that Γz0 and Γz0 are positive semi-definite, us-
ing the fact that the space of positive semi-definite matrices forms a con-
vex cone.
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The above semi-definite program can be expressed in the following form:
PRIMAL
max : bT · Γ∆ (4.8)
s. t.

 1−1
Aqb


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·Γ∆


=
Γkmarg
Γkmarg
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
DUAL
min : (Γkmarg)
T (λ1 + λ2) (4.9)
s. t.
(
1 −1 ATqb
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AT
·

 λ1λ2
λ3

 = b
λ1, λ2  0, λ3 unrestricted
4.3.4 Best attack on a bit in terms of observable probabil-
ities
Any dual solution of (4.9) leads to a bound on the distance from uniform
of the bit B in terms of the matrix elements Γkmarg. We will now change
our primal program to one where we optimize over all Γkmarg compatible
with the observable probabilities. The dual of this program has a solution
only in terms these probabilities. We then show how we can transform
any dual feasible solution of this program into a dual feasible solution of
the program above reaching the same value.
120 Security Against Quantum Adversaries
The new program we consider is the following:
PRIMAL
max : bT · Γ∆ (4.10)
s. t.


1 −1
−1 −1
Aqb 0
0 AIJ
0 Aqb

 ·
(
Γ∆
Γkmarg
) 
=
=
=
0
0
0
PX|U
0
Γ∆,Γ
k
marg unrestricted
DUAL
min : PTX|U · λ4 (4.11)
s. t.
(
1 −1 ATqb 0 0
−1 −1 0 AIJ Aqb
)
·


λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4
λ5

 =
(
b
0
)
λ1, λ2  0, λ3, λ4, λ5 unrestricted
where the matrix AIJ is such that AIJΓ
k
marg = PX|U . We claim that any
dual feasible solution of (4.11) can be transformed into a dual feasible
solution of (4.9) reaching the same value. The solution of (4.11), therefore,
gives a bound on the distance from uniform only in terms of the observ-
able probabilities.
Lemma 4.7. Let λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5 be a dual feasible solution of (4.11). Then
λ1, λ2, λ3 is a dual feasible solutions of (4.9) reaching the same objective value.
Proof. The condition that λ1, λ2, λ3 is feasible for (4.9) follows directly
from the (upper row) feasibility condition of (4.11). To see that it reaches
the same value, we use that fact that Γkmarg is a quantum certificate, i.e.,
Aqb · Γkmarg = 0
and the (lower row) condition of (4.11), i.e.,
−λ1 − λ2 +ATIJ · λ4 +ATqb · λ5 = 0 .
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We then obtain
Γk
T
marg · (λ1 + λ2) = Γk
T
marg · (λ1 + λ2)
+ ΓTmarg · (−λ1 − λ2 +ATIJ · λ4 +ATqb · λ5)
= Γk
T
marg · (ATIJ · λ4 +ATqb · λ5)
= (AIJ · Γkmarg)T · λ4
= PTX|U · λ4 .
4.4 Several Systems
4.4.1 Conditions on several quantum systems
In this section, we will show our main technical result, namely that the
conditions in the above semi-definite program behave in a product form
if the measurements on different subsystems commute. Roughly, we will
show the following: Consider a system PXY |UV associated with a single
pair of systems and the matrix Γk associated with the kth step of the hier-
archy, fulfilling AqbΓ
k = 0. Then, with two pairs of systems, it is possible
to associate a matrix Γ′k living in the tensor product space of two Γk. Fur-
thermore, this matrix must fulfil (1⊗Aqb)Γ′k = 0.
Definition 4.6. Assume an (n +m)-party quantum system. The reduced
quantum certificate of order k is the matrix Γ′kn+m, defined as
(Γ′kn+m)ij =
〈
Ψ
∣∣∣O†i1O†i2Oj2Oj1 ∣∣∣Ψ〉 ,
where i = l(i1 − 1) + i2 and j = l(j1 − 1) + j2 and l is the number of
rows of a quantum certificate of order k for the n-party quantum system.
Oi1 is the operator associated with the i
th row of the quantum certificate
of order k of the marginal n-party system (and similar for Oi2 and the
m-party system).
Lemma 4.8. The matrix Γ′kn+m is positive semi-definite, i.e., Γ
′k
n+m  0 .
Proof. This follows directly form the fact that Γ′kn+m is a sub-matrix of
the (2k)th order quantum certificate associated with the (n + m)-party
quantum system.
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The main insight, which will lead directly to the product theorems, is the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.9. Let PX1|U1 be an n-party and PX2|U2 an m-party quantum sys-
tem. Call the associated certificates of order k Γk1 and Γ
k
2 and write the linear
conditions they fulfil as Aqb,1Γ
k
1 = 0 and Aqb,2Γ
k
2 = 0. Then the reduced quan-
tum certificate of order k associated with the (n + m)-party quantum system,
fulfils
(Aqb,1 ⊗ 1Γk2 ) · Γ
′k
n+m = 0 and (1Γk1 ⊗Aqb,2) · Γ
′k
n+m = 0 .
This can be interpreted in the following way: Even conditioned on any
specific outcome (i.e., matrix entry) of the second system, the first system
must still be a quantum system.
Proof. The matrix Aqb,1 contains entries of the form
〈Ψ|Oi1Oj1 |Ψ〉 −
〈
Ψ
∣∣Oi′1Oj′1 ∣∣Ψ〉 = 0
which all operators associated with an n-party quantum system must ful-
fil, because Oi1Oj1 − Oi′1Oj′1 = 0. By the definition of Γ′
k
n+m, the condi-
tions (Aqb,1 ⊗ 1Γk2 )Γ′
k
n+m correspond to
〈Ψ|Oi1Oi2Oj2Oj1 |Ψ〉 −
〈
Ψ
∣∣Oi′1Oi2Oj2Oj′1 ∣∣Ψ〉
= 〈Ψ|Oi1Oj1Oi2Oj2 |Ψ〉 −
〈
Ψ
∣∣Oi′1Oj′1Oi2Oj2 ∣∣Ψ〉
=
〈
Ψ
∣∣ (Oi1Oj1 −Oi′1Oj′1 )Oi2Oj2 ∣∣Ψ〉 = 0 .
where we have used the fact that operators associated with different par-
ties commute, linearity, and the fact that the operators associated with an
(n +m)-party quantum system must still fulfil the conditions associated
with a single system (as given in Definition 2.40, p. 54).
4.4.2 A product lemma for the guessing probability
Using the above property, we can show a product lemma for the guessing
probability.
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Lemma 4.10. Let A1, b1, and c1 be the parameters associated with the semi-
definite program (4.3) bounding the guessing probability of f(X1) of an n-party
quantum system PX1|U1 , where Q1 = (U1 = u1, F = f). Similarly, associate
A2, b2, and c2 with an m-party quantum system PX2|U2 , where g(X2) and
Q2 = (U2 = u2, G = g). Then the guessing probability of f(X1) ‖ g(X2)
(denoting the concatenation) of the (n + m)-party system PX1X2|U1U2 where
Q = (U = u, F = f,G = g) is bounded by the semi-definite program defined
by A, b, and c, where b = b1 ⊗ b2, A = A1 ⊗A2.
Proof. This follows form the fact that any (n+m)-party quantum system
must fulfil Lemma 4.9 and that bi ⊗ bj has a 1 exactly at the entry associ-
ated with
〈
ψ
∣∣O†1O†2O2O1∣∣ψ〉, whereO1 is the operator associated with the
probability of the outcome x1 mapped to a certain f(x1), and similarly
for O2 and g(x2).
Consider now the dual of this ‘tensor product’ problem. We will use a
product theorem from [MS07] (see also [LM08]) to show that for any dual
feasible λ (for a single system), λ ⊗ · · · ⊗ λ is dual feasible for the dual
of the tensor product problem, therefore, forming an upper bound on the
guessing probability.
Theorem 4.2 (Mittal, Szegedy [MS07]). Consider a semi-definite program
min : cT1 λ1, s. t. A
T
1 λ1 − b1  0 and a feasible λ1, and similarly for A2,
b2, c2, and λ2. Assume b1  0 and b2  0. Then λ = λ1 ⊗ λ2 is feasible for the
semi-definite programmin : (c1 ⊗ c2)Tλ, s. t. (A1 ⊗A2)Tλ− (b1 ⊗ b2)  0
Proof. We use the fact that for a λ such that ATλ − b  0, where b  0, it
holds thatATλ−b+2b = ATλ+b  0, because we consider a convex cone.
The tensor product of two positive semi-definite matrices is positive semi-
definite. We obtain
(AT1 λ1 − b1)⊗ (AT2 λ2 + b2)
= AT1 λ1 ⊗AT2 λ2 − b1 ⊗AT2 λ2 +AT1 λ1 ⊗ b2 − b1 ⊗ b2  0
(AT1 λ1 + b1)⊗ (AT2 λ2 − b2)
= AT1 λ1 ⊗AT2 λ2 + b1 ⊗AT2 λ2 −AT1 λ1 ⊗ b2 − b1 ⊗ b2  0 .
Adding the two inequalities and dividing by two, implies that
AT1 λ1 ⊗AT2 λ2 − b1 ⊗ b2 = (AT1 ⊗AT2 )(λ1 ⊗ λ2)− b1 ⊗ b2  0 ,
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which means that λ1 ⊗ λ2 is feasible for the product problem.
Lemma 4.11. Let λ1 be a dual feasible solution of (4.4) defined by A1, b1, and
c1 (see Lemma 4.10), and similarly for λ2 and A2, b2, and c2. Then λ = λ1⊗λ2
is dual feasible for the program A, b, c where A = A1 ⊗A2 and b = b1 ⊗ b2.
Proof. Note that bi is of the form

0 0 · · · 0
0 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0

 ,
i.e., it has a 1 in the place where the matrix Γ has the entry
〈
Ψ
∣∣Exu†Exu∣∣Ψ〉
for f(x) = i and 0 everywhere else. It, therefore, only has positive entries
on the diagonal and 0 everywhere else. Clearly, bi  0. The claim then
follows by Theorem 4.2.
We can now formulate the product lemma for the guessing probability.
Theorem 4.3 (Product lemma for the guessing probability). Let PX1|U1
be an n-party quantum system and f(X1) a function f : X1 → F such that
Pguess(f(X1)|Z(Wq, Q) ≤ PTX1|U1λ1, where Q = (U1 = u1, F = f). Sim-
ilarly, associate the guessing probability Pguess(g(X2)|Z(Wq, Q) ≤ PTX2|U2λ2
with an m-party quantum system PX2|U2 where Q = (U2 = u2, G = g).
Then the guessing probability of f(X1)‖g(X2) obtained from the (n+m)-party
quantum system PX1X2|U1U2 with Q = (U = u, F = f,G = g) is bounded
by
Pguess(f(X1)‖g(X2)|Z(Wq), Q) ≤ PTX1X2|U1U2 · (λ1 ⊗ λ2) .
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.11.
When the marginal system is of the form PX1|U1 ⊗ PX2|U2 , this implies
that the guessing probability is the product of the guessing probabilities
of the two subsystems. Or, in terms of the min-entropy, that it is additive.
More precisely, the min-entropy of n identical systems
⊗n
i=1 PXi|Ui is n
times the min-entropy of the individual system.
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4.4.3 An XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy
Let us also consider the case where we obtain a partially secure bit from
each of the subsystems. We will show that the XOR of the two partially
secure bits is highly secure.
Lemma 4.12. Let A1, b1, and c1 be the parameters associated with the semi-
definite program (4.8) bounding the distance from uniform of a bit f(X1) ∈
{0, 1} obtained from an n-party quantum system PX1|U1 where Q = (U1 =
u1, F = f). Similarly, associate A2, b2, and c2 with the distance from uniform
of a bit g(X2) ∈ {0, 1} obtained from an m-party quantum system PX2|U2 .
Then then the distance from uniform of the bit f(X1) ⊕ g(X2) obtained from
the (n+m)-party system PX1X2|U1U2 , where Q = (U = u, F = f,G = g) is
bounded by the semi-definite program defined by A, b, and c with A = A1 ⊗A2
and b = b1 ⊗ b2.
Proof. This follows form the fact that any (n+m)-party quantum system
must fulfil Lemma 4.9 and b describing the XOR of two bits can be de-
scribed as the tensor product of the ones associated with each of the two
bits.
This implies that for any dual feasible solution, the tensor product is dual
feasible for the tensor product problem.
Lemma 4.13. Let λ1 be a dual feasible for (4.9) with A1, b1, and c1 associated
with an n-party quantum system and λ2 dual feasible for an m-party quantum
system described by A2, b2, and c2. Then λ = λ1 ⊗ λ2 is dual feasible for the
program A, b, and c where A = A1 ⊗A2 and b = b1 ⊗ b2.
Proof. λ1 ⊗ λ2 fulfils the dual constraints because
[A1 ⊗A2](λ1 ⊗ λ2) = b1 ⊗ b2 .
Furthermore, the tensor product of two positive semi-definite matrices is
again positive semi-definite.
We can now formulate the XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy.
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Theorem 4.4 (XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy). Let PX1|U1 be an n-party
quantum system and f(X1) a bit such that d(f(X1)|Z(Wq), Q) ≤
PT
X1|U1λ1/2 with Q = (U1 = u1, F = f). Similarly, associate
d(g(X2)|Z(Wq), Q) ≤ PTX2|U2λ2/2 with a bit from an m-party quantum sys-
tem PX2|U2 where Q = (U2 = u2, G = g). Then the distance from uniform of
f(X1)⊕ g(X2) obtained from the (n+m)-party quantum system PX1X2|U1U2
with Q = (U = u, F = f,G = g) is bounded by
d(f(X1)⊕ g(X2)|Z(Wq), Q) ≤ 1
2
· PTX1X2|U1U2 · (λ1 ⊗ λ2) .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 4.13.
4.5 Key Distribution from Product Systems
We can now relate the above technical lemmas to the security of quantum
key distribution. In a first step, we will show the security of key distribu-
tion if the marginal distribution as seen by Alice and Bob is the product
of several (identical) independent systems. In the next section, we will
remove the condition of independence, since knowing that we are in per-
mutation invariant scenario, we will be able to relate the security of an
arbitrary distribution to the security of independent distributions.
In the quantum case, most steps on the way to a secure key are already
known. The crucial step is to bound Eve’s guessing probability about
the raw key, which directly relates to Eve’s min-entropy. Once the min-
entropy is bounded, Alice and Bob can do information reconciliation and
privacy amplification to obtain a secure key.
The key-distribution protocol proceeds in three steps:
• Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob obtain a distribution P⊗nXY |UV .
In order to be able to bound Eve’s knowledge about the raw key,
they need to estimate the probability distribution PXY |UV of the in-
dividual systems.
• Information reconciliation: Alice sends some information about her
raw key to Bob, such that he can correct his errors.
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• Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply a public hash function
to their raw keys in order to create a highly secure key.
For a more detailed explanation of these steps, we refer to Chapter 3.
4.5.1 Parameter estimation
A parameter estimation protocol should ǫ-securely filter ‘bad’ input sys-
tems and should be ǫ′-robust on some ‘good’ input systems (see
Section 3.5.1).
In order to estimate the quality of their systems, Alice and Bob fix as para-
meters the probabilities k and p and values Pguess and δ.
Protocol 5 (Parameter estimation).
1. Alice and Bob receive a system PXY |UV = P
⊗n
XY |UV .
2. Alice chooses U such that for each i with probability 1− k, it holds
that Ui = uk, where where uk is the input from which a raw key bit
can be generated, and with probability k she chooses one of the |U|
inputs uniformly at random.
3. Bob chooses V such that Vi = vk with probability 1 − k and with
probability k, Vi is chosen uniformly at random.
4. They input u and v into the system and obtain the outputs x and y.
5. They exchange the inputs over the public authenticated channel.
6. If less than (1− k)2pn inputs were (Ui, Vi) = (uk, vk), they abort.
7. Let t be the number of inputs where both did not chose uk nor vk .
If any combination (u, v) occurred less than k2pn/|U||V| times they
abort.
8. From the inputs where they both chose a uniform input they es-
timate the distribution by P estXY UV (x, y, u, v) = |{i|(xi, yi, ui, vi) =
(x, y, u, v)}|/t. Define P as the set of all PXY UV such that
|U||V|PTXY UV λ ≤ Pguess for some dual feasible λ (see (4.4)) and
P (X 6= Y |U = uk, V = vk) ≤ δ. If d(P estXY UV , PPXY UV ) > η they
abort, otherwise, they accept.
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Definition 4.7. Let P be a set of distributions PXY UV . The set of systems
Pη are all distributions which have distance at least η with the set P , i.e.,
Pη = {PXY UV |d(PXY UV , PPXY UV ) > η for all PPXY UV ∈ P}
Definition 4.8. Let P be a set of distributions PXY UV . The set of systems
P−η are all distributions which have distance at least η with the comple-
ment of the set P , i.e.,
P−η = {PXY UV |d(PXY UV , P P¯XY UV ) > η for all P P¯XY UV /∈ P} .
We further define the set of conditional systems which are η-far or η-close
to a certain set by the closeness of the distributions which can be obtained
from them by choosing the input distribution to be uniform.
Definition 4.9. Let Pcond be a set of systems PPXY |UV . For any system
PXY |UV , consider the distribution PXY UV = PXY |UV /|U||V|. Then a
system PXY |UV is in Pηcond if PXY UV ∈ Pη and PXY |UV is in P−ηcond if
PXY UV ∈ P−η.
The reason to take exactly this definition of Pηcond is that it is useful to
estimate PTXY |UV λ, where P
T
XY |UV is the vector of all probabilities in the
conditional distribution and λ is some vector. This is in fact exactly the
form of the bound on the guessing probability.
Lemma 4.14. Let P = PXY |UV . For all P η¯XY |UV /∈ Pηcond, it holds that
P η¯XY |UV
T · λ− PTXY |UV · λ ≤ PXY |UV T · λ+ |U||V| · η ·
(∑
i
|λi|
)
.
Proof.(
P η¯XY |UV
T − PTXY |UV
)
· λ = |U||V| · P η¯XY UV
T
λ− |U||V| · PXY UV T · λ
= |U||V| · (P ηXY UV T − PXY UV T ) · λ
≤ |U||V| · η ·
(∑
i
|λi|
)
.
We will need the Sampling Lemma (Lemma 2.3, p. 28) to show that our
protocol is secure, i.e., it ǫ-securely filters input states with P˜guess ≥
Pguess + |U||V|η
∑
i |λi| for the individual systems.
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Lemma 4.15. Protocol 5 ǫ-securely filters
(P+ηcond)⊗n with
ǫ = |X ||Y||U||V| · e−
(
t′η2
8|X||Y|
)
,
where t′ = k2pn/|U||V|.
Proof. If for each of the conditional distributions PXY |U=u,V=v the estim-
ate is within η, this also holds for the total distribution PXY UV . By Lem-
ma 2.3, p. 28, the probability that for any conditional distribution the es-
timate is η-far is at most |X ||Y|e−t′η2/8|X ||Y|, where t′ = k2pn/|U||V|. We
obtain the statement by the union bound over all inputs.
Note that ǫ ∈ O(2−n) for any constant 0 < k, p < 1 and η > 0.
Lemma 4.16. Protocol 1 is ǫ′-robust on (P−η)⊗n with
ǫ′ = |X ||Y||U||V| · e−
(
t′η2
8|X||Y|
)
+ e−2n((1−p)(1−k)
2)
2
+ |U||V| · e−2n
(
(1−p)k2
|U||V|
)2
,
where t′ = k2pn/|U||V|.
Proof. This follows by the same argument as Lemma 4.15 and a Chernoff
bound (see Lemma 2.1, p. 27) on the probability that the protocol aborts
because any of the inputs did not occur sufficiently often.
It holds that ǫ′ ∈ O(2−n) for any constant 0 < k, p < 1 and η > 0.
Lemma 4.17. The protocol ǫ-securely filters systems with P˜guess ≥ Pguess + η′
for the individual system, where η′ = |U||V|η∑i |λi|.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.15 and Lemma 4.14 and
the fact that the guessing probability is given by PTXY |UV λ, see (4.4) .
Lemma 4.17 also implies that the protocol filters systems with small min-
entropy, i.e., H˜min(X |Z(Wq)) ≤ − log2 P˜guess.
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Lemma 4.18. The protocol ǫ-securely filters systems with δ˜ ≥ δ + η′ for the
individual systems, where η′ = |U||V|η∑i |λi|.
Proof. This follows from the definition of P+ηcond.
4.5.2 Information reconciliation
Having estimated the probability of error δ of their key bits in the pre-
vious section, Alice and Bob can do information reconciliation by ap-
plying a two-universal hash function3 with output length m bits, where
m = n · h(δ) + κ′ and they can almost surely correct their errors, i.e., the
keys will be equal except with exponentially small probability.
Protocol 6 (Information reconciliation).
1. Alice obtains x and Bob y distributed according to P⊗nXY with X =
Y = {0, 1}. Alice outputs x′ = x.
2. Alice chooses a function f ∈ F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m at random,where
F is a two-universal set of functions.
3. She sends the function f and the value f(x) to Bob.
4. Bob chooses y′ such that dH(y,y′) is minimal among all strings z
with f(z) = f(x) (if there are two possibilities, he chooses one at
random) and outputs y′.
The following theorem by Brassard and Salvail states that information
reconciliation can be achieved this way. We state the theorem with a
slightly stronger bound on the error probability than the one originally
given in [BS93].
3Information reconciliation using a two-universal hash function has the disadvantage
that the decoding procedure (i.e., for Bob to find y′) cannot be done in a computationally
efficient way, in general. It is possible to use a code for information reconciliation instead,
and there exist codes which can be efficiently decoded [Hol06]. However, in our setup the
theoretical efficiency of the decoding procedure is actually not important, since there exist
codes with very good decoding properties in practice and Alice and Bob can test whether
they have correctly decoded using a short hash value of their strings. In case decoding does
not succeed, they can repeat the protocol, resulting in some loss of robustness.
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Theorem 4.5 (Information reconciliation [BS93]). Let x be an n-bit string
and y another n-bit string obtained by sending x over a binary symmetric chan-
nel with error parameter δ. Assume the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is
chosen at random amongst a two-universal set of functions. Choose y′ such
that dH(y,y
′) is minimal among all strings r with f(r) = f(x). Then
Pr[x 6= y′] ≤ e−2κ2·n + 2n·h(δ+κ)−m ,
where h(p) = −p · log2 p− (1 − p) log2(1− p) is the binary entropy function.
Proof. x 6= y′ either if dH(x,y) is large or if f(x) = f(y′). The probability
that the strings x and y differ at more than n(δ+ κ) positions is bounded
by
Pr[dH(x,y)] ≥ n · (δ + κ)] ≤ e−2κ2·n .
The probability that a y′ 6= x with small dH(x,y′) is mapped to the same
value by f is
Pr[f(x) = f(y′), dH(x,y′) ≤ n(δ + κ)] ≤ 2−m ·
n(δ+κ)∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ 2−m2n·h(δ+κ) .
The theorem follows by the union bound.
Lemma 4.19. The protocol is ǫ-correct on input P⊗nXY such that P (X 6= Y ) ≤ δ
where, for any κ > 0,
ǫ = e−2κ
2·n + 2n·h(δ+κ)−m ,
and it is 0-robust on all inputs.
Proof. Correctness follows directly fromTheorem 4.5. Robustness follows
from the fact that there always exists a y′ such that f(y′) = f(x).
For any κ > 0 andm > n · h(δ + κ), this value is ∈ O(2−n).
When some information about the raw key is released — such as, for
example, when Alice and Bob do information reconciliation — the min-
entropy can at most be reduced by the number of bits communicated,
see [Ren05].
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Theorem 4.6 (Chain rule [Ren05]). Let ρXEC be classical on C. Then
Hmin(X |E,C)ρ ≥ Hmin(X |E)ρ −Hmax(C) ≥ Hmin(X |E)ρ −m ,
wherem = log2 |C| is the number of bits of C.
4.5.3 Privacy amplification
It is possible to create a highly secure key from a partially secure string
by applying a two-universal hash function. The distance from uniform of
the final key string is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7 (Privacy amplification [RK05, Ren05]). Let ρXE be classical
onHX and let F be a family of two-universal hash functions from |X | to {0, 1}s.
Then
d(ρF (X)EF |EF ) ≤
√
tr ρXE · 2− 12 (Hmin(ρXE |E) − s) ≤ 2− 12 (Hmin(ρXE |E)−s) .
4.5.4 Key distribution on product inputs
We can now put everything together to obtain a key-distribution scheme.
As discussed in Section 3.5.4, a key-distribution protocol should be secure.
This means that it should output the same key to Alice and Bob (correct-
ness) and that Eve should not know anything about the key (secrecy) (the
exact definitions are given in Definition 3.13, p. 98). Furthermore, the pro-
tocol should output a key when the adversary is passive, i.e., it should be
robust.
Protocol 7 (Key distribution).
1. Alice and Bob receive P⊗nXY |UV
2. They apply parameter estimation using Protocol 5.
3. They do information reconciliation using Protocol 6.
4. Privacy amplification: Alice chooses a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}s
∈ F from a two-universal set and sends f to Bob. Alice outputs
f(x) and Bob f(y′).
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Lemma 4.20. The protocol is ǫ-secret with ǫ ∈ O(2−n) and ǫ′-correct with
ǫ′ ∈ O(2−n) form > n ·h(δ) and s = q ·n < log2 Pguess−m/n. It is ǫ′′-robust
on (P−η)⊗n with ǫ′′ ∈ O(2−n).
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the fact that each step in the protocol
is secure (Lemmas 4.15 and 4.19, and Theorem 4.7), taking into account
Theorem 4.6. Robustness follows from the robustness of the parameter-
estimation protocol, Lemma 4.16.
The secret key rate is the length of the key S that the protocol can output
and still remain secure. We obtain the following.
Lemma 4.21. The scheme reaches a key rate q of
q = − log2 Pguess − h(δ) .
Lemma 4.22. The scheme reaches a positive key rate q whenever
− log2 Pguess − h(δ) > 0 .
4.6 Removing the Requirement of Independence
We have seen that Alice and Bob can do key agreement (i.e., they either
agree on a secret key or abort) if they share i.i.d. distributions. We now
want to remove the requirement of independence.
4.6.1 A special case: the CHSH inequality
First, we consider a special case: the one where Alice and Bob have two
inputs and two outputs. In this case, Alice and Bob can apply a (classical)
map to their inputs and outputs such that the distribution they share af-
terwards actually is i.i.d., more precisely a convex combination of i.i.d.
distributions. The systems obtained this way, furthermore still violate the
CHSH inequality by the same amount.4
4A similar map also exists for the generalization of the CHSH inequality, the Braunstein-
Caves inequalities.
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Assume Alice and Bob share an arbitrary distribution PXY |UV where
X,Y ,U ,V is an n-bit string. They can perform a sequence of local oper-
ations and public communication in order to obtain a system which cor-
responds to the convex combination of n independent unbiased PR boxes
with error ε, i.e., systems, such that Pr[X ⊕ Y = u · v] = 1 − ε for all u, v
and whereX and Y are random bits (see Figure 5.1, p. 144).
The local operations achieving this, are given in [MAG06, MRW+09]. We
restate them here briefly: For each system i, Alice and Bob choose the
local map independently in two steps. First, with probability 1/2, they
do either of the following:
1. nothing
2. both flip their outcome bits, i.e., xi → xi ⊕ 1 and yi → yi ⊕ 1 .
Then, with probability 1/4 each, they do either of the following:
1. nothing
2. xi → xi ⊕ ui and vi → vi ⊕ 1
3. ui → ui ⊕ 1 and yi → yi ⊕ vi
4. ui → ui ⊕ 1, xi → xi ⊕ ui ⊕ 1, vi → vi ⊕ 1 and yi → yi ⊕ vi .
The choice of local operation needs 3 random bits per system which have
to be communicated from Alice to Bob. Since, each of these operations
conserves the ‘probability of error’ εi, a system with the same error para-
meter — but now an unbiased one with the same error for all inputs — is
obtained. When this transformation is applied to each input/output bit
of a distribution PXY |UV taking n bits input and giving n bits output, a
convex combination of products of such systems is obtained.
When using systems based on the CHSHor Braunstein-Caves inequalities
for a key-distribution scheme, we can, therefore, obtain any system as
input, apply the above transformation and, hereby, enforce the situation
in which we already know that the key-distrubtions scheme is secure (as
seen in Section 4.5).
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4.6.2 The general case
In general, we do not know of amap, such as the one given in Section 4.6.1
to transform arbitrary systems into product systems. Nevertheless, we
will be able to relate the security of the key-distribution scheme on any in-
put to the security of the scheme on product inputs PXY |UV = P
⊗n
XY |UV ,
for which we have already seen that it is secure, in Section 4.5. The reason
is that we know that security is ‘permutation invariant’ under the systems
because each step of the protocol— parameter estimation, information re-
conciliation and privacy amplification — is permutation invariant5. The
post-selection theorem allows us to relate security of permutation invari-
ant states to the security of product states.
The post-selection theorem states that any permutation-invariant state
can be obtained from the convex combination of i.i.d. (product) states by
a measurement, and furthermore this measurement ‘works’ sufficiently
often. Therefore, if our key-distribution scheme is secure for product dis-
tributions, it is still ‘almost as secure’ on a permutation invariant one.
Technically, the post-selection technique [CKR09] gives a bound on the
diamond norm between two completely positive trace-preserving maps (i.e.,
quantum channels) acting symmetrically on an n-party system. The dia-
mond norm is directly related to the maximal probability of guessing
whether one or the other map has been applied (on an input of choice),
through the formula p = 1/2 + (1/4)‖E − F‖⋄ (i.e., the distinguishing
advantage is then (1/4)‖E − F‖⋄.) Therefore, it is especially useful in the
context of cryptography, where a real map is compared to an ideal map
— such as one that creates a key that is secure by construction. While
the diamond norm is defined as a maximization over all possible input
states, the post-selection technique states that in the case of permutation
invariant maps it is enough to consider them acting on a de Finetti state,
i.e., a convex combination of product states τHn =
∫
σ⊗nH µ(σH), where µ
is the measure induced by the Hilbert-Schmidt metric. We now restate
the main result of [CKR09].
Theorem 4.8 (Post-selection [CKR09]). Consider a linear map from
End(H⊗n) to End(H′).6 If for any permutation π there exists a completely
5Otherwise permutation-invariance can be enforced by applying a random permutation
on the systems at the start of the protocol.
6Note that, in particular, ∆ can be the difference between two completely positive trace-
preserving maps E and F .
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positive trace-preserving map Kpi such that∆ ◦ π = Kpi ◦∆, then
‖∆‖⋄ ≤ gn,d‖(∆⊗ 1R)τHnR‖1 ,
where 1R denotes the identity map on End(R) and the factor gn,d =
(
n+d2−1
n
)
≤ (n+ 1)d2−1, where d = dimH.
For our purposes, this means roughly
Pr[E(σpi) = insecure] ≤ (n+ 1)(d2−1)
∫
Pr[E(σ⊗n) = insecure]dσ ,
where σpi is a permutation invariant input, and E denotes the event that
the scheme is insecure. The very right-hand side is what we have ana-
lysed in the previous section, and because this is exponentially small,
it remains exponentially small even when multiplied by the polynomial
factor in front of it.
In our case, σ represents the system PXY |UV . We, therefore, need tomodel
PXY |UV by a quantum state (note that this is only a mathematical tool
and does not have any physical meaning). More precisely, we represent
the distribution PXY UV by σ. Since our parameter estimation protocol is
such that it filters the conditional distribution independently of the input
distribution (it aborts if any input does not occur often enough), this is
equivalent to the conditional distribution.
Lemma 4.23. Let PXY UV be a probability distribution. Then there exists a
density matrix σ in a Hilbert space H with dim(H) = |X ||Y||U||V| such that
measuring σ in the standard basis gives the distribution PXY UV .
Proof. Associate with each element of the standard basis {|i〉}i an out-
come x, y, u, v. Take σ =
∑|X ||Y||U||V|
i=1 pi |i〉 〈i| where the weights are pi =
PXY UV (x, y, u, v).
This implies, that we can use d = |X ||Y||U||V| in the above formula de-
scribing the security of our protocol. We can now state, that the key-
distribution protocol is secure on any input (not only product). The pro-
tocol furthermore, reaches essentially the same key rate as in the product
case. Robustness remains, of course, unchanged.
4.7. The Protocol 137
Theorem 4.9. Protocol 7 is ǫ-secure with ǫ ∈ O(2−n) on any input for m >
n · h(δ) and s = q · n < log2 Pguess −m/n. It is ǫ′′-robust on (P−η)⊗n with
ǫ′′ ∈ O(2−n).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 4.20, using Theorem 4.8.
4.7 The Protocol
We can apply the generic security proof of Section 4.5 to a specific pro-
tocol. The implementation of this protocol is similar to [Eke91], i.e., it is
an entanglement-based quantum key-distribution protocol. By the ana-
lysis given in Section 4.5, it is secure in the device-independent scenario.
π/8
π/8
v1
v0
u0, v2
u1
Figure 4.4: Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases in terms of polarization
used in Protocol 8.
Protocol 8.
1. Alice creates nmaximally entangled states |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/√2,
and sends one qubit of every state to Bob.
2. Alice and Bob randomly measure the ith system in either the basis
u0 or u1 (for Alice) or v0, v1 or v2 (Bob); the five bases are shown in
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Figure 4.4. Bob flips his measurement result. They make sure that
measurements on different subsystems commute.
3. The measurement results when both measured u0, v2 form the raw
key.
4. For the remainingmeasurements they announce the results over the
public authenticated channel and estimate the guessing probability
Pguess and δ (see Section 4.5.1). If the parameters are such that key
agreement is possible, they continue; otherwise they abort.
5. They do information reconciliation and privacy amplification as
given in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.
When Alice and Bob use a noisy quantum channel for the above protocol,
they will not obtain a perfect singlet state. Let us assume that they obtain
a mixture of the singlet with weight 1 − ρ and a fully mixed state with
weight ρ. The guessing probability for each individual system is then
given in Figure 4.3 and we give the key rate as function of the parameter
ρ in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: The key rate of Protocol 8 secure against quantum adversaries
in the device-independent scenario as function of the channel noise.
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4.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have shown that secure device-independent quantum
key distribution is possible even against the most general attacks of the
eavesdropper, under the additional requirement that the measurements
of the honest parties on different subsystems must commute. Our secur-
ity analysis does not use any Hilbert space formalism, only convex optim-
ization and works for any type of system.
It is an open question whether the requirement of commuting measure-
ments is necessary. When basing security only on the (weaker) non-sig-
nalling condition, the analysis given in Chapter 5 implies that some ad-
ditional requirement is indeed needed, but this does not imply that the
same is the case against a (weaker) quantum adversary. If this is pos-
sible, it would, of course, be interesting to give a security proof of device-
independent quantum key distribution where both the state and meas-
urements are completely arbitrary.
A further open question is to find other systems which are (partially) se-
cure against quantum adversaries. In particular, it is unknown whether
there exist systems which are partially secure against quantum adversar-
ies but completely insecure against non-signalling adversaries (in the con-
text of key agreement, where we analyse security under public inputs).
Finally, it would be interesting to see how the key rate of our key-distri-
bution scheme behaves in the non-asymptotic scenario, i.e., where only
a finite number of systems are considered and a key of finite length is
created.

Chapter 5
Necessity of the
Non-Signalling Condition
5.1 Introduction
Privacy amplification [BBR88, ILL89, KMR05] is the technique of apply-
ing a function to a partially secure string in order to obtain a (shorter)
highly secure string. It can be used if the adversary holds classical as
well as when she holds quantum information and might suggest, that the
same is true against non-signalling adversaries. In Chapter 3, we have
seen that this is indeed the case if we impose further non-signalling con-
ditions between the different subsystems. Privacy amplification is then
even possible using a deterministic function. In this chapter, wewill show
that such an additional non-signalling condition within Alice’s and Bob’s
laboratories is necessary, in the sense that without it, no privacy amplific-
ation is possible.
We will consider the case where Alice, Bob, and Eve share a system which
is non-signalling between the three of them (but not between the subsys-
tems). The system is such that it outputs a partially secure n-bit string
to Alice and Bob. We then show that, no matter what function Alice and
Bob apply to this string, they cannot obtain a highly secure bit. Put differ-
ently, Eve can attack the final key bit directly (without trying to learn the
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bit string).1
As an example, consider the case where Alice and Bob share n systems,
each taking one bit input and giving one bit output on both sides and such
that the outputs are uniform and fulfil P [X⊕Y = U ·V ] = 1−ε for each in-
put pair (see Figure 5.1). Note that this system can be expressed as a mix-
ture of a systemwith error ε′ (< ε) of weight 1−p = 1−(ε− ε′)/(1/2− 2ε′)
and a completely random bit with weight p = (ε− ε′)/(1/2− 2ε′). It is
now easy to see that the XOR cannot be used as privacy amplification
function in this case because of the following attack [CM09]. Eve sends a
system to Alice and Bob such that the first n−1 bits are just the outputs of
n− 1 independent systems, i.e., they have exactly error ε. The last system
is created by Eve as a probabilistic mixture of the systems as described
above. She first tosses a coin such that ‘heads’ has probability p. In case
the result is ‘heads’, Eve chooses the last bit pair such that it corresponds
to a system with error ε′ and accepts to know nothing about the XOR. If
the result is ‘tails’, she tosses another coin and decides whether the out-
come of the XOR should be 0 or 1. The system then outputs a random bit
on Bob’s side, and on Alice’s side it outputs exactly the bit such that the
XOR of all outputs corresponds to the result of the coin toss. Obviously,
with probability p Eve knows the XOR perfectly and this probability is in-
dependent of the number of systems nAlice and Bob share. Furthermore,
this attack works both in the non-signalling case (in which case ε′ = 0),
as well as in the quantum case (where ε′ ≈ 0.15), and it even works when
signalling is only permitted in the ‘forward’ direction, i.e., when consid-
ering an even stronger restriction than what we will consider now.
The above attack is such that the marginal systems of Alice and Bob are
exactly as expected. Alternatively, Eve could always send a local system
such that she knows the outcome of the XOR with certainty. In that case,
the probability not to get caught is the same as the probability not to get
caught on a single system. In either scenario, the security only depends
on the security of a single system and is independent of the total number
of systems n.
This already shows that the proof techniques we have used in the previ-
ous chapters do not carry over to this case.
1Maybe this is not so surprising, after all, Eve can delay her measurement and choose
an attack depending on the hash function Alice and Bob have chosen. It might be more
surprising that privacy amplification against quantum (or non-signalling) adversaries does
work in certain cases.
5.1. Introduction 143
Chapter outline The security definition and the eavesdroppers possib-
ilities to attack are given in Section 5.2. We then give an intuition why pri-
vacy amplification does not work without an additional non-signalling
assumptions by describing the system as probabilistic mixture of two
systems, one of which is completely local. The maximum weight this
local system can have is the local part and gives a lower bound on the
adversarial knowledge. In Section 5.4, we show that one or two systems
have the same local part and that we can, therefore, not hope to create a
more secret bit by applying a function to the outputs of two systems than
when considering a single system.
We then consider an arbitrary number of systems and give a good joint
attack in Section 5.5.2. In Section 5.6.1, we show that applying the XOR to
a randomly selected subset of systems (i.e., applying a linear function) is
actually counter-productive: The more systems are XORed together, the
better Eve can know the outcome. Finally in Section 5.6.2, we show (again
using the above attack) that even for arbitrary functions there exists a
constant lower bound on the adversary’s knowledge, and this bound is
independent of the number of systems. This implies that there does not
exist any function that can be used to obtain an secure bit, no matter how
many systems are shared by Alice and Bob.
Relatedwork The local part has been introduced in the context of quan-
tum systems in [EPR92] and further studied in [Sca08] and [BGS10]. We
are not aware of anywork considering directly the possibility or impossib-
ility of privacy amplification in this setting. Since a higher violation of the
CHSH inequality (Section 2.6.1, Example 7, p. 52) corresponds to more se-
crecy, the question of privacy amplification is related to the question of
non-locality distillation, i.e., whether several partially non-local systems
can be used to obtain a more non-local one. This question has been invest-
igated and both positive as well as negative answers have been found for
special systems [FWW09, BS09, DW08, Sho09].
Contributions The contributions of this chapter are Lemma 5.5 about
the local part of 2 systems, the attack of a non-signalling adversary
against an arbitrary number of systems (Lemma 5.10) and the resulting
impossibility of privacy amplification in the tripartite non-signalling case,
given in Lemma 5.11 and Theorem 5.2. The results of this chapter have
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previously been published in [FHSW09] and [HRW08].
5.2 Scenario and Security Criteria
We study the scenario where Alice and Bob share several approximations
of PR boxes (see Example 2.9, p. 59); more precisely, n independent and
unbiased PR boxes with error ε, defined below.
Definition 5.1. An unbiased PR box with error ε is a system PXY |UV , where
X = Y = U = V = {0, 1}, and for every pair (u, v), X and Y are uniform
random bits, and
Pr[X ⊕ Y = u · v] = 1− ε
(see also Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: An unbiased PR box with error ε.
The system we consider behaves like n systems, but we only require it to
be non-signalling between Alice and Bob, i.e., two sets of interfaces. This
means that even though the marginal system of Alice and Bob is actually
a 2n-party non-signalling system, we only consider it as a 2-party non-
signalling system which takes an n-bit string as input and gives an n-bit
string as output on each side.
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We define a short notation for the bipartite non-signalling system that
behaves like n unbiased PR boxes with error ε.
Definition 5.2. The system Pn,εXY |UV is a bipartite non-signalling system
with X = Y = U = V = {0, 1}n, such that
Pn,εXY |UV :=
n∏
i=1
PXiYi|UiVi ,
and where PXiYi|UiVi is an unbiased PR box with error ε.
{0, 1}n
{0, 1}n
{0, 1}n
{0, 1}n
⊗
⊗
PRε
PRε
PRε
Figure 5.2: Alice’s and Bob’s system looks like n independent systems.
For an impossibility proof, we can make the assumption that the system
behaves exactly this way (i.e., Alice and Bob do not need to do parameter
estimation) and only consider the distance from uniform of Alice’s key
(i.e., they do not do information reconciliation and Bob does not out-
put anything). Since the distance from uniform of a key string is lower-
bounded by the distance of each bit, it will be enough to consider the case
when Alice’s key consists of a single bit, and to give a specific (explicit)
attack which reaches a high distance from uniform of this bit.
More specifically, we will consider the case where Alice, Bob, and Eve
share a tripartite non-signalling system such that the marginal of Alice
and Bob corresponds to n unbiased PR boxes with error ε (see Defini-
tion 5.2 and Figure 5.2), plus a classical public authenticated channel (see
Figure 5.3). Alice applies a (public) function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} to her
n-bit string to obtain a single bit. Bob outputs nothing. Eve receives the
information sent over the channel Q, where Q = (U = u, V = v, F = f)2
2As in the previous chapters, lower case letters in Qmean that we consider the distance
from uniform given this specific value.
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(we have included the inputs in analogy with the situation in the previ-
ous chapters, although we will see that for the specific attack we will use,
it is not necessary to know the inputs). Eve can then choose an input (pos-
sibly depending on Q) to her interface of the non-signalling system and
obtains an output. The only restriction hereby, is the following condition.
Sreal public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
non-signalling
system
Q
pi pi′
B
Sideal public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
non-signalling
system
Q
pi pi′
PU (b) = 1/|B| = 1/2B
Figure 5.3: Our real system (top). Alice and Bob share a public authentic-
ated channel and a non-signalling system. The key bit is B = f(X). In
the ideal system (bottom), the bit B is a perfectly uniform bit unrelated to
the other parts of the system.
Condition 3. The system PXY Z|UVW is tripartite non-signalling with
marginal PXY |UV = P
n,ε
XY |UV .
The distinguishing advantage between the real and ideal system is the
distance from uniform of B = f(X) given Z(Wn−s) and Q, denoted by
d(B|Z(Wn−s), Q). We recall the definition here, see Definition 3.2, p. 70
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for more details.
d(B|Z(Wn−s), Q) =
1
2
∑
b,q
max
w:n−s
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) ·
∣∣PB|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(b)− PU (b)∣∣ .
The distance from uniform is exactly the advantage Eve has when guess-
ing the bit B and it, therefore, quantifies the knowledge Eve has about
the key bit. Obviously, this quantity depends on the system Alice and
Bob share, Eve’s strategy (the non-signalling partition she uses), and the
information Q sent over the public channel, in particular, the hash func-
tion f that is applied to the output bits.
The quantity that we are interested in — the distance from uniform of B
given Z(Wn−s) and Q — is defined as a maximization over all possible
non-signalling strategies of Eve. We will sometimes also consider the dis-
tance from uniform given a specific adversarial strategy, defined as
d(B|Z(w), Q) = 1
2
∑
b,q
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) ·
∣∣PB|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(b)− PU (b)∣∣ .
(see Definition 3.3, p. 70 for details).
Since we will only consider the case when Alice tries to create a single
secure bit, we can further simplify this expression.
Lemma 5.1. For the case B = f(X) with f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and Q = (U =
u, V = v, F = f)
d(B|Z(w), Q) = 1
2
∑
zw
pzw ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(x,y)
(−1)f(x)P zwXY |UV (x, y, u, v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where {(pzw , P zwXY |UV )}zw are the elements of the non-signalling partition
defined by w.
Proof.
d(B|Z(w), Q) = 1
2
∑
b,z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) ·
∣∣∣∣PB|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(b)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
zw
pzw ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(x,y)
(−1)f(x)P zwXY |UV (x, y, u, v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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d(B|Z(w), Q) = 0 means that the eavesdropper has no knowledge about
the bit B while d(B|Z(w), Q) = 1/2 corresponds to complete knowledge.
We will now show that there exists a strategy w such that this distance
from uniform is high, independent of the number of systems and what
function f is applied to the output bits.
5.3 BestNon-Signalling Partition of a Single Sys-
tem
In this section, we show that the bound on the distance from uniform of
the outputs of a bipartite system with binary inputs and outputs derived
in Lemma 3.5, p. 72 is tight.
Lemma 5.2. Let PXY |UV be a non-signaling system with X = Y = U = V =
{0, 1} and∑x⊕y=u·v PXY |UV (x, y, u, v)/4 = 1 − ε, where ε ≤ 1/4. Then for
Q = (U = u, V = v), there exists a non-signalling partition w such that
d(X |Z(w), Q) = 2ε .
Proof. The proof is given by the non-signalling partition given in Fig-
ure 5.4. To see that Figure 5.4 defines a non-signalling partition, notice
that the parameters a2, a3, b2, b3, c2, c3, d1, d4 (the ones for which x⊕ y 6=
u · v) fully characterize the non-signalling system. By the normalization
(
∑
i ai = 1; and similar for b, c, and d) and the non-signalling condition
(a1 + a2 = b1 + b2, etc.) we can express a1 as
a1 =
1
2
· (1− a2 − a3 + b2 − b3 − c2 + c3 + d1 − d4) .
This shows that the right-hand side and left-hand side of the equation are
indeed equal. Because we assumed 4ε ≤ 1, all weights are positive. To
see that it reaches this distance from uniform, note that with probability
a2 − a3 + b2 − b3 − c2 + c3 + d1 − d4 = 4ε, z is such that P zXY |UV is local
deterministic (i.e., X and Y ) are deterministic functions of U and V ), in
which case knowing U = u and V = v, z gives perfect information about
X . With probability 1 − 4ε, z is such that P zXY |UV is a PR box, in which
case even knowing U = u and V = v,X is a uniform random bit.
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Figure 5.4: The optimal non-signalling partition of a bipartite systemwith
binary inputs and outputs.
In the above non-signalling partition, with probability 4ε, the outcome z
is such that P zXY |UV is local deterministic. We define the local part as the
maximum weight a local system can have in a non-signalling partition.
Definition 5.3. Let PX|U be an n-party non-signalling system. The local
part of PX|U is the maximal p such that
PX|U = p · P localX|U + (1− p) · P n−sX|U
and where P local
X|U is an (n-party) local system and P
n−s
X|U is an (n-party)
non-signalling system.
For any bit obtained from the outputs of a non-signalling system, the local
part is a lower bound on the distance from uniform as seen from a non-
signalling adversary.
Lemma 5.3. Let PX|U be a system with local part p. Then for any function
f : X → {0, 1} such that B = f(X) and Q = (U = u, F = f),
d(B|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≥ 1
2
· p .
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Proof. Any local system can be expressed as a convex combination of local
deterministic systems. A system PX|U with local part p, therefore, has
a non-signalling partition w such that with probability p, z is such that
P z
X|U is local deterministic. For any local deterministic P
z
X|U , the output
X and, therefore, also B = f(X) is a deterministic function of U . There-
fore,
d(B|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≥ d(B|Z(w), Q)
=
1
2
∑
b
∑
zw
pzw ·
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x:f(x)=b
P zw
X|U (x,u)−
1
2
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
zw
pzw ·
∣∣∣∣∑
x
(−1)f(x)P zw
X|U (x,u)
∣∣∣∣
≥ 1
2
∑
zw local
pzw =
1
2
· p .
Lemma 5.4. The local part of a system PXY |UV with X = Y = U = V =
{0, 1} and∑x⊕y=u·v PXY |UV (x, y, u, v)/4 = 1− ε where ε ≤ 1/4 is 4ε.
Proof. That this value can be reached follows from the non-signalling
partition given in Figure 5.4. The optimality of this value follows from
Lemma 5.3 and the bound on the distance fromuniform of the bitX given
in Lemma 3.5, p. 72.
5.4 A Special Case: TwoUnbiased PRBoxeswith
Error ε
In the previous section, we have studied the local part of a bipartite sys-
tem with binary inputs and outputs. In this section, we study the spe-
cial case of two unbiased PR boxes with error ε. We show that the local
part remains the same as for the case of a single unbiased PR box with
error ε. By Lemma 5.3, this implies directly that privacy amplification
of the outputs of two systems is impossible, independently of the func-
tion that is applied. The fact that the local part of several systems can be
significantly higher than what would be expected when the local part of
each individual system is analysed could give an intuition why privacy
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amplification of non-signalling secrecy is impossible also for an arbitrary
number of systems, as we will see in Section 5.5.
Lemma 5.5. The local part of P 2,εXY |UV is 4ε.
Proof. The local part of two unbiased PR boxes with error ε cannot be
larger than 4ε as this would contradict the fact that 4ε is the local part
of a single PR box with error ε. To see that this value can be reached
we provide an explicit non-signalling partition: With probability 4ε− 8ε2,
the system is one of the 64 local deterministic strategies which can be
obtained from the strategy
u1u2 → x1x2 : 00 7→ 00, 01 7→ 00, 10 7→ 00, 11 7→ 01
v1v2 → y1y2 : 00 7→ 00, 01 7→ 00, 10 7→ 10, 11 7→ 00
by depolarization (see Section 4.6.1, p. 133). With probability 8ε2, it is one
of the 64 local deterministic strategies which can be obtained from
u1u2 → x1x2 : 00 7→ 00, 01 7→ 00, 10 7→ 00, 11 7→ 00
v1v2 → y1y2 : 00 7→ 00, 01 7→ 00, 10 7→ 00, 11 7→ 00
by depolarization. With probability 1 − 4ε it is two PR boxes (see also
Figure 5.5).
=(4ε)(1-4ε)· +(4ε)2· +(1-4ε)·⊗
PRε
PRε
Local ⊗
Local
Local
⊗
PR
PR
Figure 5.5: The local part of two systems is as large as the one of a single
system. Some of the local deterministic strategies correspond to inde-
pendent local strategies for each of the two systems, while others are joint
strategies for the two systems.
This has direct consequences for the amount of (non-signalling) secrecy
which can be extracted from the outputs of two unbiased PR boxes with
error ε. In fact, it is not possible to apply a (public) function to the outputs
of two systems such that the resulting bit is more secret than the output
of a single system.
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Lemma 5.6. Assume a system P 2,εXY |UV andQ = (U = u, V = v, F = f) with
f : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}. Then
d(f(X)|Z(Wn−s), Q) ≥ 2ε .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 5.5 and 5.3.
The above result also implies, that by applying a function to the inputs
and outputs of two unbiased PR boxes with error ε, it is not possible to
create an unbiased PR box with error ε′, where ε′ < ε. This fact was
already known, even when not restricting the transformations to the ap-
plication of functions [Sho09].
If the local part is large, we know that the distance from uniform of any
bit we can extract from this system is also large. However, as it has been
shown in [FHSW09], the local part of n unbiased PR boxes with error ε
behaves as O(2⌊n/2⌋). If we want to show that the distance from uniform
of a bit extracted from any number of systems is always high, we, there-
fore, need to give a different attack than the one determined by the local
part.
5.5 Several Systems
5.5.1 The general optimal attack on a bit
What is the best attack a non-signalling adversary can do on a single bit
which is obtained from the outcome of a non-signalling system with pub-
lic inputs? According to Lemma 3.9, p. 77, this corresponds to finding the
non-signalling partition with two outputs z0 and z1 such that for P
z0
XY |UV
the bit B is maximally biased towards 0while for P z1XY |UV it is maximally
biased towards 1. This optimization can be expressed as a linear program-
ming problem.
Lemma 5.7. Let PXY Z|UVW be a tripartite non-signalling system. The distance
from uniform of B = f(X) ∈ {0, 1} given Z(Wn−s) and Q := (U = u, V =
v, F = f) is given by the optimal value of the following optimization problem
(we drop the index of the probability distribution in the notation).
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max :
1
2
·
[
pz0 ·
( ∑
(x,y):B=0
P z0(x, y, u, v)−
∑
(x,y):B=1
P z0(x, y, u, v)
)
+ pz1 ·
( ∑
(x,y):B=1
P z1(x, y, u, v)−
∑
(x,y):B=0
P z1(x, y, u, v)
)]
s. t.
∑
x
P z0(x, y, u, v)−
∑
x
P z0(x, y, u′, v) = 0
∑
x
P z1(x, y, u, v)−
∑
x
P z1(x, y, u′, v) = 0
∑
y
P z0(x, y, u, v)−
∑
y
P z0(x, y, u, v′) = 0
∑
y
P z1(x, y, u, v)−
∑
y
P z1(x, y, u, v′) = 0
pz0 · P z0(x, y, u, v) ≥ 0
pz1 · P z1(x, y, u, v) ≥ 0
pz0 · P z0(x, y, u, v) + pz1 · P z1(x, y, u, v) = P (x, y, u, v)
for all x, y, u, u′, v, v′ .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.9, p. 77 and the definition of a
tripartite non-signalling system.
Note that when expressed in terms of the variables P ′z0(x, y, u, v) = pz0 ·
P z0(x, y, u, v) and P ′z1(x, y, u, v) = pz1 · P z1(x, y, u, v) this is a linear pro-
gram.
5.5.2 A concrete (good) adversarial strategy
We now describe a special non-signalling partition w¯ of the system
Pn,εXY |UV , which gives a large distance from uniform of the key bit B =
f(X). The non-signalling partition is of the form (see also Figure 5.6)
Pn,εXY |UV =
1
2
· P z¯0XY |UV +
1
2
· P z¯1XY |UV .
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It will, therefore, be enough to give P z¯0XY |UV and to show that
(1/2, P z¯0XY |UV ) is an element of a non-signalling partition of P
n,ε
XY |UV .
PXY |UV
B biased to 0
= 12 ·
P z0XY |UV
non-signalling
B biased to 1
+ 12 ·
P z1XY |UV
non-signalling
Figure 5.6: The successful attack in the tripartite non-signalling case is
such that, with probability 1/2, Eve obtains an outcome such that the bit
B is biased to 0.
The probabilities P z¯0(x, y, u, v) are defined in four cases, according to the
values of x and y and the properties of the system PXY |UV . For simplicity,
let us use the following notation:
y<:=
{
y
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (x, y, u, v) <
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (x, y, u, v)
}
,
y>:=
{
y
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (x, y, u, v) >
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (x, y, u, v)
}
,
x0:={x|f(x) = 0} ,
x1:={x|f(x) = 1} .
Definition 5.4. For a given system PXY |UV and function f : X → {0, 1},
the system P z¯0XY |UV is defined as (see Figure 5.7)
P z¯0XY |UV (x, y, u, v) := c(x, y, u, v) · PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) ,
where the factor c(x, y, u, v) is defined as follows.
For all x ∈ x0, y ∈ y<, c(x, y, u, v) := 2 .
For all x ∈ x1, y ∈ y<, c(x, y, u, v) :=
∑
x
(−1)(f(x)+1)P (x, y, u, v)∑
x:f(x)=1
P (x, y, u, v)
.
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For all x ∈ x0, y ∈ y>, c(x, y, u, v) :=
∑
x
P (x, y, u, v)∑
x:f(x)=0
P (x, y, u, v)
.
For all x ∈ x1, y ∈ y>, c(x, y, u, v) := 0 .
Lemma 5.8. For Pn,εXY |UV and any f : X → {0, 1}, P z¯0XY |UV is a non-signalling
system.
Proof.
For all u, v and y ∈ y<:∑
x
P z¯0(x, y, u, v) =
∑
x:f(x)=0
2 · P (x, y, u, v) (5.1)
+
∑
x:f(x)=1
∑
x′
(−1)(f(x′)+1)P (x′, y, u, v)∑
x′:f(x′)=1
P (x′, y, u, v)
· P (x, y, u, v)
= 2
∑
x:f(x)=0
P (x, y, u, v) +
∑
x
(−1)(f(x)+1)P (x, y, u, v)
=
∑
x
P (x, y, u, v) =
1
2n
.
For all u, v and y ∈ y>:∑
x
P z¯0(x, y, u, v) =
∑
x:f(x)=1
0 (5.2)
+
∑
x:f(x)=0
∑
x′
P (x′, y, u, v)∑
x′:f(x′)=0
P (x′, y, u, v)
· P (x, y, u, v)
=
∑
x:f(x)=1
P (x, y, u, v) +
∑
x:f(x)=0
P (x, y, u, v) =
1
2n
.
For the non-signalling condition in the other direction, note that
P (x, y, u, v′) = P (x, y′, u, v) ,
where the ith bit of y′ is defined as y′i := yi ⊕ ui · (v′i − vi). Therefore, for
all x, u, v′:∑
y
P z¯0(x, y, u, v′) =
∑
y′
P z¯0(x, y′, u, v) =
∑
y
P z¯0(x, y, u, v) .
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Figure 5.7: The intuition for the construction of P z0XY |UV from PXY |UV :
For each value of y, move as much probability as possible from values
mapped to 1 to values mapped to 0.
Finally, the normalization follows directly from (5.1) and (5.2):
∑
x,y
P z¯0(x, y, u, v) =
∑
y
(∑
x
P z¯0(x, y, u, v)
)
=
∑
y
1
2n
= 1 .
Lemma 5.9. There exists a non-signalling partition of Pn,εXY |UV with an element
(1/2, P z¯0XY |UV ).
Proof. Lemma 5.8 implies that P z¯0XY |UV is a non-signalling system. The
criterion for an element of a non-signalling partition is given in Lem-
ma 3.8, p. 76, which for the case p = 1/2 translates to the constraint
P z¯0(x, y, u, v) ≤ 2P (x, y, u, v), and which is satisfied due to the definition
of c(x, y, u, v).
Defining the complementary system as P z¯1(x, y, u, v) = 2P (x, y, u, v) −
P z¯1(x, y, u, v), we obtain a non-signalling partition of Pn,εXY |UV , by
Pn,εXY |UV =
1
2
P z¯0(x, y, u, v) +
1
2
P z¯1(x, y, u, v) .
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Definition 5.5. The non-signalling partition w¯ of Pn,εXY |UV is{(
1
2
, P z¯0XY |UV
)
,
(
1
2
, 2 · Pn,εXY |UV − P z¯0XY |UV
)}
z¯
.
We can now calculate the distance from uniform of the bit B = f(X) that
can be reached by this non-signalling partition.
Lemma 5.10. Consider the non-signalling system Pn,εXY |UV . The distance from
uniform of B = f(X) ∈ {0, 1} given Z(w¯) and Q = (U = u, V = v, F = f)
is
d(B|Z(w¯), Q)
= max

12 ·
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(x,y):f(x)=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)−
∑
(x,y):f(x)=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)
∣∣∣∣,
∑
y
min
{ ∑
x:f(x)=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v),
∑
x:f(x)=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)
}
 .
Note that the first term in the maximization corresponds to the bias of the
bit B and the second to the sum over all possible values of y, of the proba-
bility that given this specific value of y, B is mapped to 0 or 1, whichever
one of the two is smaller.
Proof. By Definition 5.4,∑
(x,y):f(x)=0
P z¯0(x, y, u, v)−
∑
(x,y):f(x)=1
P z¯0(x, y, u, v)
=
∑
y
( ∑
x:f(x)=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)−
∑
x:f(x)=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)
)
+ 2
∑
y

min
{ ∑
x:f(x)=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v),
∑
x:f(x)=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)
} .
Assume w.l.o.g. that this quantity is positive, otherwise exchange the role
of z¯0 and z¯1. We use P
z¯1(x, y, u, v) = 2 ·Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)−P z¯1(x, y, u, v) and
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Lemma 5.1 and distinguish two cases:
If B given z¯1 is biased towards 1, then
d(B|Z(w¯), Q)
=
∑
y
min
{ ∑
x:f(x)=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v),
∑
x:f(x)=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)
}
.
If B given z1 is biased towards 0, then
d(B|Z(w¯), Q) = 1
2
∑
(x,y)
(−1)f(x)Pn,ε(x, y, u, v) .
Note that B given z¯1 is biased towards 1 exactly if
∑
y

 ∑
x:f(x)=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)−
∑
x:f(x)=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)
+ 2min
{ ∑
x:f(x)=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v),
∑
x:f(x)=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v)
} > 0 .
This concludes the proof.
5.6 Impossibility of Privacy Amplification
5.6.1 For linear functions
Using the non-signalling partition given in Section 5.5.2, it is now
straightforward to show that privacy amplification by applying a linear
function — taking the XOR of some subset of the output bits — is im-
possible. Moreover, we will show that the more bits we take the XOR
of, the more Eve can know. The non-signalling partition w¯ is such that
the distance from uniform of the key bit given w¯ is always bigger than ε,
where ε is the error of the system. In the limit of large n it is, however,
even larger and Eve can almost perfectly know Alice’s final bit.
Lemma 5.11. For all linear functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the distance from
uniform of the bit B = f(X) given the non-signalling partition w¯ and Q =
(U = u, V = v, F = f) is larger than ε, i.e., d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ ε.
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Figure 5.8: The lower bound on the distance from uniform of
⊕
iXi as
given by (5.3) as a function of the number of systems n and the error ε.
Note that the non-trivial region of ε is below 1/4.
Proof. Any function from n bits to 1 bit which is linear in the input bits
can be expressed as f(X) =
⊕
i∈K Xi. Because all values ofX are output
with the same probability, the probability that B = 0 is the same as the
probability that B = 1. The first term in the maximization (Lemma 5.10)
is, therefore, 0. To determine the distance from uniform of B = f(X)
given the non-signalling partition w¯, we calculate the value of the second
term. For each value of y it holds that
∑
x:⊕ixi=0
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v) =
⌊n2 ⌋∑
i=0
(
n
n− 2i
)(
1
2
− ε
2
)n−2i (ε
2
)2i
∑
x:⊕ixi=1
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v) =
⌊n−12 ⌋∑
i=0
(
n
n− 2i− 1
)(
1
2
− ε
2
)n−2i−1 (ε
2
)2i+1
or with the value of the function flipped. The value of the second expres-
sion is always smaller than the value of the first one, because both values
sum up to 1/2n and the first one is larger than (1− ε)/2n, which is at least
half of the sum for ε ≤ 1/2. Therefore,
d
(⊕
i
Xi
∣∣∣ Z(w¯), Q) =∑
y
⌊n−12 ⌋∑
i=0
(
n
n− 2i− 1
)(
1
2
− ε
2
)n−2i−1 (ε
2
)2i+1
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=
⌊n−12 ⌋∑
i=0
(
n
n− 2i− 1
)
(1− ε)n−2i−1 ε2i+1 , (5.3)
which is larger than ε for all n > 1.
This shows that there exists a constant lower bound on the knowledge
Eve can obtain about the key bit by using this strategy. Furthermore, in
the limit of large n, the distance from uniform of the bit f(X) =
⊕
iXi
tends toward 1/2 and Eve can have almost perfect knowledge about
Alice’s output bit, no matter the original error of the system.
5.6.2 For any hashing
Let us now turn to the case where f can be any function and does not ne-
cessarily need to be linear. We will show that even then, privacy amplific-
ation is not possible. For the proof we will proceed in several steps: First,
we will show that the distance from uniform of the bit f(X) reached by
the non-signalling partition w¯ is independent of the input that Alice and
Bob have given. This will allow us to consider the distance from uniform
only for the case when the input has been the all-zero input, in which
case we can express it in terms of the correlations of the output bit strings.
We will then use a result by Yang [Yan07] on (the impossibility of) non-
interactive correlation distillation, limiting the correlation of bits which
can be obtained from a sequence of weakly correlated bits.
Lemma 5.12. The distance from uniform of the bit f(X) given the non-signal-
ling partition w¯ defined in Section 5.5.2 is independent of the values of u and v,
i.e., d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) = d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q′), where Q = (U = u, V = v, F =
f) and Q′ = (F = f).
Proof. The probability of the output x, y, given input u, v, is the same as
the probability of output x, y′, given the all-zero input, i.e.,
Pn,ε(x, y, u, v) =
(
1
2
− ε
2
)∑
i
1⊕xi⊕yi⊕ui·vi
·
(ε
2
)∑
i
xi⊕yi⊕ui·vi
= Pn,ε(x, y′, 0 . . . 0, 0 . . .0) ,
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where we have defined y′i = yi ⊕ ui · vi. Because the distance from uni-
form given the non-signalling partition w¯ (Lemma 5.10) is obtained by
summing over all values of y it is independent of the values u, v.
Hence, we only have to find a lower bound on the distance from uniform
of d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q′), where we can assume that the input was the all-zero
input. Note that the output probabilities given the all-zero input take a
particularly simple form, more precisely,
Pn,εXY |UV (x, y, 0 . . . 0, 0 . . . 0) =
(
1
2
− ε
2
)n−dH(x,y)
·
(ε
2
)dH(x,y)
,
where dH(x, y) denotes the Hamming distance between the bit strings x
and y, i.e., the number of positions where the strings differ.
We will now show that the distance from uniform reached by the non-
signalling partition w¯ is related to the correlation of two bits which can be
obtained from the outputs. First, we need to introduce some definitions.
Definition 5.6. The correlation cXY between two random bits X and Y is
the probability for the two bits to be equal, minus the probability for the
two bits to be different, i.e.,
cXY = P (X = Y )− P (X 6= Y ) .
Two equal random bits have correlation 1 and are called completely correl-
ated, two random bits which are always different have correlation−1 and
are called completely anti-correlated.
Let us further consider the following scenario: Alice has a random n-bit-
string X to which she applies a public function f in order to obtain a
single bit: f : X → {0, 1}. Bob has a random n-bit-string Y . Each bit of
Y is correlated with each bit of X and Bob would like to calculate a bit
g(Y ) that is highly correlated with f(X). The best achievable correlation
is coptg(Y )f(X) = 2Ey[max(P (f(X) = 0|g(y)), P (f(X) = 1|g(y)))]− 1, and it
is reached by choosing g(Y ) to be 0 (or 1) if f(X) is more likely to be 0 (1)
given the value of Y .
Definition 5.7. Assume a random variable X , which is mapped to a bit
f(X) ∈ {0, 1}, and a random variable Y with a joint distribution PXY .
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The maximum-likelihood function g of f(X) given Y is the function g : Y →
{0, 1} such that
g(y) =
{
0 if Pr[f(X) = 0|Y = y) ≥ P (f(X) = 1|Y = y]
1 if Pr[f(X) = 0|Y = y) < P (f(X) = 1|Y = y] .
Using these definitions, we can show the key statement for the derivation
of our result: The amount of information Eve can gain about the key bit
is proportional to the error in correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s bits.
Lemma 5.13. The distance from uniform of f(X) given the non-signalling par-
tition w¯ andQ = (F = f) is at least (1−cf(X)g(Y ))/2, where g is the maximum-
likelihood function of f(X) given Y , i.e.,
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ 1
2
− 1
2
· cf(X)g(Y ) .
Proof.
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ 1
2n
∑
y
min
{ ∑
x:f(x)=0
(1− ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y),
∑
x:f(x)=1
(1 − ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y)
}
= 1− 1
2n
∑
y
max
{ ∑
x:f(x)=0
(1− ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y),
∑
x:f(x)=1
(1 − ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y)
}
= 1− E
y
[max(P (f(X) = 0|Y = y), P (f(X) = 1|Y = y))] .
The last line is exactly equal to 1/2−cf(X)g(Y )/2, where g is the maximum-
likelihood function of f(X) given Y .
This means that unless Bob is able to create a bit which is highly correl-
ated with Alice’s output bit, the adversary can always obtain significant
information about the key bit. However, we will see now that the only
way to obtain highly correlated bits is to apply a biased function.
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The following theorem, proven by Yang [Yan07], shows the trade-off be-
tween randomness and correlation of two random bits.
Theorem 5.1 (Non-interactive correlation distillation [Yan07]). Let X and
Y be strings of n uniformly random bits with correlation 1 − 2ε. Then the
maximal correlation that can be reached by locally applying a function f (and g,
respectively) to the n bits is 1−2ε(1−4δ2), where δ := max(d(f(X)), d(g(Y ))).
Lemma 5.13 implies that if δ is small, then Eve’s knowledge is high. We
now need to see whether we can lower-bound Eve’s knowledge for the
case of large δ. For δ to be large, either d(f(X)) or d(g(Y )) needs to be
large. We first show that if d(f(X)) is large, then so is Eve’s knowledge
about the bit f(X).
Lemma 5.14. The distance from uniform of f(X) given the non-signalling par-
tition w¯ and Q = (F = f) is at least d(f(X)), i.e.,
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ d(f(X)) .
Proof.
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ 1
2
· |P (f(X) = 0|0 . . . 0)− P (f(X) = 1|0 . . . 0)|
= d(f(X)) .
Wehave shown that Eve’s knowledge about the key bit is high if either the
output bits are not very correlated or one of the bits is biased. It remains
to exclude the case that δ is large because d(f(X)) is small and d(g(Y )) is
large. However, when the difference between these two values is large,
the correlation between the two bits cannot be high.
Lemma 5.15.
cf(X)g(Y ) ≥ 1− 2 |d(g(Y ))− d(f(X))| .
Proof.
cf(X)g(Y ) = 2 · Pr [f(X) = g(Y )]− 1
≤ 2 · (1− |d(g(Y ))− d(f(X))|)− 1
= 1− 2 · |d(g(Y ))− d(f(X))| .
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By Lemma 5.13, this implies directly that when the difference between the
two distances from uniform is large, then the correlation is low and, there-
fore, the distance from uniform of the key bit is large. We can connect the
distance from uniform of the bit f(X)with the value δ.
Lemma 5.16. The distance from uniform of f(X) given the non-signalling par-
tition w¯ and Q = (F = f) is at least δ/2, i.e.,
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ 1
2
· δ ,
where δ := max(d(f(X)), d(g(Y )) and g is the maximum-likelihood function
of f(X) given Y .
Proof. Lemmas 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 imply that
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ max {d(f(X)), |d(g(Y ))− d(f(X))|}
≥ 1
2
·max {d(f(X)), d(g(Y ))}
≥ 1
2
· δ
Now we can put Lemmas 5.13 to 5.16 and Theorem 5.1 together to obtain
a general lower bound on the adversary’s knowledge.
Theorem 5.2. The distance from uniform of f(X) given the non-signalling
partition w¯ and Q = (F = f), is at least (−1 +√1 + 64ε2)/(32ε), i.e.,
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ −1 +
√
1 + 64ε2
32ε
.
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, it holds that 1/2 − cf(X),g(Y )/2 ≥ ε(1 − 4δ2). To-
gether with Lemmas 5.13 and 5.16, this implies that
d(f(X)|Z(w¯), Q) ≥ max
{
ε(1− 4δ2), 1
2
· δ
}
≥ −1 +
√
1 + 64ε2
32ε
.
Note that for small ε, this lower bound actually takes a value close to 2ε;
while for ε close to 1/4, it is still larger than ε/2. We obtain a constant
lower bound (see Fig. 5.9) depending only on the error ε of the individual
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Figure 5.9: The lower bound on the distance from uniform of the final bit
as function of the error of the systems ε.
systems and independent of the number of systems n. This implies that
the distance from uniform can never become negligible in the number n,
as it should be the case for privacy amplification.
The above argument further implies that by applying a function to the
inputs and outputs of any number of unbiased PR boxes with error ε, it
is not possible to create an unbiased PR box with error ε′ < ε/4.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that when a non-signalling condition holds only between
Alice, Bob, and Eve, privacy amplification is, in general, not possible
against non-signalling adversaries. Some sort of additional non-signal-
ling condition is, therefore, necessary.
We have also argued that the XOR is not a good privacy amplification
even if non-signalling is restricted to one direction and in the quantum
case. It remains an open question, whether a different function could be
used in these cases.
The question might arise, whether instead of using a fixed function f , it
might be useful to choose a random function, i.e., a function chosen from
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a certain set of functions. For the impossibility result in this chapter, this
would, however, not help. In fact, a non-signalling adversary always has
all the possibilities to attack a distribution of a certain marginal. In the
above argument, it is, therefore, not important what set the function f
was chosen from, because the eavesdropper can delay the choice of her
input until the function becomes public. In the quantum case, it is an
open question, whether functions chosen at random from a certain set
are strictly stronger than fixed functions.
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